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Abstract 
The thesis contains four essays on 'Inequality, Rural Development and Food Policy 
in Vietnam' . Re-examining the sources of ethnic inequality, the first essay uses 
instrumental variable approaches to provide consistent estimators of explanatory 
variables at household and commune levels for ethnic differences in household ex-
penditure per person. Four key conclusions are drawn. First , removing language 
barriers significantly reduces ethnic inequality, especially through enhancing the 
gains earned by minorities from education. Second, variations in returns to edu-
cation favour the majority in mixed communes, suggesting that special needs of 
minority students have not been adequately addressed, or that there exists unequal 
treatment in the labour market. Third, with the exception of hard-surfaced roads , 
there is little difference in the benefits drawn from enhanced infrastructure at the 
commune level across ethnic groups. Finally, contrary to established views, we 
find that as much as 49 to 66 percent of the ethnic gap is attributed to differences 
in endowments, not to differences in the returns to endowments. 
The second essay analyses the properties of the fixed-effects vector decomposition 
estimator, an emerging and popular technique for estimating time-invariant vari-
ables in panel data models with group effects. The formal analysis finds: (1) This 
decomposition is equivalent to a standard instrumental variables approach, for a 
specific set of instruments. (2) The estimator reproduces classical fixed-effects es-
timates for time-varying variables exactly. (3) The standard errors recommended 
for this estimator are too small for both time-varying and time-invariant variables. 
( 4) The estimator is inconsistent when the time-invariant variables are endogenous. 
(5) The reported sampling properties in the original Monte Carlo evidence do not 
account for the presence of group effects. (6) The decomposition estimator has a 
higher risk than existing shrinkage approaches , unless the endogeneity problem is 
known to be small or no relevant instruments exist . 
The third essay examines the effects of extensive land and market reform in Viet-
nam on rice output and incomes, principally illustrated with measures of total 
factor productivity, net incomes and net returns in rice production from 1985-
2006. Results also show considerable gains in major rice growing areas , but recent 
evidence of a productivity 'slow down' . The differences over time and region speak 
to existing land use practice, calling for further reform. Stochastic frontier estima-
tions detail the effects of remaining institutional and policy constraints, including 
V 
existing restrictions on land use, ambiguous property rights, and inadequate mar-
kets for land and access to extension services and credit. 
The fourth essay analyses Vietnam's rice export policy and recent export ban in the 
context of rising food prices, drawing on insights from a regionally-disaggregated 
or 'bottom-up' CGE model and a micro-simulation using household data. Three 
main conclusions are drawn. First, although there is little impact on GDP, there 
are substantial distributional impacts across regions and households from different 
export policies and market conditions. Second, both rural and urban households, 
including poor households, benefit from free trade, even though domestic rice 
prices are higher. Finally, under free trade, relatively large gains accrue to rural 
households, where poverty is most pervasive. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Vietnam's performance over the last three or four decades has been regarded as one 
of the most successful stories in economic development of the last century. Since 
1986, when Vietnam made its landmark commitment, under Doi Moi, to transform 
the economy from a centrally-planned model into a market-based economy with 
a socialist orientation, it has achieved remarkable progress in economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 2008 , for 
example, was more than three times larger in comparison with that at the outset 
of Doi Moi (General Statistic Office, 2000, 2009) , and between 1993, when the first 
household expenditure survey was conducted, and 2008, the poverty rate among 
the population as a whole fell sharply from 58 to 14.5 percent (Vietnam Academy 
of Social Sciences, 2011), lifting more than 30 million people out of poverty. 
Much of the remarkable and ongoing progress in reducing rural poverty, in par-
ticular, has been achieved largely through a series of extensive market and land 
reforms in agriculture and rural institutions. The land and market reforms in 
agriculture were pervasive, moving the system of rice production from commune-
based public ownership and control to one with effective private property rights 
over land and farm assets, competitive domestic markets and individual decision 
making over a wide range of agricultural activities. The substantial incentive ef-
fects created by these policy measures, inducing farmers to work harder and use 
land more efficiently, have been estimated to be as much as fifty percent of the 
increase in total factor productivity (TFP) during the peak of the reform period 
1 
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(Che et al., 2006). Overall, given these reforms, Vietna1n has gone from being 
a large importer of rice in 1976-80, to now the second largest exporter of rice in 
the world, with considerable increases in farm profitability and rural incomes, and 
decreases in rural poverty rates by over forty percent from 1993 to 2004 alone 
(Hansen and Nguyen, 2007). 
However, much still remains to be done to increase living standards in rural areas 
and enhance general rural development. Like many reform processes, the early 
rapid gains in economic activity have dissipated over time, with the suggestion 
now of a TFP 'slow down' in rice production in many areas in Vietnam. In 
addition, many of the poor still farm small areas of land, constrained in use, often 
with fragmented or non-contiguous plots, and with little or no human and physical 
capital accumulation or access to agricultural extension services and farm credit. 
Much of this is due to remnants from past institutional arrangements, but also 
to continued constraints in land use, credit availability and the provision of rural 
services, all calling for further or renewed land policy and market reform. 
Along with dramatically changing institutions and economic conditions, with Doi 
M oi, as well as international and regional integration, inequality has also increased 
in Vietnam, although at a comparatively modest rate by international standards. 
Gaps in income, especially between rural and urban areas, are increasing while 
remaining poverty is characterised by strong spatial or regional dimensions. For 
example, in 2008, the poverty rate in the South East of Vietnam was 3.5 percent 
while in the North West it was 45.7 percent. At the same time, household per 
capita expenditure and income of an average urban household is almost double 
those of counterparts in rural areas. This fact , together with disparities in other 
socio-economic aspects, has motivated many people to migrate from rural to urban 
areas in spite of constraints on movement and other administrative barriers. This 
1nigration can only be slowed by added and significant economic development in 
rural areas. 
Further reductions in rural poverty in the years to come will likely still depend on 
policies in the rice sector. While contributing less than 20 percent to GDP, this 
sector is of particular political , social and economic importance, and for good rea-
son. Vietnam is the world's second largest rice exporter, with exports of six million 
tons , equivalent to about 16 percent of the world trade volume in rice (Shigetomi 
et al., 2011). While export revenues represent only roughly three percent of Viet-
nam's GDP (World Bank, 2009c) , production and sales in this sector have a broad 
.. 
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distributional impact since as much as 66 percent of rural households and 77 per-
cent of the poorest quintile in Vietnam are rice producers ( General Statistic Office, 
2006a). Rice is also the dominant staple food of the Vietnamese, and accounts 
for about 33 percent of the household expenditure among the poorest quintile 
households ( General Statistic Office, 2006a). 
Given the importance of rice, the Government of Vietnam has maintained strict 
control over rice exports since 1992, three years after Vietnam began exporting 
rice. To do so, the Government sets annual rice export targets, which can be 
adjusted throughout the year, subject to changes in domestic supply and demand. 
The Government, at its discretion, can also suspend rice exports whenever it is 
deemed necessary. This control is further underpinned by the near 'monopoly 
power' possessed by state-owned enterprises (SO Es) in the domestic rice export 
market, as well as their heavy involvement in rice export policy formulation and 
management. SOEs also dominate north-south trade in the domestic market , 
especially under the national food security framework, in spite of representing 
only 25-30 percent of the total domestic rice market. Given SOE control, generally 
partitioned by north and south, Vietnam's domestic rice supplies are characterised 
by a lack of integration between markets across the north and the south of the 
country (Minot and Goletti, 1998; Baulch et al., 2008; Luu, 2003). 
Vietnam's international integration, especially the accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in early 2007, has brought many opportunities as well as 
challenges for the rural Vietnamese. One of the key risks that farmers face is price 
uncertainty in world prices for commodities. At times, the fluctuations in world 
commodity prices can be dramatic, resulting in large swings in farm and household 
income. For example, world food prices reached their peak in the second quarter 
of 2008, with wheat and maize three times and rice five times more expensive than 
at the beginning of 2003 (Von Braun, 2008) . In the face of rising world prices for 
rice, and given its importance in Vietnam, the government imposed an export ban 
from March 25 to the end of June. By the time the · ban was lifted, the world 
price for rice had begun trending downward. This downward trend, coupled with 
a domestic excess supply, dramatically pushed rice farmers ' profits down in what 
would have otherwise been a 'golden year' for rice production and profitability. 
The rice export ban by the government reveals shortcomings in existing gover-
nance and institutions. While the objective of ensuring domestic food security 
and controlling inflation was appealing, poor price forecasts , lack of transparency 
Chapter 1. Introduction 4 
and market distortions generated considerable uncertainty and less than optimal 
behaviour, preventing rural households, many of them poor, from making full use 
of international integration. 
In terms of the progress toward poverty reduction in Vietnam, challenges especially 
remain for ethnic minorities. Although positive developments are broadly visible 
across different segments of the population, the gains from growth have not been 
shared proportionately among different groups of people. For example, while the 
poverty rate of the Kinh and Chinese fell from 54 percent in 1993 to 9 percent in 
2008, for other ethnic minorities as a whole, it decreased more modestly, from 86 
to 50 percent over the same period of time. The proportion of ethnic minorities 
among poor households has also increased sharply from 17. 7 percent in 1993 to 40. 7 
percent in 2008, despite representing only 14 percent of the country's population 
(Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, 2011). Together, ethnic minorities account 
for more than 60 percent of those classified as 'hungry' in Vietnam. 
The Government of Vietnam has a number of policies and programs in place to help 
the minority group. These policies and programs are based on two approaches, 
those that target communes and those that target households. As an example of 
the former, Program 135 largely finances local infrastructure improvement ( e.g. , 
the provision of roads, power and water) in so-called "extremely difficult" com-
munes in ethnic minority and mountainous areas. For the latter, the Hunger 
Eradication and Poverty Reduction Program, targets poor households (largely the 
minority), by providing access to credit, exemption from education fees, and sup-
port for health care, among other benefits. In spite of these policies and programs, 
progress in raising the living standards of the minority has been much slower than 
that for the majority. 
Inclusive development is at root of social and political stability, which the Com-
munist Party of Vietnam has vowed to protect. Therefore, inclusive development 
must remain at the heart of Vietnam's development strategies . Looking forward , 
whether or not this objective is realised, may well depend on Vietnam's perfor-
mance in rural development and poverty reduction among ethnic minorities in the 
years to come. 
.. 
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1.2 Outline of the Thesis and Key Results 
Against the background, this thesis focuses on two broad issues, (a) ethnic in-
equality and (b) rural development and food policy with a particular interest in 
the rice production and export sectors. These two broad issues are discussed in 
four stand-alone essays in applied economics and microeconometrics. 
The first essay examines what drives the gap in the living standard between the 
Kinh and Chinese ( defined as the 'majority' in this thesis) and other ethnic mi-
norities as a whole ( defined as the 'minority'), measured by differences in house-
hold expenditures per person. In particular, we investigate the role of language 
barriers and how they may hinder minority households from taking advantage of 
their acquired skills and attributes; whether commune infrastructure, a key instru-
ment used by the Vietnamese Government to narrow the ethnic gap, works for or 
against the minority; and to what extent preferential treatment and differences 
in endowments, as opposed to returns to endowments, explain the ethnic gap in 
expenditures. 
Using data from a household survey in Vietnam in 2006 (VHLSS 2006), we draw 
four key conclusions. First , removing language barriers would significantly re-
duce inequality among ethnic groups, narrowing the ethnic gap, and especially so 
- through enhancing the gains earned by minorities from education. Second, varia-
tions in returns to education exist in favour of the majority in mixed communes, 
suggesting that either the special needs of minority children have not been ad-
equately addressed in the classroom, or that there exists unequal or preferential 
treatment in the labour market. Third, in contrast to recent literature, there is lit-
tle difference between ethnic groups in terms of the benefits drawn from enhanced 
infrastructure, such as power and clean water, at the commune level. An excep-
tion is the returns to paved or hard-surfaced roads, which differentially benefits 
the minority group. Finally, contrary to established views, we find that as much 
as 49 to 66 percent of the ethnic gap is attributed to differences in endowments, 
and not to differences in the returns to endowments. 
The second essay analyses the properties of a recently introduced methodology for 
panel data, known as fixed-effects vector decomposition or FEVD, which Plumper 
and Troeger (2007a) developed to produce improved estimates for such time-
invariant or slowly-changing variables. I came across this methodology in a search 
for an approach which could provide consistent estimators of explanatory variables 
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at household and commune levels for ethnic differences in household expenditure 
per person in the first essay of this thesis. As households in VHLSS 2006 are sam-
pled by communes, they share common commune-level effects, thereby forming a 
panel-like data structure. 
Researchers in many fields seek to exploit the advantages of such panel data. Hav-
ing repeated observations across time for each group in a panel allows one, under 
suitable assumptions, to control for unobserved heterogeneity across the groups 
which might otherwise bias the estimates. Mundlak (1978) demonstrated that a 
generalized least squares approach to unobserved group effects, which treats them 
as random and potentially correlated with the regressor, gives rise to the tradi-
tional fixed-effects (FE) estimator. However, FE is a blunt instrument for con-
trolling for correlation between observed and unobserved characteristics because it 
ignores any systematic average differences between groups. Thus any potential ex-
planatory factors that are constant longitudinally (time-invariant) will be ignored 
by the FE estimator. Likewise, any explanatory variables that have little within 
variation (that is, slowly-changing over the longitudinal dimension) will have lit-
tle explanatory power, and will result in imprecise coefficient estimates that have 
large standard errors. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) had previously shown that a better estimator than FE 
is available if some of the explanatory variables are known to be uncorrelated with 
the unobserved group effect , thus described as exogenous explanatory variables. 
The Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator is an instrumental variables (IV) procedure 
that combines aspects of both fixed-effects and random-effects estimation. Given a 
sufficient number of exogenous regressors, the HT procedure allows time-invariant 
variables to be kept in the model. It also provides more efficient estimates than 
FE for the coefficients of the exogenous time-varying variables. The downside of 
the HT estimator resides in specifying the exogeneity status for each of the time-
varying and time-invariant variables in the model. In many practical applications 
such detailed specification is onerous. 
Plumper and Troeger introduced FEVD as an alternative that seemed to be supe-
rior to HT because it requires fewer explicit assumptions yet seemed to always have 
more desirable sampling properties. Plumper ~and Troeger motivated the FEVD 
procedure on heuristic grounds, and advocated it on the strength of favorable re-
sults in a Monte Carlo simulation study. In particular, the simulation indicated 
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that FEVD has superior sampling properties for time-invariant explanatory vari-
ables. 
This second essay, in this sense, is a remedy to the lack of formal analysis. There 
are six main results. First, the FEVD is equivalent to a standard instrumental 
variables approach, for a specific set of instruments. In this sense, it provides 
nothing that is new or different to estimation techniques in this area. Second, the 
estimator reproduces classical fixed-effects estimates for time-varying variables ex-
actly. Third, the standard errors recommended for this estimator are too small 
for both time-varying and time-invariant variables. Fourth, the estimator is in-
consistent when the time-invariant variables are endogenous. Fifth, the reported 
sampling properties in the original Monte Carlo evidence do not account for the 
presence of group effects. Finally, the decomposition estimator has a higher risk 
than existing shrinkage approaches, unless the endogeneity problem is known to 
be small or no relevant instruments exist. 
The third essay focuses on productivity, net returns and efficiency in Vietnamese 
rice production. This essay has two basic tasks. First, it assembles a data set from 
1985 to 2006 to measure the changes in total factor productivity (TFP), terms of 
-trade, net ·incomes and net returns in Vietnamese rice production, both in the 
principal rice growing areas and throughout the country. The results track the 
effects of the major land and market reform process and determine key differences 
in TFP and net returns over time and by region. All of this speaks directly to 
existing land use practices and is suggestive of needed policy response. The second 
task is to isolate the remaining institutional constraints and policy challenges that 
may be limiting increases in productivity and efficiency. For this purpose, two 
stochastic production frontier and inefficiency models, drawn from two different 
farm survey data sets, are estimated to determine the potential effects of ongoing 
issues over land use and sale, the provision of credit, land fragmentation , less than 
secure property rights and the lack of rural education and support services. 
The work finds that extensive land and market reform in Vietnam has resulted in 
dramatic increases in rice output and incomes. This is illustrated with measures 
of TFP, net incomes and net returns in rice production from 1985-2006. Results 
show considerable gains in major rice growing areas, but recent evidence of a 
productivity 'slow down' . The differences over time and region speak to existing 
land use practice, calling for further reform. Estimations detail the effects of 
remaining institutional and policy constraints, including existing restrictions on 
.. 
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land use, ambiguous property rights, and inadequate markets for land and access 
to extension services and credit. 
In the forth essay, Vietnam's rice export policy is analysed in the context of rising 
world rice prices. In particular, the essay investigates both national and sub-
national ( or regional) impacts as well as distributional implications of different 
policy scenarios. To do so, insights from a regionally-disaggregated or 'bottom-
up' computable general equilibrium (CGE) and a micro- simulation on household 
data are brought together . At the economy-wide level, the bottom-up CGE 
model is a combination of eight interacting CGE models, representing eight regions 
in Vietnam. To this end, it allows both national and subnational equilibrium 
assessments of an international rice price change to GDP, domestic prices and 
employment under different policy scenarios. Subnational changes in domestic 
producer and consumer prices of both food and non-food as well as factor prices 
generated from the bottom-up CGE are then inputed into household data for 
further disaggregated analysis of different policy options at the household level. 
Three policy scenarios are considered in this essay. The first is when Vietnam 
1naintains the status-quo with a rice export control, designed to mimic the imposed 
export ban ·in 2008, and the prevailing and market-segmenting powers of the SO Es 
in domestic rice markets. In the second scenario, Vietnam still controls rice export 
quantities, but liberalises the rice export market domestically - a WTO accession 
commitment Vietnam has promised to deliver since 2011. In the last scenario,we 
assume that Vietnam has a completely free rice export policy, with no export 
controls or bans, and a competitive domestic rice market. 
Three main conclusions are drawn. First , although there is little impact on GDP, 
there are substantial distributional impacts across regions and households from 
different export policies and market conditions. Second, both rural and urban 
households, including poor households , benefit from free trade, even though do-
mestic rice prices are higher. For many, this is a surprising result until it is recog-
nised that many households produce rice in Vietnam, and wages often correlate 
with the price of rice. Finally, under free tra~e, relatively large gains accrue to 
rural households, where poverty is most pervasive in Vietnam . 
Chapter 2 
Language, Mixed Communes and 
Infrastructure: Sources of 
Inequality and Ethnic Minorities 
in Vietnam 
2.1 Introduction 
Inequality in wealth and income is often the source of tension between large dis-
enfranchised groups of relatively poor minorities and the majority population. 
Failure to address this inequality may lead to ethnic conflict , resulting in poor 
economic performance and political instability (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Al-
though ethnic inequality is not a characteristic of transitional economies alone, 
such concerns tend to predominate in these countries due to high but unequally 
shared growth in incomes, substantial differences in initial endowments and dra-
matically changing institutions and economic conditions that often quickly leave 
the poor behind. 
Vietnam offers a useful case study in this regard. In the transition to a market-
based economy, Vietnam has experienced remarkable success in economic growth 
and poverty reduction. GDP per capita in 2008 was three times larger than that 
in 1986, when Vietnam first made a landmark commitment to economic reform 
9 
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(General Statistic Office, 2000, 2009). Between 1993, when the first household ex-
penditure survey was conducted, and 2006, the poverty rate among the population 
as a whole fell from 58 to 16 percent. 
Nonetheless, the gains from growth have not been shared proportionately among 
different groups of people. For example, while the poverty rate of the Kinh and 
Chinese ( defined as the 'majority' in this paper) fell from 54 percent in 1993 to 10 
percent in 2006, for other ethnic minorities as a whole ( defined as the 'minority '), 
it decreased more modestly, from 86 to 52 percent over the same period of time 
(World Bank, 2007). Moreover, in 2006, the minority group accounted for 44 
percent of the poor and 59 percent of those classified as 'hungry' in Vietnam, 
despite representing only 14 percent of the country's population (World Bank, 
2007). The gap in expenditure between the two groups has also widened over time 
(Baulch et al., 2012, 2010). 
The Government of Vietnam has a number of policies and programs in place to help 
the minority group. These policies and programs are based on two approaches, 
those that target communes and those that target households. As an example of 
the former, Program 135 largely finances local infrastructure improvement (e.g., 
the provision of roads, power and water) in so-called "extremely difficult" com-
munes in ethnic minority and mountainous areas. For the latter, the Hunger 
Eradication and Poverty Reduction Program, targets poor households (largely the 
minority), by providing access to credit, exemption from education fees, and sup-
port for health care, among other benefits. In spite of these policies and programs, 
progress in raising the living standard of the minority has been much slower than 
that for the majority. 
This paper examines what drives the gap in the living standard between the ma-
jority and minority groups, measured by differences in household expenditures per 
person. In particular, we investigate the role of language barriers1 and how they 
may hinder minority households from taking advantage of their acquired skills 
and attributes; whether commune infrastructure, a key instrument used by the 
Vietnamese Government to narrow the ethnic gap, works for or against the mi-
nority; and to what extent preferential treatment and differences in endowments, 
as opposed to returns to endowments, explain the ethnic gap in expenditures. 
1The language barrier here refers to the inability to speak Vietnamese. According to Ethno-
logue (as quoted in World Bank (2009a)), Vietnam encompasses seven major language families 
but 102 distinct languages. Vietnamese, the language of the Kinh, is the majority and official 
language. 
Chapter 2. Sources of Inequality and Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam 11 
Using data from a household survey in Vietnam in 2006, we draw .four key con-
clusions. First, removing language barriers would significantly reduce inequality 
among ethnic groups, narrowing the ethnic gap, and especially so through enhanc-
ing the gains earned by minorities from education. Second, variations in returns 
to education exist in favour of the majority in mixed communes, suggesting that 
either the special needs of minority children have not been adequately addressed in 
the classroom, or that there exists unequal or preferential treatment in the labour 
market. Third, in contrast to recent literature, there is little difference between 
ethnic groups in terms of the benefits drawn from enhanced infrastructure, such 
as power and clean water , at the commune level. An exception is the returns 
to paved or hard-surfaced roads, which differentially benefits the minority group. 
Finally, contrary to established views, we find that as much as 49 to 66 percent of 
the ethnic gap is attributed to differences in endowments, and not to differences 
in the returns to endowments. 
Our results are important for a number of reasons. First, they point to language as 
a significant determinant of the ethnic gap in expenditures. Traditionally, language 
has yet to be explicitly controlled for in econometric models examining ethnic 
inequality t_n Vietnam. 2 One reason for this could be the small sample size of 
household data with language variables in the first and early national surveys 
conducted in Vietnam.3 But perhaps a more fundamental reason is that most 
studies use an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition framework. Here, the differences in 
average outcomes in the two groups are decomposed into differences in the average 
level of each characteristic and differences in the returns to these characteristics 
between groups. Most of the researchers who use this method focus on variables 
that are relevant to both groups. As language barriers are almost entirely restricted 
to the minority, this variable is often dropped from the analysis. 
In qualitative analyses, on the other hand, this is never the case. Language barriers 
are seen as key and have been highlighted as a major constraint preventing the 
minority from taking advantage of government policies and programs (see World 
2Without estimating how language barriers affect ethnic inequality, Baulch et al. (2010) do 
suggest that not being able to speak Vietnamese substantially increases the minority's likelihood 
of being poor. 
3For example, the work of Van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) noted (but did not report) 
their attempt to use a language dummy in regressions for the minority group using the 1993 
household data, and found no significant effects. 
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Bank, 2009a; Vasavakul, 2003; Tran, 2004; Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, 
2009, among others).4 Our findings quantitatively corroborate this claim. 
Second, our work explores the role of infrastructure in explaining the ethnic gap. 
There are two reasons for the need to consider infrastructure in quantifying the 
expenditure gap by ethnicity. The first is that the minority tends to live in more 
remote areas, characterised by difficult terrain, poor roads, no power and limited 
access to markets, making it difficult to isolate the effect of ethnicity itself on the 
expenditure gap. The second reason is that majority households living in the same 
remote and impoverished areas are doing increasingly well, to the point of being 
difficult to distinguish from their counterparts in the low-land communes (Swinkels 
and Turk, 2006). Recent literature indeed suggests that majority households ben-
efit more from local investment and government poverty reduction programs than 
other groups (Pham et al., 2011; World Bank, 2009a, p.3). Our result challenges 
this view and generally supports the need for infrastructure improvement programs 
by the Vietnamese Government for the minority. 
Despite a number of different economic studies on ethnic inequality in Vietnam, 
using various estimation techniques, our paper differs substantially in terms of 
estimation method. Typically, economic studies on ethnic inequality in Vietnam 
have tended to focus on differences in the household-specific characteristics, in-
cluding differences in demographic structure, education and land, along with re-
turns to those characteristics, to explain expenditure gaps among ethnic groups 
(see Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al. , 2007; Hoang et al. , 
2007; Baulch et al., 2012, 2010). This objective is complicated by two potential 
concerns. The first is the existence of common commune-specific unobserved char-
acteristics, such as local customs, practices, and land and school quality, which 
are likely correlated with household-specific characteristics. Failure to control for 
this correlation, for example, in the use of an OLS estimator (e.g. , Baulch et al. , 
2012, 2010), causes potential bias in estimating returns to those household-specific 
characteristics (Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). This bias can be eliminated by using 
least-squares dummy-variable (LSDV) or fixed effects (FE) estimators, the com-
monly used approach in the earlier literature (e.g., Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 
4For cross-country comparisons, Grafton et al. (2007) find that language barriers generate 
social barriers to communication and impede knowledge transfer and productivity. In various 
country studies, Patrinos et al. (1994) and Parker et al. (2005) report school inequality and 
language barriers for indigenous children, and Chiswick (1991) , Chiswick and Miller (1995) , 
Chiswick et al. (2000) and Dustmann and Fabbri (2003), among others, show evidence of the 
importance of language skills in labour market participation and the earnings of immigrants. 
.. 
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2001; Hoang et al., 2007). However, this way of eliminating the bias comes at the 
expense of the ability to estimate impacts of commune-specific observed attributes 
such as geographical characteristics and infrastructure. 
The second concern is reverse causation. A good example of this occurs in cases 
where household expenditure patterns determine the provision of commune infras-
tructure, rather than the reverse. Ignoring this possibility could potentially lead 
to bias in estimating returns to infrastructure. 
In this paper, we apply an instrumental variable approach to address both of 
these concerns. Our estimators of both household-specific and commune-specific 
observed variables are consistent and avoid potential bias while still capturing 
commune-observed effects. 
The paper is organised as follows. Some background is provided in Section 2, 
including detail on ethnicity and the key government programs designed to assist 
the minority. Data and variables are described in Section 3. Section 4 provides the 
model specification and estimation method and section 5 presents results. Section 
6 concludes, highlighting policy implications and scope for further research. 
2.2 Ethnicity, Migration and Programs Affect-
ing the Minority 
According to the official classification of the Government of Vietnam, there are 
54 ethnic groups living in Vietnam, including the Kinh and Chinese (Bui, 1999). 
The Kinh group accounts for about 86 per cent of the population. In spite of their 
diversity, ethnic minorities are usually grouped based on the place where they 
live. For instance, there is a tendency to lump together the ethnic groups in the 
Northern Mountains, in the Central Highlands, and in the lowlands. The largest 
proportion (about 12 million people) lives in the first two areas. The group in the 
lowlands comprises mainly the Chinese in Ho Chi Minh City, the Khmer in the 
Mekong Delta and the Cham in the Southern Coast. The biggest groups after the 
Kinh are the Tay (1.2 million people) , the Thai (one million), and the Khmer (one 
~ 
million). The smallest groups, including the Si La, the Pu Pep, the Ro Man, the 
Brau and the O Du, include less than one thousand people each (Huynh et al., 
2002) . 
~ 
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Ethnic minorities have been affected by the consequences of Doi Moi, the process 
of economic reform and trade liberalisation initiated in 1986, much the same as the 
rest of the population. These economic reforms have resulted in an unambiguous 
improvement in living standards in Vietnam. A combination of better incentives, 
improved access to markets and government support was critical to this success. 
But ethnic minorities have also been affected, not always positively, by specific 
public policies and programs. Some of those policies and programs have had a 
dramatic impact on their livelihoods, both before and after Doi Moi. 
Until the beginning of the 20th century, the Kinh people largely lived in deltas 
and lowland coastal areas while other non-Vietnamese speaking ethnic communi-
ties occupied the upland mountain areas (World Bank, 2009a). The establishment 
of new economic zones resulted in a massive migration of Kinh people to areas 
that had been traditionally inhabited by ethnic minorities. Migrations were largely 
driven by economic considerations, such as the desire to develop mountainous ar-
eas or spread population more evenly across the country (World Bank, 2009a). As 
a result, majority households received more support from the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment to migrate into minority areas, with far less support available to ethnic 
minorities. The World Bank (2009a, p.27), for example, notes _that "some invest-
ment programs for the highlands, particularly in the Central Highlands, initially 
focused on bringing in Kinh migrants to set up services and work opportunities 
with the State, rather than hiring or promoting local ethnic minorities." 
These migration movements can be divided in three periods. Between 1960 and 
1975, economic zones in the mountainous areas took the form of state agricultural 
and forest enterprises, as well as new economic villages. In total, some 920,000 
people from the Red River Delta were resettled in the Central Highlands and the 
Northern Mountains areas, and 80,000 people in the coastal areas. Subsequently, 
between 1976 and 1986, the government established a planned migration program 
to support the development of state forests and farms . As a result , an additional 
710,000 people moved to the Central Highlands and some 200,000 to the Northern 
Mountains. In 1987, the planned migration program slowed down, due to a short-
age of funding. But spontaneous migration soared, with as many as 2.3 million 
people moving during the 1980s, and around 300 ,000 more every year from then 
on (Huynh et al., 2002). " 
These massive population movements affected access to land by ethnic minorities 
and even the ecosystems on which their livelihoods depended. For example, in the 
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Central Highlands, from 1975 to 2000, total forest area falls (with clearing) from 
4 million to about 2.9 ha, and of the remaining forest, state forestry enterprises 
occupy as much as 50 percent of the available land. The local indigenous people 
which accounted for the most population in the Central Highlands in 1975 rep-
resented only 26 percent of the population in early 2000s (Luu, 2010). As much 
as 60 percent local indigenous households were reported as having no production 
land as of 2002, while most of the fertile land was in hand of immigrants (Luu, 
2010). As a result, local indigenous people were pushed further into the forest to 
create new farm and/ or to work for immigrants on the land they used to own. 
Another government initiative directly affecting ethnic minorities was the so-
called "sedentarisation program" launched in 1968. This program aimed to reduce 
poverty and eliminate hunger in the mountainous regions by providing support for 
agricultural production and livelihoods. The program facilitated fixed settlement 
and cultivation, while also providing assistance for ~echnical training, capacity 
building, technology transfer and raising market awareness. By 1998, when ac-
tivities of the "sedentarisation program" were merged into Program 135, for the 
socioeconomic development of the most disadvantaged communes, about 3.8 mil-
lion people had been resettled. 
Program 135 was one of the first programs to concentrate not on population move-
ments, but on direct support for minorities. It was established in 1998 to improve 
the living standards of ethnic minorities in so-called "extremely difficult" com-
munes, and to narrow the development gap among ethnic groups and regions 
throughout the country. With a commune-targeting approach, the program has 
largely financed infrastructure development in these troublesome communes, with 
the number of defined "extremely difficult" communes increasing from 1,200 in 
1999 to 2,410 communes in 2005 (Committee for Ethnic Minorities , 2005) , ac-
counting for about 25 percent of total communes in Vietnam. 
Roughly 90 percent of the funding for Program 135 came from the central state 
budget. Other funding sources included local budgets and mobilised funds from 
various sources. During Phase I from 1999 to 2005, the total investment fund 
of Program 135 was 10,178 billion VND (equivalent to about 650 million USD 5). 
Investments focused on transportation ( 40 percent of totql investment), schools (23 
percent), irrigation (17 percent), electricity (8 percent) , water supply (6 percent) , 
and clinics (2 percent) (Committee for Ethnic Minorities, 2005). 
5We use the prevalent exchange rate of VND 15,700 = 1 USD in 2005 for conversion. 
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The Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Program (HEPR) was launched 
in 1998 with an objective to eliminate chronic hunger and reduce the percentage of 
poor households in the country. HEPR, together with a wide range of health and 
education exemption policies, specifically targeted households classified as hungry 
or poor, many of whom are from the minority group. HEPR, in particular, focuses 
on providing access to credit, exemption from education fees, and support for 
health care, among other benefits , to entitled households (see Nguyen and Baulch, 
2007). Funding for HEPR comes mainly from the central state budget ( about 75 
percent), with support from local budgets ( about 25 percent). From 2001 to 2005, 
total funding for HEPR was roughly 6,240 billion VND ( equivalent to about 400 
million USD) (Ministry of Labour, Invalids & Social Affairs and UNDP, 2004). 
2.3 Data and Variables 
2.3.1 Data 
Our estimates rely on the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey in 2006 
(VHLSS 2006). This is a multi-stage stratified household survey on expenditure, 
among other indicators, representative of the whole country, for both urban and 
rural areas. Three households were randomly selected from a single census enu-
meration area in each commune, making up 9,189 households, living in 3,063 
communes. 
Since the survey does not cover all the different ethnic groups in full detail, we 
are forced to simplify the ethnic divisions we consider. This lack of information is 
compounded by the fact that both the poor and ethnic minority households tend 
to live in rural areas, where we are interested in the determinants of poverty for 
ethnic minorities alone. To focus attention on the questions of interest, and avoid 
undue confounding of factors, we follow previous research in limiting our sample 
to rural households, which covers most ethnic minority groups, and then group 
households into a majority group, combining Kinh and Chinese households, and a 
minority group, which includes the remaining 52 officially recognised ethnicities. 
One important characteristic of many communes is the presence of majority and 
minority households within the same commune. However, precise information on 
actual ethnic breakdown in Vietnam's rural communes is not directly available in 
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the survey. As a result, we use information on households surveyed per co1nmune, 
together with an ethnicity indicator, to construct a proxy of the overall ethnic 
composition of the commune. 
Expenditure data from VHLSS 2006 also does not allow us to get a good proxy of 
ethnic composition, since there are only three households surveyed per commune. 
We overcome this by supplementing with income data, which includes more house-
holds per commune. Based on these constructions, we describe communes as either 
mixed in the sense they include both the majority and the minority, or non-mixed, 
when all households sampled in a commune belong to the same ethnic category. 
In total, the rural sample used for this paper has 5,392 majority households and 
1,168 minority households in 2,187 communes. Using information from income 
data, 1,611 communes have observations only from the majority group and 243 
communes have observations only from the minority. On the other hand, 560 
majority households and 439 minority households are found in 254 and 214 mixed 
communes, respectively. 
2.3.2 Variables and Summary Statistics 
The key dependent variable we model is real household expenditure per person. It 
is measured in thousand Vietnamese Dong, using January 2006 prices to correct 
for different inflation rates due to different survey times in different regions of the 
country. It might be argued that income per person, rather than expenditure, is 
a better indicator of economic welfare, and thus the welfare gap between ethnic 
groups. Nevertheless, income is difficult to measure in a developing country like 
Vietnam, particularly for the rural and minority groups we are studying. In rural 
areas, there are often no well-developed input markets to compute net income 
from farming and household activities, and no reliable measures of 'own-income' for 
household-managed and operated farms , making it difficult to distinguish between 
revenue and costs ( Che et al., 2006) , not to mention the potentially large amount 
of 'informal' or unreported income. The extent of own and informal income might 
differ systematically between social groups, therefore further distorting measured 
income as an indicator of group welfare. Another advantage of using expenditure 
as a welfare measure is that consumption tends to be smoothed in response to 
income fluctuations over relatively a long period of time (Deaton, 1997) , as thus 
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may be a better indicator of economic welfare than a snapshot of income which is 
possibly highly transient. 
The explanatory variables we use are characteristics and endowments at both the 
household and commune levels. These include the demographic characteristics of 
the household and endowments of the household in human and physical capital. 
At the commune level, endowments as infrastructure are similarly distinguished 
from geographical characteristics. 
Summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 2.1. The characteristics 
of the majority and minority ethnic groups are often very different, and there 
clearly exist substantial gaps in endowments between the two groups. Of particular 
interest in this study, along with differences in language, infrastructure and years 
of schooling, real expenditures per person among the minority are more than a 
third lower than those for the majority group. The mean difference of the two 
groups is statistically different at the 1 percent level for all of the variables in 
Table 2.1, except for perennial land, other land, and existence of a primary school. 
2.3.2.1 Household-level variables 
Household characteristics of interest include household size, proportions of children 
in the 0-6 and 7-16 year brackets, proportions of male and female adults, household 
structures ( describing whether a household consists of two generations with fewer 
than 3 children, two generations with three or more children, and three generations 
and other household structures) , and some household-head specific variables such 
as age and gender. Table 2.1 suggests that the minority is more likely to have 
larger families, live in three-generation households and be headed by a man, while 
majority households tend to have a higher proportion of members over 16. 
Household characteristics are expected to have an impact on household expen-
diture per capita. Economies of scale and complementarity in consumption and 
production are all factors evident in literature (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b; 
Lazear and Michael, 1988), suggesting the need to control for household size and 
its composition while other explanatory variables are being considered. A pattern 
of strong negative correlation between household size and consumption per person 
is found in many household surveys, especially in developing countries (Lipton and 
Ravallion, 1995). Increasing returns in household production due to specialisation 
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TABLE 2 .1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Real per capita expenditure in Jan. 06 prices (VND000s) 
Household Characteristics 
Household size 
Proportion of household member(s) 
Aged from 0 to 6 
Aged from 7 to 16 
1\1ales, aged over 16 
Females, aged over 16 
Proportion of households that consist of 
Parent(s) only /Parent(s) with fewer than 3 children 
Parent(s) and three or more children 
Three-generation households 
Other household structures 
Headed by female (yes = 1) 
Age of household head 
Household Human Capital: 
Require interpretation 
Years of schooling of the most educated member 
Household Physical Capital: Land area (1000m2) 
Irrigated annual land 
Non-irrigated annual land 
Perennial land 
Forestry land 
Water-surface land 
Other land 
Commune Characteristics: 
Proportion of households living in communes located in 
Rural coastal and delta land 
Rural hilly land 
Rural low /high mountains 
Distance to city (1000 km) 
Commune Infrastructure: 
Proportion of households living in communes that have 
Power 
Clean water 
Hard-surfaced car road 
Primary school 
Village daily market 
State-owned enterprise within 10km 
Foreign-shared enterprise within 10km 
Local enterprise 
Number of households 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Majority Minority Difference 
Mean 
5151 
4.10 
0.07 
0.19 
0.34 
0.39 
0.54 
0.21 
0.13 
0.12 
0.22 
49.93 
0.00 
9.58 
2.74 
0.48 
1.42 
0.61 
0.39 
0.03 
0.72 
0.08 
0.20 
0.14 
0.99 
0.52 
0.47 
0.50 
0.36 
0.21 
0.13 
0.67 
5392 
Mean Mean 
2916 2235*** 
5.14 -1.04*** 
0.12 -0.05*** 
0.24 -0.05*** 
0.31 0.03*** 
0.33 0.06*** 
0.36 0.18*** 
0.30 -0.09*** 
0.17 -0.04*** 
0.17 -0.05*** 
0.11 0.11*** 
43.95 5.98*** 
0.28 -0.28*** 
8.01 1.57*** 
3.24 -0.50** 
4.93 -4.45*** 
1.48 -0.06 
5.54 -4.93*** 
0.11 0.28*** 
0.07 -0.04 
0.10 0.62*** 
0.01 0.07*** 
0.89 -0.69*** 
0.25 -0.11 *** 
0.95 0.04*** 
0.13 0.39*** 
0.20 0.27*** 
0.52 -0.02* 
0.11 0.25*** 
0.13 0.08*** 
0.02 0.11*** 
0.40 0.27*** 
1168 
• 
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and complementarity of skills could also be expected in agricultural and house-
hold businesses, while differences in the age and gender structure could influence 
consumption patterns across households. Furthermore, as child labour is not un-
usual in Vietnam (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005), having an additional household 
member beyond 7 years old in the household may reduce the total 'time cost' per 
person for cooking and cleaning, and hence free time for other members to work. 
Household human capital in our data consists of two variables. The first variable 
is the years of schooling of the most educated member. Schooling has been widely 
shown to have strongly positive impacts on income, and hence on expenditures. 
The previous literature on ethnic inequality in Vietnam measured schooling as 
the highest level of attainment, and used indicator dummy variables to show the 
impact of different education levels on household living standards. We believe 
that schooling years as a (nearly) continuous variable will allow us to measure 
incremental returns to education in a better way. In our data, the majority group 
dominates with an average of 9.6 years of schooling of the most educated member, 
significantly more than the minority group with about eight years. 
The second variable on household human capital of interest is fluency in Viet-
namese. In the survey, this is simply indicated by whether an interpreter was 
required to complete the survey. Language barriers are expected to influence the 
household living standard of the minority. For example, the minority often re-
ports on their lack of knowledge of government policies and programs due to their 
inability to read or hear about these measures, let alone to request government 
services they are entitled to (World Bank, 2009a). Language barriers prevent mi-
nority women, in particular, from using government health services, even though 
they possess health care coverage cards (Tran, 2004). This barrier also results in 
a higher likelihood of minority children beginning school late , repeating school, or 
dropping out, compared with their majority counterparts (World Bank, 2009a). 
Lack of language skills, which leads to lack of confidence and limits social network-
ing, also hinders the minority from sharing information, and accessing off-farm 
employment outside their specific group (World Bank, 2009a; Vietnam Academy 
of Social Sciences, 2009). In our sample, the minority group has a significant lan-
guage barrier, as shown in Table 2.1 , with 28 percent of such households requiring 
the needed of language interpretation for the survey interview . 
The primary measure of household physical capital in the survey is land. We in-
clude different types of land: irrigated annual, non-irrigated annual, perennial, 
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forestry, water-surfaced land and other land. Land disaggregation by type is 
needed to control for heterogeneity in land productivity of various types of land, 
crops that they can produce, and land tenures, as well as their usefulness as col-
lateral for loans (Kompas et al., 2012). In general, the quantity of land area is 
markedly in favour of minority households, except for the water-surface land where 
holdings by majority households are nearly four times as great as minority house-
holds. The distinction is important because of great variability in land quality. It 
is generally the case that the more fertile and higher market-valued land is in the 
deltas and coastal areas. 
2.3.2.2 Commune-level variables 
In our model, the commune-level variables include commune characteristics and 
infrastructure. Commune characteristics capture inherent location effects. There 
are three types of communes in the data set: coastal and delta land, hilly land, 
and low and high mountain land. Distance from the commune to the nearest city 
is also a key identifier. Geography and distance to a city has been widely shown 
to be important in development (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). There is 
sharp contrast between the proportions of households living in various types of 
communes: 72 percent of majority households are concentrated in rural coastal 
and delta land areas, while as much as 89 percent of minority households reside 
in rural low or high mountain areas. Likewise, minority households live almost 
twice as far from the city compared to majority households. All of this suggests 
the need to control for these commune characteristics in model specification. 
Commune infrastructure reflects the existence of basic infrastructure, trade f acil-
i ties and off-farm employment opportunities. We include four measures of basic 
infrastructure which cover access to power, clean water, 6 hard-surfaced roads , and 
a primary school. 7 Each of these variables has a plausible causal relationship 
with household income and expenditure. For example, one might expect hav-
ing access to power would enhance household production and consumption and 
thus positively influence household expenditure. Similarly, clean water promotes 
6 Clean water includes water from the following sources: private tap water inside and/or 
outside the house, public tap water, water pumped from a deep drilled well, and bought water 
in bottles or tanks. 
7We could not include the presence of health clinics in our research, despite its presence in 
Government Program 135, since as many as 98 percent of both groups have access to a health 
clinic, leading to little contrast in the data. 
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good health, which enhances economic productivity, and easy water access reduces 
labor-time and costs in transporting water. The availability of a hard-surfaced road 
greatly assists the transportation of goods and services, and reduces travel costs of 
dwellers both in time and money. Finally, the existence of a primary school would 
likely help increase community-wide education and enhance living standards. 
We measure 'trade facilities' of households in the commune by the existence of 
a daily village market. Clearly, a daily village market is likely to help facilitate 
trade and the exchange of products, which helps promote household production 
and consumption. 
Off-farm e1nployment is often seen as one important channel out of poverty in 
rural areas. Its importance is quantified by three indicators in the survey in terms 
of the existence of different types of enterprises: state-owned enterprises within 
10 km of the commune, foreign-shared enterprises within 10 km of the commune, 
and other enterprises located in the commune. Generally speaking, state-owned 
enterprises are often larger and reportedly less efficient, foreign-shared enterprises 
vary considerably in size and employment opportunities, and local enterprises , 
although often small in size, usually indicate the presence of a highly-developed 
local mark~ economy. 
For all items in commune infrastructure, minority households are often far less well 
off than their majority counterparts. An exception is access to a primary school 
where the difference by ethnicity is in favour of the minority, though marginal. 
Furthermore, many more majority households live in communes with alternative 
enterprises, of varying ownership types. One limitation of our data is that variables 
on commune endowments do not measure quality, or differences in quality, which 
are likely to vary across regions. If anything, we suspect the data we do have on 
infrastructure understates the differences between the two groups. 
2.4 Model Specification and Estimation Method 
Household expenditure per capita is assumed to be a function of household-specific 
and commune-specific characteristics and endowments. The dependent variable 
appears in the equation as its logarithm, representing constant proportional effects 
of explanatory variables on per capita household expenditure. Household size as 
an explanatory variable also appears in log form. We are interested in exploring 
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how the two ethnic groups differ in their responses to their household-specific 
characteristics and endowments, which also vary on average across communes, as 
well as to commune-specific characteristics and infrastructure, which are variable 
only between communes. Our basic specification for each group is: 
lnEji = x;J3 + z;, + [ai + Eji], for j = l, ... , Mi; i = 1, ... , N (2.1) 
where Eji is the per capita household expenditure for household j living in com-
mune i, Xji is a K x 1 vector of household-specific explanatory variables , which 
include household characteristics and household human and physical capital, while 
Zi is a G x 1 vector of commune-specific explanatory variables, which include com-
mune characteristics and commune infrastructure. These variables are described 
in detail in the previous section. 
We note explicitly that Xji varies over both household j and commune i, while 
Zi varies over only commune i. The dimensioned parameter vectors /3 and 1 , the 
commune-specific intercept ai and the error term Eji are all unobserved. There are 
Mi households in each of the i = 1, ... , N communes, making NM observations 
in total, where M = I::1 Mi. 
The composite error term in equation 2.1, formed by the commune-specific inter-
cept ai and the error term Eji in the square brackets, captures both the variation 
in coefficients across communes and the usual idiosyncratic error term. If this 
composite error term was uncorrelated with each of the explanatory variables, 
OLS would provide a consistent estimator. Furthermore, with the assumptions 
of homoskedasticity and independence of effects, a random-effects (RE) estima-
tor would be consistent and efficient. However, such an absence of correlation is 
unlikely. 
The principal concern is correlation of the commune-specific unobserved effect ai 
with commune averages of the household-varying explanatory variable Xji· In 
our application, when households are sampled by communes, they share com-
mon commune-level effects, thereby forming a panel-like data structure. These 
commune-level effects partially reflect local practices and customs as well as the 
unobserved qualities of institutions and endowments such as schools and land. It 
is likely that these terms are correlated with the commune averages of household 
characteristics and endowments, such as family size, educational attainment and 
land ownership. 
.. 
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When the group effects are correlated with explanatory variables, OLS (and RE) 
produces inconsistent estimates for the coefficients /3 and,. The standard remedy 
is to use a FE estimator, which is equivalent to including a dummy variable for 
each commune. Unfortunately, under the fixed-effects approach, coefficients , on 
the commune-invariant variables Z are not identified. 
In a model with a random intercept, Hausman and Taylor (1981) observe that 
the fixed-effects estimator can be viewed as an instrumental variables (IV) proce-
dure, where the instruments are deviations in the X explanatory variables around 
their group means ( the "within-group" variation). This interpretation suggests 
that the coefficients , of the group-invariant variables Z can then be estimated, 
provided sufficient additional instruments to separately identify , are available. 
Some commune characteristics, such as geography and distance to the city, de-
noted as Z1 , can clearly be seen as exogenous. In such cases, these variables can 
be instrumented by themselves (Breusch et al., 2011). 
By contrast, commune infrastructure, denoted as Z2 , may not be exogenous. The 
concern is that the availability of infrastructure is jointly determined with the 
dependent variable, per capita household expenditure. As described in section 2, 
-
provision of basic infrastructure including roads, power, water and primary schools 
is the backbone of Program 135, which supports poor and ethnic minority com-
munes. For this reason, provision of this basic infrastructure would be influenced 
in part by commune (average) living standards and the ratio of 1ninority house-
holds in the communes, which is , itself, also often correlated with the co1nmune 
average living standard. Also, the provision of basic infrastructure is often based 
on economies of scale: how easy it would be to provide infrastructure, how many 
households can benefit from it, and to what extent it would be used. To this end, 
highly populated communes with easy access, or those expected to have higher liv-
ing standards on average, would more likely attract public investment. Finally, the 
establishn1ent of enterprises and daily markets would depend on basic commune 
infrastructure, as well as average labour skills and production capacity. 
We address these concerns by constructing instrumental variables that remove pos-
sible causal links from household expenditures to commune infrastructure Z2 . To 
do so, following Hausman and Taylor (1983), we use as instruments for commune 
endowments Z2 the residuals from equations predicting each of the Z2 variables. 
The regressors in these prediction equations (below called H) include an indicator 
of whether the co1nmune is under Program 135, as well as the ratio of minority 
' 
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households , commune population size and commune averages of all household hu-
man and physical capital. These instruments are particularly attractive because 
they pick out the variation in household expenditure caused by commune infras-
tructure Z2 , rather than a causal link from the household expenditure to commune 
infrastructure Z2 . 
To describe our IV estimator, some notation is helpful. We can stack the data 
with all households in all communes, so the model for NM observations can be 
written compactly as: 
Y = X/3 + (Z1),1 + (Z2),2 + E (2.2) 
It is useful to define the NM x NM "within" operator Qc as the matrix that 
converts any variable of data, such as Y = lnE and the columns of X, into the 
deviations from its commune-level means. In this notation, the instruments for 
the household characteristics X are QcX, their within-commune deviations. If 
these were the only available instruments, the estimator would be a simple FE 
estimator and the coefficients , would remain unidentified. 
Given tl;ie -:xegressors H in the prediction equations that are -used to form the 
additional instruments, a projection matrix PH can be defined such that (I-PH )Z2 
is the matrix of residuals that provides the instruments. The IV estimator has the 
following moment conditions: 
[QcX, Z1, (I - PH)Z2]'[Y - X/3 - Z1,1 - Z2,2] = 0, (2.3) 
which decompose as: 
[QcX]'(Y - X/3) = 0 , 
[Z1, (I - PH)Z2]'[Y - X/3 - Z1,1 - Z2,2] = 0 
(2.4) 
The first of these conditions in 2.4 shows that the estimator of /3 is the same as 
fixed-effects. In particular, it will be consistent in situations when there exists 
correlation between the group-specific random intercept a i and a group-varying 
explanatory variable Xji· The second condition in 2.4 assumes that Z1 is exogenous 
and that the residual from equations predicting each of Z2 on H is uncorrelated 
with the error term (hence it is a valid instrument) . When these conditions are 
satisfied, the estimators of , 1 and , 2 will be consistent . 
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One of the key concerns in our research is the difference in returns to character-
istics and endowments between groups. We could estimate separate regressions 
specified in equation 2.1 for majority and minority sub-samples to identify the 
average coefficients for each group. Instead and equivalently, we add interactions 
between the covariates and group dummy-variables to the same regression applied 
to the whole sample, which has the advantage of providing standard errors of the 
difference in coefficients between groups. 
2.5 Estimation Results 
We first check if our estimation method is appropriate, and then examine the effect 
of language, mixed communes and infrastructure, with a focus on differences in 
returns to those attributes between the two ethnic groups. Finally, after various 
robustness checks, we decompose the ethnic gap. 
2.5.1 Checking the Estimation Method 
We begin by testing the need for using the first set of instruments, the within-
comn1une deviations QcX for household-specific characteristics X. The Hausman 
test , which compares coefficients estimated using RE and FE estimators, rejects 
the null hypothesis that a RE estimator is consistent (x~5 = 140.34 ), suggesting 
the need for a FE estimator. This test result confirms our concern about the cor-
relation between commune-level unobserved effects and ( commune-level averages 
of) household-level characteristics and endowments, thereby lending credence to 
our use of within-commune deviations QcX as instruments. 
We next consider if commune-level infrastructure Z2 is possibly endogenous. The 
concern is that infrastructure is jointly determined with ( commune-level averages 
of) household expenditure, and so its use as a regressor will fail to identify the 
extent that households benefit from having access to infrastructure. In our data, 
there are relatively strong correlations between household expenditure and the 
existence of Program 135, and ratios of minority households in the commune and 
commune population sizes (-0.27, -0.40 and 0.27, respectively). Furthermore, as 
shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, regressions explaining the availability of each Z2 by 
the variables in Hare all (and overall) significant. Indeed, Program 135, commune 
,. ~ 
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population size, and the ratio of minority households are highly significant in most 
regressions, suggesting their strong influence on the availability of commune in-
frastructure. Although such regressions do not prove that these infrastructure 
variables Z2 are endogenous, the regression results do support our concerns about 
possible endogeneity and endorse our strategy for constructing suitable instrumen-
tal variables. 
Unlike simple FE estimation, where the nature of the instruments obviates the 
need to adjust for the error correlation that is due to the panel structure of the 
data, in this broader IV estimation the error correlation should be taken into 
account. We conduct this IV estimation in Stata, version 11, using the command 
ivreg2 with option vce(cluster commune) to correct for cluster correlation at the 
commune level and heteroskedasticity. The F-statistic for the first stage regression 
for the whole rural sample is 34.64. It is well above the critical value of 21.42, 
identified by Stock and Yogo (2005) for a 5 percent maximal IV relative bias. It 
thus appears to exclude a possible problem with weak instruments. 
Finally, we perform a Chow test for whether the coefficients estimated over the 
majority are equal to the coefficients estimated over the minority group. The 
tests soundly reject the null hypothesis that they are equal betw~en groups (x~8 = 
192.51). 
2.5.2 The Effect of Language 
Table 2.4 reports results of estimating equation 2.2 by an IV estimator with the 
instruments described in equation 2.3. We find a negative and significant effect 
of the presence of a language barrier on household expenditure. Being language 
'incompetent' - requiring interpretation during the survey interview - results in 
an approximately 14 percent fall in household expenditure in the pooled model. 
This negative result is not sensitive to the choice of instruments for language abil-
ity, which we will discuss in detail in our robustness checks. Furthermore, this 
impact remains almost the same in the regression for minority households only, 
suggesting that even among minority households, where people can communicate 
in their own minority language, not being fluent in Vietnamese imposes a substan-
tial disadvantage. 
d 
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"Cl (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) c+ ('!) 
Power Clean Hard ·: Primary Daily Local en- Foreign State-owned 
1-1 
t,...J 
water surf aced car :1 school market terprise shared enterprise V) 
road enterprises C) ~ 
Program 135 -0.049*** 0.095*** -0.027 0.053* -0.011 -0.074** -0.033*** -0.065*** ~ (1:) 
(yes=l) (-3.57) (5.72) (-1.07) (1.68) (-0.60) (-2.51) (-3.33) (-3.09) Cr., ~ Commune population size 0.022*** 0.234*** 0.081 *** -0.033* 0.114*** 0.142*** 0.006 0.069*** 
( 1000 hholds) (2.76) (24.79) (5.68) (-1.85) (10.55) (8.47) (1.13) (5.69) ~ (1:) 
Ratio of minority households 0.020 -0.104** -0.023 -0.095 -0.156*** -0.186** -0.036 -0.143** ~ ~ 
~ 
sampled in the commune (0.55) (-2.33) (-0.34) (-1.11) (-3.06) (-2.35) (-1.37) (-2.52) .,.__ N. ~ 
Years of schooling 0.007*** -0.002 0.001 -0.023*** 0.005 0.018*** -0.000 0.014*** <:c:: ~ (2.78) (-0.62) (0.18) (-3.86) (1.45) (3.35) (-0.07) (3.63) ;:::l ~ 
Irrigated crop land -0.002** 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.001 tt:l 
(1000 m2) (-2.30) (0.79) (1.56) (1.46) (0.98) (-1.28) (0.03) (0.81) ~ ~ ;:::l 
Non-irrigated crop land -0.006*** -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.006*** -0.000 0.001 N . \J 
(1000 m2) (-7.61) (-1.01) (1.61) (0.41) (-1.49) (-3.70) (-0.56) (0.96) ~ 
Perennial land 0.002 -0.005*** -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.003 ;:::l C) 
(1000 m2) (1.33) (-3.75) (-0.29) ( 1.15) (-1.01) (-0.94) (0.93) (1.57) -, N . ~ 
Forestry land 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 * -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 N. (1:) Cr., 
(1000 m2) (1.65) (-1.29) (0.78) (-1.06) (-1.91) (-0.36) (-0.97) (-0.91) N. ;:::l 
Water-surface land -0.000 0.017*** 0.005 -0.020* 0.005 -0.012 -0.001 -0.004 $ (1000 m2) (-0.03) (2.94) (0.63) (-1. 79) (0.83) (-1.19) (-0.41) (-0.54) (1:) ~ 
Other land 0.004 -0.008 -0.011 I 0.008 -0.007 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 ;:::l ~ 
(1000 m2) (0.53) (-0.91) (-0.86) (0.48) (-0.77) (0.18) (-0.26) (-0.54) ~ 
Constant 0.904*** -0.083 0.110 0.789*** 0.099 0.342*** 0.072** 0.100 
(19.02) (-1.45) (1.27) (7.18) (1.51) (3.37) (2.13) (1.37) 
Number of households 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 
F 14.867 81.615 4.677 3.847 19.769 18.493 2.590 9.885 
r2 0.114 0.414 0.039 0.032 0.146 0.138 0.022 0.079 I~ 
Except for Program 135, commune population size, and ratio of minority households sampled in the commune, all variables are commune averages. t ratio in 
parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. 
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~ 
(2) (4) (5) (6) 'd (1) (7) (8) (9) c-t-(1) 
Power Clean Hard Primary Daily Local en- Foreign State-owned 
1-1 
tv 
water surf aced car school market terprise shared enterprise V) 
road enterprises C) ~ 
Program 135 0.001 0.043* -0.108*** 0.095*** 0.028 -0.173*** -0.052*** -0.072*** M (i) 
(yes=l) (0.63) (1.85) (-4.59) (4.04) (1.24) (-7.88) (-3.25) (-3.71) Cr., ~ Commune population size 0.001 * 0.087*** 0.035*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.098*** 0.015*** 0.022*** ~ ( 1000 hholds) (1.92) (12.27) ( 4.85) (8.84) (10.01) (14.54) (3.09) (3.65) (i) 
Ratio of minority households -0.029*** -0.406*** -0.330*** 0.011 -0.173** 0.074 -0.101 * 0.185*** .Q ~ 
~ 
sampled in the commune (-7.88) (-5.38) (-4.32) (0.14) (-2.35) (1.05) (-1.94) (2.95) e--.. N. ~ 
Years of schooling 0.000 -0.004 0.010*** -0.016*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.016*** ~ ~ (0.62) (-1.17) (3.27) (-5.18) (0.90) ( 4.52) ( 4.80) (6.33) ;3 ~ 
Irrigated crop land 0.000 0.002* -0.005*** 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** ~ 
(1000 m2) (0.49) (1.86) (-4.51) (2.81) (-3.62) (-2.42) (-3.99) (-3.59) ~ ~ ;3 
Non-irrigated crop land -0.000*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 0.000 0.005** 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 N . \J 
(1000 m2) (-4.04) (-4.26) (-3.85) (0.16) (2.21) (0.06) (-1.10) (-0.42) ~ 
Perennial land -0.000 -0.006*** -0.003** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 ;3 C) 
(1000 m2) (-0.65) (-5.79) (-2.39) (1.06) (-0.32) (-0.01) (-1.01) (-1.45) -, N . ~ 
Forestry land 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 * N . (i) Cr., 
(1000 m2) (0.46) (-3.07) (-1.56) (-2.10) (0.19) (-0.61) (-1.12) (1.94) N . ;3 
Water-surface land 0.000 0.009*** 0.001 0.003* -0.002 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002 $ (1000 m2) (0.02) ( 4.67) (0.48) (1.80) (-1.13) (-2.86) (-1.63) (-1.24) (i) ~ 
Other land 0.000 0.010 0.011 I 0.007 -0.005 0.006 -0.000 0.015** ;3 ~ 
(1000 m2) (0.24) (1.19) (1.27) (0.81) (-0.54) (0.74) (-0.06) (2.00) ~ 
Constant 0.998*** 0.375*** 0.341 0.495*** 0.194*** 0.356*** 0.020 0.025 
(582.21) (10.54) (9.45) (13. 70) (5.59) (10.61) (0.82) (0.85) 
Number of households 5392 5392 5392 5392 5392 5392 5392 5392 
F 9.200 30.979 14.888 16.056 12.311 32.360 8.079 9.835 
r2 0.017 0.054 0.027 0.029 0.022 0.057 0.015 0.018 I~ 
Except for Program 135, commune population size, and ratio of minority households sampled in the commune, all variables are commune averages. t ratio in 
parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. 
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In Table 2.4, column (4), highlighting differences between groups, and where lan-
guage differences are excluded, we see little evidence of significant difference in 
returns to characteristics and endowments. An exception is in years of schooling 
and to a lesser extent, in water-surface land. This is in spite of substantial differ-
ence in intercepts, as shown in column (1), where being a minority household is 
associated with a roughly 24 percent reduction in expenditure. 
To further investigate the effect of language in household returns to attributes, 
we compare returns between households with and without language ability (i.e., 
those that do not or do require interpretation). In Table 2.5, for brevity, we 
present only variables with statistically significant difference in returns. A key 
finding is that the difference in returns to education between these two language 
groups is highly significant. This difference is much larger than that between the 
two ethnic groups: 0.041 per year of schooling as compared with 0.024. Language 
barriers thus clearly contribute to a widening of the ethnic gap, at least through 
the channel of differences in household gains from education.8 
Does the ethnic gap dissipate among language competent households? In the re-
gression for language competent households, we measure this gap using an indica-
tor of 'belonging to the minority group'. By doing so, we assume that the returns 
to attributes are the same among language competent households. Results are 
shown in Table 2.5, where we find the ethnic gap remains almost the same as in 
the pooled regression. This implies that being competent in Vietnamese is not 
enough to eliminate the ethnic gap in expenditures. 
8World Bank (2004) finds that students who always spoke Vietnamese outside school or 
belonged to the ethnic majority Kinh group were likely to have higher test scores than students 
who never speak Vietnamese outside school, or who belonged to the ethnic minority group. 
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TABLE 2 .4: Difference in Determinants of Household Expenditure by Ethnicity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pool Majority Minority Difference 
Household Characteristics 
Household size (log) -0.333*** -0.327*** -0.392*** 0.065 
(-12.99) (-11.61) (-6.33) (0.96) 
Aged from 7 to 16 0.158*** 0.151 *** 0.298*** -0.147 
(3.21) (2.66) (2.82) (-1.22) 
Males, aged over 16 0.482*** 0.476*** 0.571 *** -0.095 
(8.31) (7.26) ( 4.30) (-0.65) 
Females, aged over 16 0.424*** 0.425*** 0.507*** -0.082 
(6.69) (6.05) (3.11) (-0.47) 
Parent(s) and three/more children -0.060*** -0.068*** -0.028 -0.040 
(-3.54) (-3.52) (-0.75) (-0.98) 
Three-generation households -0.056*** -0.052** -0.058 0.006 
(-2.68) (-2.22) (-1.20) (0.11) 
Other household structures 0.000 0.013 -0.024 0.037 
(0.02) (0.49) (-0.45) (0.62) 
Headed by female -0.071 *** -0.069*** -0 ._086* 0.017 
;. 
(yes = 1) (-4.11) (-3.69) (-1.93) (0.35) 
Age of household head 0.011 *** 0.014*** -0.002 0.016** 
(3.26) (3.65) (-0.31) (1.97) 
Household Human Capital: 
Require interpretation -0.141 ** -0.120** 
(-2.57) (-2.23) 
Years of schooling 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.034*** 0.024*** 
(24.06) (23.49) (5.79) (3.60) 
Household Physical Capital: 
Irrigated annual land 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.003 
(1000 rn2) (5. 73) ( 6.91) (2.37) (0.96) 
Non-irrigated annual land 0.006*** 0.004 0.009*** -0.005 
(1000 m2) (3.28) (1.47) ( 4.38) (-1.21) 
Perennial land 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.013*** -0.005* 
(1000 m2) (7.35) (6.59) (5.34) (-1.75) 
Forestry land 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.000 
(1000 m2) (2.84) (2.38) (2.20) (0.12) 
Water-surface land 0.012*** 0.011 *** 0.021 *** -0.010** 
(1000 m2) ( 4.20) (3.97) (5.67) (-2.17) 
.. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pool Majority Minority Difference 
-
Other land 0.006* 0.007* -0.003 0.010 
(1000 m2) (1.81) (1.88) (-0.14) (0.48) 
Commune Characteristics: 
Rural low or high mountains -0.039** -0.014 -0.092 0.078 
(-1.98) (-0.66) (-1.35) (1.10) 
Rural hilly land 0.015 0.015 0.060 -0.045 
(0.51) (0.51) (0.54) (-0.39) 
Distance to city -0.287*** -0.335*** -0.224* -0.111 
(1000 km) (-5.04) (-5.30) (-1.81) (-0.81) 
Commune Infrastructure: 
Power 0.170*** 0.142 0.156** -0.014 
(2.85) (1.01) (2.40) (-0.16) 
Clean water 0.031 ** 0.027* 0.123* -0.096 
(2.06) (1. 76) (1.94) (-1.49) 
Hard-surfaced car road 0.004 -0.006 0.072** -0.078** 
(0.28) (-0.37) (1.99) (-1.99) 
Primary school 0.028** 0.036** -0.005 0.041 
(2.02) (2.35) (-0.17) (1.24) 
Village daily market 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.072 -0.025 
(3.23) (3.01) (1.50) (-0.50) 
State-owned enterprise 0.021 0.018 0.051 -0.033 
(within 10km) (1.28) (1.03) (1.10) (-0.66) 
Foreign-shared enterprise 0.091 *** 0.092*** 0.003 0.089 
(within 10km) (3.95) (3.88) (0.03) (1.13) 
Local enterprise 0.061 *** 0.058*** 0.072** -0.014 
( 4.23) (3.68) (2.16) (-0.37) 
Minority Group -0.242*** 
(-9.00) 
Constant 7.281 *** 7.435*** 7.752*** -0.317 
(71.81) ( 44.33) ( 40.51) (-1.17) 
Number of households 6560 5392 1168 6560 
Number of communes 2187 1865 457 2187 
Log of real per capita expenditure as dependent variable. t statistics are in brackets. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regression omits the proportion of members aged 06 ; one-
or two-generation households that consist of no more than two children; commune geographical 
types as coastal/delta; other dummy variables having yes=l and no=0. 
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TABLE 2.5: Difference in Determinants of Household Expenditure by Language 
Ability 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pool Not Require Require In- Difference 
Interpretation terpretation 
Years of schooling 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.015 0.041 *** 
(24.06) (24.60) (1.12) (2.92) 
Foreign-shared enterprise 0.091 *** 0.091 *** -0.368** 0.459*** 
(within 10km) (3.95) (3.96) (-2.55) (3.14) 
Minority Group -0.242*** -0.240*** 
(yes=l) (9.00) (10.57) 
Require interpretation -0.141 ** 
(yes=l) (-2.57) 
Number of households 6560 6228 332 6560 
Number of communes 2187 2099 136 2187 
Pool regression and notes are the same as those in Table 2.4 . 
To further disentangle the ethnic gap among language 'competent' households, we 
narrow our sample to households that speak the majority language, and we relax 
our assumption that returns to attributes by ethnicity are the same. In Table 2.6, 
. for brevity, we again only present variables with statistically significant differences 
between. the two ethnic groups. In terms of returns per year-of schooling, the 
results still favour the majority, albeit at now much smaller values. Specifically, 
the difference between groups falls to 0.014 per year of schooling, and is significant 
only at 10 percent level. This difference is less than two thirds of the difference 
between the two ethnic groups in the whole rural sample. On the other hand, 
the ethnic difference in returns to perennial land still favours minority households 
and becomes almost twice as much as that in the whole rural sample. Work-
ing on perennial land is a comparative advantage of minority households, given 
their indigenous knowledge. Having language skills seems to further enhance this 
advantage. Results in Table 2.6, thus suggest, once again, that the ethnic gap 
could be narrowed by removing the language barrier through enhanced returns to 
education and ( as well) perennial land of the minority. 
.. 
2.5.3 The Effect of Mixed Communes 
Table 2. 7 extends the results in Table 2.6 by separating language 'competent ' 
households by both ethnicity and whether they live in a mixed or non-mixed 
commune. The idea is to see if living in the same commune helps further reduce the 
ethnic gap after controlling for language. In this case, we find that the difference 
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TABLE 2.6: Difference in Determinants of Household Expenditure by Ethnicity 
among Households not Requiring Interpretation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
34 
Not Require Majority Minority Difference 
Interpretation 
Years of schooling 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.014* 
(24.60) (23.49) (6.49) (1.92) 
Perennial land 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.018*** -0.009*** 
(1000 m2) (7.50) (6.59) (6.03) (-2.89) 
Minority Group -0.240*** 
(yes=l) (-10.57) 
Number of households 6228 5392 837 6228 
Number of communes 2099 1865 356 2099 
Regression for households not requiring interpretation is the same as that in Table 2.5. Notes 
are the same as those in Table 2.4. 
in returns to education between majority and minority households in non-mixed 
communes 1s very small, or 0.009 per year of schooling and insignificant. On 
the contrary, the difference is significant and much larger, at 0.023 per year of 
schooling, between majority and minority households in mixed communes. 
TABLE 2. 7: Difference in Determinants of Household Expenditure by Ethnicity 
among Households not Requiring Interpretation in Mixed and Non-mixed Com-
munes 
Non-mixed Communes Mixed Communes 
Majority Minority Majority Minority 
Years of schooling 0.059*** 0.050*** 0.061 *** 0.038*** 
(22. 73) (6.72) (7.67) (3.67) 
Perennial land 0.008*** 0.012** 0.009*** 0.018*** 
(1000 m2) (6.06) (2.13) (3.01) (4.31) 
Number of households 4832 450 560 387 
Number of communes 1611 163 254 193 
Information based on ethnic mix is from Income data, thereby causing difference in the number 
of mixed communes for the majority and the minority. Difference in returns to years of schooling 
between majority and minority in mixed communes is significant (p=0.079); between majority 
and minority in non-mixed communes is insignificant (p=0.301); Difference in returns to peren-
nial land between majority and minority in mixed communes is significant (p=0.073); between 
majority and minority in non-mixed communes is insignificant (p=0.476) . Other notes are the 
same as for Table 2.4. 
This larger difference in returns to education among language 'competent ' house-
holds in mixed communes is initially surprising. In the absence of language barri-
ers, one would expect to see that living in the same commune with the majority 
group would generate comparable returns to education for the minority. In mixed 
communes, one might also expect little difference in education quality - minority 
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and majority students are in the same classrooms - and that the availability of 
employment in the commune to both groups should be comparable. 
This wider disparity in returns to education suggests at least two possibilities. 
First , education quality may not be uniform to majority and minority groups in 
the same classroom. This will often be the case where special needs of minority 
children are not addressed in mixed classrooms, the way they might be in those 
with minority children only. In mixed classrooms, in other words, minorities may 
be 'left behind' compared to their majority counterparts. This will be especially 
the case if minority children enter the classroom with differential skills and prior 
differences in home-based learning. 9 
Second, the disparity in returns to education may suggest unequal treatment in 
labour markets within mixed communes. This is likely rooted in the government 
policy which has largely favoured Kinh movement into minority areas, rather than 
the reverse (World Bank, 2004; Huynh et al., 2002). As indicated in section 2, the 
labour market in mixed communes was distorted from migration patterns (World 
Bank, 2009a), which generally favoured the majority at the expense of minority 
groups in terms of concessions for migration and the establishment of preferential 
employment by local governments for the majority. If the majority is favoured 
in hiring in mixed communes - and differences between individuals by ethnicity 
are commonly known or identified at the point of the job application - this may 
explain the difference in returns and expenditure patterns. Indeed, the results 
show that that not only are returns to education of minority households in mixed 
communes much lower than those of the majority households, but that they are 
also much lower than those of their minority counterparts living in non-mixed 
communes. 
.. 
2.5.4 The Effect of Infrastructure 
In Table 2.4, we find no statistically significant difference in returns to commune 
infrastructure between the two ethnic groups. An exception is in returns to hard-
surfaced road, which favours the minority. As such, this result offers us no evidence 
for the hypothesis, as recently argued in Vietnam, that majority households benefit 
9There might be a concern that household heterogeneity may affect educational attainment 
and returns to education. Our use of within-commune deviations as an instrument for education 
does not correct for this possibility. However, if this bias is systematically similar for both the 
majority and minority groups , noting that we are interested only in the ethnic differences in 
educational attainment and returns to education, its effect would be small . 
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more than minority households from local investment (i.e., progra1ns supporting 
poor and minority communes, such as Program 135). In fact, if anything, local 
investment seems to benefit minorities more. 
It is also worth noting that even with no statistically significant difference, minor-
ity and majority groups exhibit relatively divergent patterns in their returns to 
infrastructure. This divergence is in contrast to the similarity in trend in returns to 
household physical and human capital. Understanding this divergence sheds light 
on what mechanisms outside the household could give rise to the living standard 
of the minority. There are a number of results to highlight in this regard. 
First, our results show that the minority generally benefits more than the majority 
from basic infrastructure. Indeed, having access to power, clean water, and hard-
surfaced roads increases household expenditure of the minority by 16 percent , 12 
percent and 7 percent, respectively. On the contrary, the majority gains little, if 
anything, from these infrastructure facilities. Higher returns in poorer communes 
in rural settings have often been noted (e.g., Mu and Van De Walle, 2007). It 
is possible that poor communes, where minority households are often found to 
live, are generally underdeveloped, thereby offering greater scope for returns from 
infrastructure. 
Second, it is clear from the evidence that primary schools are the only item among 
the four basic infrastructure categories (i.e. power, water, road and primary 
schools), largely funded by the Government, which benefits the majority more 
than the minority. Primary schools have no impact on the minority, but increase 
majority household expenditures by 3 percent. This may be an artefact of Viet-
nam's inability to provide a suitable language-based education for minority chil-
dren. Generally speaking, Vietnam has no systematic teacher training for bilingual 
education (Vasavakul, 2003; World Bank, 2003b) , and minority languages are not 
used as the main medium of instruction in any known area. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that having a school with teachers who can not speak the relevant eth-
nic language seems to seriously hamper the educational performance of minority 
children, who largely speak their own indigenous language at home, and may have 
little or no exposure to Vietnamese before they arrive at primary schools (e.g., 
Ministry of Education and Training, UNICEF and UNESCO, 2008). 
Third, majority households often outperform minority households in gaining from 
the availability of market and off-farm employment . Our results show that the 
existence of a daily market does not seem to help the minority, but significantly 
supports the majority group. This result is broadly consistent with the standard 
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view in qualitative research that the majority group does better than the minority 
group in a market context and in market places, and that the majority dominates 
overall in trading systems (World Bank, 2009). Barriers that the minority often 
face in the market place include lack of market information, language difficulties 
and calculation skills, and a culture of community reciprocity which prevents many 
minorities from doing business in an otherwise or strictly entrepreneurial fashion 
(see World Bank, 2009a; Tran, 2004; Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, 2009). 
Finally, in terms of off-farm employment, living in a commune with a foreign-
owned enterprise within 10 km, has the largest positive impact among all infras-
tructure facilities on the majority, but no impact on the minority. On the other 
hand, minority households appear to benefit more than majority counterparts from 
presence of local enterprises. Lack of social networks, poor infrastructure, their 
isolated nature and limited mobility of many minority households are likely key 
drivers for this result. 
2.5.5 Robustness Checks 
Before turning to decomposition of ethnic gap, which relies on estimated results, 
we subject our estimates a few robustness checks. The approach here is twofold, 
concentrating on two concerns. First, we check if there is sensitivity in the choice 
of instrument for a key variable, namely "requires interpretation." Second, we 
exclude outliers from our sample, in particular, households with remittances ( often 
cash-transfers from overseas relatives) and households who are classified as poor 
in the survey year, or the year prior. 
For the first concern, the Vietnamese speaking ability of a household may be 
affected by not only the commune-average Vietnamese speaking ability, which we 
have controlled for using within-commune deviation as an instrument. Rather , it 
may also depend on how assimilated to Kinh group is that household and/or the 
specific ethnicity it belongs to. At the household level, the degree of assimilation 
may come from intermarriage with a Kinh partner ( at present or in the past). 
Unfortunately, we do not have information on ethnicity of any household member 
rather than the household head, so we are not being able to assess this effect. For 
a specific ethnicity, we do know that the better off it is , the more assimilated it 
tends to be to the Kinh majority (Baulch et al. , 2007) . 
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We address this concern by constructing an instrument which measures the propen-
sity to speak Vietnamese for each ethnicity, 10 checking to see if our main results are 
sensitive to this choice of instrument. Results are presented in Table 2.8 , column 
(2). For brevity, only results in pooled and regression differences are presented. 
As we might expect, we find larger negative impact from a language barrier. Not 
being able to speaking Vietnamese is now associated with a 20 percent reduction 
in expenditure as compared to 14 percent using the within-commune deviation as 
an instrument. This result further underpins the importance of language in the 
minority living standard. Other variables in our regression remain stable in their 
contribution to the ethnic gap, with an exception to the distance to the city which 
now helps narrow the ethnic gap. 
For the second concern, as discussed in the background section above, households 
classified as poor are likely to receive support from various government policies, 
such as the HEPR program. Furthermore, given remnants of the war in Vietnam as 
well as the Vietnamese culture of reciprocity, some households may receive overseas 
and/or domestic remittances. This external support, regardless of whether it 
originates from relatives or through the government, would substantially alter 
expenditures and the way a household gains from its endowme~ts. 
In Table 2.8, we exclude each group of outliers in turn. In column (3), for the 
restricted sample of households not receiving remittances, only a negligible eth-
nic difference is observed in returns to household capital as compared with that 
estimated for the full sample. In particular, this ethnic d(fference falls slightly, un-
doubtedly since many more majority households , rather than minority ones that 
receive remittances, are removed from the sample. 
Taking out households classified as poor in column ( 4) leaves coefficients relatively 
stable. While language barriers become insignificant in this subsample of 'better 
off' households , disparity in returns to education increases, though marginally. 
Non-poor minority households tend to be able to make more use of their land and 
local off-fann opportunities in this subsample. 
10We use information from income data which has a larger sample to construct the propensity 
to speak Vietnamese for each ethnicity. 
TABLE 2.8: Robustness Checks 
(1) Full sample (2) 'Require Interpretation' 
instrumented by propensity 
to speak Vietnamese 
Pool Difference Pool Difference 
Household Characteristics 
Household size (log) -0.333*** 0.065 -0.333*** 0.063 
(-12.99) (0.96) (-12.97) (0.91) 
Aged from 7 to 16 0.158*** -0.148 0.157*** -0.132 
(3.21) (-1.22) (3.18) (-108) 
Males aged over 16 years 0.482*** -0.096 0.481 *** -0.051 
(8.31) (-0.65) (8.27) (-0.34) 
Fe1nale aged over 16 years 0.424*** -0.083 0.422*** -0.053 
(6.69) (-0.47) (6.67) (-0.30) 
Parent(s) and three -0.060*** -0.041 -0.060*** -0.037 
or more children (-3.54) (-0.98) (-3.56) (-0.88) 
Three-generation households -0.056*** 0.006 -0.056*** 0.012 
(-2 .68) (0.11) (-2.69) (0.22) 
Other household structures 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.033 
(0.02) (0.62) (0.03) (0.56) 
Headed by female -0.071 *** 0.017 -0.071 *** 0.017 
(-4.11) (0.35) (-4.11) (0.35) 
Age of household head 0.011 *** 0.016** 0.011 *** 0.016** 
I (3.26) (1.97) (3.26) (2.01) 
Age of household head, -0.012*** -0.015* -0.012*** -0.016* 
squared/100 (-3. 98) (-1.88) (-3.98) (-1.95) 
Household Human Capital 
Require interpretation -0.141 ** -0.203*** 
(-2.57) (-3.91) 
(3) Exclude 
households with 
remittances 
Pool Difference 
-0.321 *** 0.081 
(-12.20) (1.18) 
0.151 *** -0.151 
(2.97) (-1.24) 
0.482*** -0.064 
(8.01) (-0.44) 
0.436*** -0.039 
( 6.61) (-0.21) 
-0.061 *** -0.031 
(-3.52) (-0.74) 
-0.069*** -0.006 
(-3.19) (-0.11) 
0.004 0.043 
(0.16) (0.71) 
-0.068*** 0.000 
(-3. 70) (0.00) 
0.013*** 0.016* 
(3.75) (1.92) 
-0.014*** -0.015* 
(-4.55) (-1.82) 
-0.139** 
(-2.41) 
(4) Exclude 
poor households 
Pool Difference 
-0.347*** 0.135 
(-12.13) (1.50) 
0.118** -0.221 
(2.20) (-1.58) 
0.381 *** -0.148 
(6.09) (-0.83) 
0.373*** -0.177 
(5.43) (-0.94) 
-0.060*** -0.042 
(-3.18) (-0.81) 
-0.050** -0.015 
(-2.22) (-0.23) 
-0.011 0.070 
(-0.44) (0.92) 
-0.061 *** -0.030 
(-3.27) (-0.52) 
0.011 *** 0.018* 
(3.05) (1.85) 
-0.012*** -0.017* 
(-3.54) (-1.77) 
-0.098 
(-1.20) 
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(1) Full sample (2) 'Require Interpretation' 
instrumented by propensity 
to speak Vietnamese 
Pool Difference Pool Difference 
Years of schooling 0.054*** 0.023*** 0.054*** 0.023*** 
(24.06) (3.60) (24.06) (3.68) 
Household Physical Capital 
Irrigated crop land 0.009*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 
(1000 m2) (5.73) (0.96) (5.74) (0.91) 
Non-Irrigated crop land 0.006*** -0.004 0.006*** -0.004 
(1000 m2) (3.28) (-1.21) (3 .28) (-1.25) 
Perennial land 0.009*** -0.005* 0.009*** -0.005* 
(1000 m2) (7.35) (-1.75) (7.37) (-1.75) 
Forestry land 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 
(1000 m2) (2.84) (0.12) (2.84) (0.13) 
Water-surface land 0.012*** -0.010** 0.012*** -0.010** 
(1000 m2) ( 4.20) (-2.17) ( 4.20) (-2.16) 
Other land 0.006* 0.010 0.006* 0.010 
(1000 m2) (1.81) (0.48) (1.81) (0.50) 
Commune characteristics 
Rural high or low mountains -0.039** 0.078 -0.038* 0.045 
(-1.98) (1.10) (-1.95) (0.61) 
Rural hilly lands 0.015 -0.045 0.015 I -0.041 
(0 .51) (-0.39) (0.52) (-0.35) 
Distance to city -0.287*** -0.112 -0.268*** -0.327** 
(1000 km) (-5.04) (-0.81) (-4.84) (-2.42) 
Commune Infrastructure 
Power 0.170*** -0.025 0.172*** -0.034 
(2.85) (-0.16) (2.85) (-0.22) 
(3) Exclude 
households with 
remittances 
Pool Difference 
0.054*** 0.019*** 
(23.54) (3.00) 
0.008*** 0.003 
(5.55) (1.03) 
0.006*** -0.003 
(3.30) (-0.85) 
0.009*** -0.004 
(7.18) (-1.56) 
0.001 ** -0.000 
(2.10) (-0.13) 
0.011 *** -0.004 
(3.78) (-0.21) 
0.006* 0.010 
(1.73) (0.49) 
-0.022 0.080 
(-1.11) (1.16) 
0.031 -0.059 
(1.07) (-0.54) 
-0.295*** -0.168 
(-5.13) (-1.22) 
0.163*** -0.017 
(2.61) (-0.11) 
(4) Exclude 
poor households 
Pool Difference 
0.049*** 0.026*** 
(19.80) (3.41) 
0.007*** 0.005* 
( 4.64) (1.85) 
0.004** -0.002 
(2.34) (-0.67) 
0.008*** -0.007** 
(6.95) (-2.02) 
0.001 ** 0.001 
(2.27) (0.73) 
0.011 *** -0.011 ** 
(4.13) (-2.26) 
-0.000 -0.079*** 
(-0.06) (-2.63) 
-0.011 0.032 
(-0.54) (0.37) 
0.027 0.042 
(0.88) (0.23) 
-0.238*** 0.006 
(-3.82) (0.04) 
0.130* -0.038 
(1.73) (-0.18) 
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(1) Full sample (2) 'Require Interpretation' (3) Exclude (4) Exclude 
instrumented by propensity households with poor households 
to speak Vietnamese remittances 
Pool Difference Pool Difference Pool Difference · Pool Difference 
Clean water 0.031 ** -0.096 0.031 ** -0.087 0.026* -0.095 0.026* -0.090 
(2.06) (-1.49) (2.10) (-1.23) (1.76) (-1.54) (1.66) (-1.18) 
Hard-surfaced car road 0.004 -0.078** 0.004 -0.091 ** 0.002 -0.076* 0.004 -0.077* 
(0.28) (-1.99) (0.30) (-2.31) (0.16) (-1.94) (0.29) (-1.72) 
Primary school 0.028** 0.041 0.029** 0.019 0.025* 0.050 0.021 0.057 
(2.02) (1.24) (2.08) (0.56) (1.84) (1.52) (1.44) (1.54) 
Village daily market 0.048*** -0.025 0.048*** -0.033 0.049*** -0.015 0.047*** -0.034 
(3.23) (-0.50) (3.22) (-0.64) (3.28) (-0.29) (3.07) (-0.59) 
State-owned enterprise 0.021 -0.033 0.022 -0.023 0.015 -0.035 0.023 -0.034 
within 10km (1.28) (-0.66) (1.25) (-0.63) (0.90) (-0. 72) (1.31) (-0.70) 
Foreign-shared enterprise 0.091 *** 0.090 0.092*** 0.109 0.096*** 0.085 0.090*** 0.082 
within 10km (3.95) (1.13) (3.99) (1.46) (4.15) (1.15) (3.87) (1.11) 
Local enterprise 0.061 *** -0.014 0.062*** -0.030 0.060*** -0.018 0.061 *** -0.072* 
( 4.23) (-0.37) ( 4.27) (-0.63) ( 4.20) (-0.49) ( 4.12) (-1.95) 
Minority Group -0.242*** -0.227*** -0.249*** -0.233*** 
(-9.00) (-9.46) (-9.06) (-7.64) 
Constant 7.281 *** -0.304 7.292*** -0.282 7.218*** -0.315 7.495*** -0.408 
(71.81) (-1.17) (71.46) (-1.09) (69.58) (-1.24) (64.76) (-1.30) 
Number of households 6560 6560 6560 6560 6235 6235 5366 5366 
Communes 2187 2187 2187 I 2187 2180 2180 2120 2120 
Log of real per capita expenditure as dependent variable. t statistics are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regression omits the 
proportion of members aged 06; one- or two-generation households that consist of no more than two children; commune geographical types as coastal/ delta; 
other dummy variables having yes=l and no=0. 
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2.5.6 Decomposition of the Ethnic Gap 
In this section, we employ a Blinder-Oaxaca deco1nposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blin-
der, 1973), commonly applied in labour economics, to investigate how household 
and commune characteristics and endowments contribute to differences between 
the majority and minority groups. This technique has been applied in previous 
research on ethnic inequality in Vietnam (Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; 
Baulch et al., 2007; Hoang et al., 2007; Baulch et al., 2012, 2010). The basic idea 
is to split (in this case) the average log expenditure gap between the majority and 
minority populations into the gap caused by the difference in endowments ( the re-
gressors) and the difference in returns to endowments ( the regression parameters), 
or 
A A 
Ym-Ye 
A A 
Ym-Ye 
A A 
Ym-Ye 
(Xmtm + Zmim + &m) - (Xete + Zeie + &e) 
(Xm - Xe)tm + Xe(tm - te) 
+(Zm - Ze)im + Ze(im - ie) + (&m - &e) (2.5) 
(Xm - Xe)tm + (Zm - Ze)im 
+ Xe (tm - te) + Ze ( im - ie) + ( &m - &e) (2.6) 
where the subscripts m and e stand for majority and minority groups , respectively. 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of 2.5 represent the gap in house-
hold expenditures that can be attributed to differences in the household-level ex-
planatory variables of the majority and minority groups , and the returns to given 
household-level explanatory variables. The third and the forth terms measure the 
gap in expenditures that can be attributed to differences in the commune-level 
explanatory variables of the two groups, and the returns to those commune-level 
explanatory variables. The last term, the difference in the constants, represents 
the difference in unobserved commune fixed effects combined with joint effects of 
excluded dummy variables. 
Rearranging equation 2.5 now gives the left-hand side as the total difference in 
expenditures, or the ethnic gap, while the sum of the first two terms on the right-
hand side of equation 2.6 is the difference in endowments, and the remainder of 
the expression is the difference in returns to endowments. The results presented 
in Table 2. 9 are arranged in accordance with estimation results presented in Table 
2.4, which include household characteristics, household human capital, household 
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physical capital, commune characteristics and commune infrastructure. We use, 
alternatively, the majority and minority coefficients as reference weights. We also 
present our decomposition results in comparison with those generated by OLS and 
FE estimates, which were previously applied in the literature. 
Our results indicate that the ethnic gap is largely explained by differences in 
characteristics and endowments. Together, they account for as much as 66 percent 
of the ethnic gap using minority group coefficients as the reference weight. When 
majority coefficients are used as the reference, language was omitted because its 
coefficient is undefined for the majority. In this case, differences in endowments 
account for about 49 percent of the ethnic gap. 
Regardless of which group is used as a reference, our IV-based decomposition 
results are in sharp contrast to FE-based decomposition results in Table 2.9 as well 
as established views in the literature. In particular, the FE-based decomposition 
results in Table 2.9 suggest that differences in characteristics and endowments 
explain only about 30 percent of the ethnic gap. These results are similar to 
findings in the literature using FE estimators on earlier household data (Hoang 
et al., 2007; Baulch et al., 2007; Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001), and again, 
they are much different compared to our IV-based decomposifion results. The 
reason for the difference between IV-based and FE-based decomposition results 
is that the FE estimator fails to estimate impacts of commune-specific observed 
attributes such as geography and infrastructure, and hence misses an important 
part of the story on inequality. 
OLS-based decomposition results, on the other hand, are closer to our IV-based 
decomposition ones because they can also estimate returns to commune-specific 
attributes. However, the estimation bias of OLS causes a corresponding bias in 
the OLS-based decomposition results, which is especially clear in differences in 
returns to endowments. For example, IV-based (and FE-based) decomposition 
results suggest the principal driver in the difference in returns to endowments is 
the ethnic disparity in returns to human capital. To put it differently, according to 
these two consistent estimators, even if the minority had the same level of human 
capital (i.e., measured by education and language) , they could never 'catch up ' 
with the majority since the minority has lower returns to those attributes. On the 
contrary, OLS-based decomposition results show an insignificant and much smaller 
difference in returns to human capital between the two groups. The biased OLS-
based decomposition results reported in Table 2.9 are also comparable to OLS-
based decomposition findings in previous literature (Baulch et al. , 2012, 2010). 
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It is important to note that not only does the difference in endowments in our IV-
based decomposition explain most of the ethnic gap, all of its components are also 
highly significant. Indeed, with an exception of land, all differences in endowments 
contribute to widening the ethnic gap. In particular, the differences in infrastruc-
ture and household characteristics, each accounting for 20 percent of the ethnic 
gap, are the largest among all of the components. Differences in household human 
capital also play an important role in widening the ethnic gap, explaining about 
16 percent of the total difference, as do differences in commune characteristics. In 
summary, our results support government investment in commune infrastructure 
to mitigate ethnic inequality and add a further call for removing language barriers, 
improving education for the minority in both the number of years and (presum-
ably) the quality of education as well as allowing for more mobility, especially 
among the minority. 
On the other hand, the components in differences in returns to endowments in our 
IV-based decomposition, although they contribute to narrowing the ethnic gap, 
are largely insignificant. A key exception is household human capital, which stands 
out as highly significant and widens the gap by as much as 40 percent. Returns to 
household characteristics also increase the ethnic gap, but again :Vith no statistical 
significance. Finally, the effects of location can also be observed in differences in 
returns to commune characteristics as well as in the constants, in addition to 
differences in commune characteristics. Both differences in returns to commune 
characteristics as well as in the constants are insignificant and apparently do not 
contribute to the gap. 
, 
TABLE 2.9: Decomposition of Ethnic Gap 
Minority Group as Reference 
OLS FE IV 
Difference in Endowments 0.428*** 0.187*** 0.375*** 
(0.034) (0.026) (0.035) 
Household Characteristics 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.119*** 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
Household Human Capital 0.121 *** 0.104*** 0.089*** 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.020) 
Household Physical Capital -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.043*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Commune Characteristics 0.093** 0.093** 
(0.037) (0.048) 
Commune Infrastructure 0.124*** 0.118*** 
(0.024) (0.032) 
Difference in Returns to Endowments 0.137*** 0.377*** 0.190*** 
(0.034) (0.026) (0.034) 
Household Characteristics 0.375** 0.348* 0.386 
(0.177) (0.183) (0.205) 
Household Human Capital 0.048 0.198*** 0.223*** 
(0.048) (0.051) (0.061) 
Household Physical Capital 0.007 0.001 -0.005 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
Commune Characteristics -0.020 -0.004 
(0.024) (0.029) 
Commune Infrastructure 0.042 I -0.094 
(0.078) (0.165) 
Constant 
-0.317 -0.170 -0.317 
(0.195) (0.172) (0.255) 
Standard errors are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. 
Majority Group as Reference 
OLS FE IV 
0.293*** 0.173*** 0.276*** 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.025) 
0.104*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
0.088*** 0.091 *** 0.090*** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
-0.025* -0.030** -0.029** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
0.048*** 0.048*** 
(0.015) (0.015) 
0.079*** 0.054*** 
(0.010) (0.012) 
0.272*** 0.392*** 0.289*** 
(0.023) (0.018) (0.027) 
0.397** 0.359** 0.394* 
(0.176) (0.183) (0.204) 
0.082* 0.211 *** 0.221 *** 
(0.043) (0.047) (0.052) 
-0.003 -0.008 -0.019 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022) 
0.026 0.041 
(0.059) (0.075) 
0.087 -0.030 
(0.069) (0.150) 
-0.317 -0.170 -0.317 
(0.195) (0.172) (0.254) 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This paper has examined what drives the gap in household expenditures between 
the two ethnic groups in Vietnam. Based on an IV approach, we have argued that 
removing language barriers can significantly narrow the gap, that majority house-
holds do not benefit more than minorities from local infrastructure investment, 
and that the ethnic gap is as much as 49 to 66 percent attributed to differences 
in characteristics and endowments, especially household characteristics and com-
mune infrastructure. The results represent a significant improvement over OLS 
estimates in explaining the sources of ethnic inequality, as well as FE estimates, 
which are unable to estimate commune specific observed explanatory variables. 
Minorities tend to live in more remote and mountainous areas of Vietnam but this 
fact is found to contribute a much smaller effect than expected to the ethnic gap. 
That said, a relaxed policy on migration, especially for the minority would help 
ease this disparity. On the other hand, minority households, regardless of location, 
can benefit greatly from basic infrastructure in the commune: clean water, electric 
power, and the provision of a hard-surfaced road. Government programs, as such 
Program 135, will thus contribute to enhancing the living standards of minorities 
and reduce the ethnic gap through providing more equalised levels of commune 
endowments. 
We have shown that while removing language barriers eases ethnic inequality, 
especially through the gains from schooling and to a lesser extent, from land, the 
ethnic difference in returns to education are intensified in an environment where 
households from both groups are found to live. Our results thus suggest that 
either the special educational needs of minority children are not being addressed 
in classrooms, or unequal treatment in favour of the majority exists in the labour 
1narket. 
The importance of language is a new and perhaps surprising addition to the under-
standing of the differences in expenditures among majority and minority house-
holds in Vietnam. Much of this is potentially attributable to the quality of 2006 
VHLSS data, and the use of a language indicator in our estimates, but the size 
of the effect both in the estimation and in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in-
dicates its relative significance, and greatly conditions how we might interpret 
results from estimates using earlier versions of VHLSS data. 
With this mind, there are at least two issues worth exploring in future work. 
First, it would be useful to further investigate the effects of social characteristics 
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on household living standards. Co1nmunity and social effects, along with language 
skills and the ability to 'social network', are important indicators of differences in 
living standards and potential changes in the poverty rate. Little in our current 
work accounts for network and community effects, except for the simple presence 
of language barriers and the co-location that goes with being in a mixed commune. 
Second, there is a need to investigate the role of labour mobility and barriers in 
the labour market that prevent more equalised returns from education. These are 
partly bound up in language differences, but in many circumstances this may not 
be the case. In this regard, our results would also benefit from measures of the 
differences in labour market experience among households, as well as a further 
investigation of potential preferential treatment for the majority (in particular) in 
mixed communes. 
Chapter 3 
The Fixed-Effects Vector 
Decomposition: A critical 
analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
Researchers in many fields seek to exploit the advantages of panel data. Having 
repeated observations across time for each group in a panel allows one, under 
suitable assumptions, to control for unobserved heterogeneity across the groups 
which might otherwise bias the estimates. However, traditional panel analysis 
techniques have difficulty when some of the explanatory variables have little or 
no variation across time within a group. We consider here the properties of a 
recently introduced methodology for panel data, known as fixed-effects vector 
deco1nposition FEVD, which Pli.imper and Troeger (2007a) developed to produce 
improved estimates for such time-invariant or slowly-changing variables. 
From the earliest days of panel data methods, there has been a tension between 
alternative treatments of the unobserved individual effects as either fixed or ran-
dom. Mundlak (1978) demonstrated that a generalized least squares approach to 
unobserved group effects, which treats the1n as random and potentially correlated 
with the regressor, gives rise to the traditional fixed-effects (FE) estimator. How-
ever, FE is a blunt instrument for controlling for correlation between observed 
and unobserved characteristics because it ignores any systematic average differ-
ences between groups. Thus any potential explanatory factors that are constant 
longitudinally (time-invariant) will be ignored by the FE estimator. Likewise, any 
48 
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explanatory variables that have little within variation ( that is, slowly-changing 
over the longitudinal dimension) will have little explanatory power, and will result 
in imprecise coefficient estimates that have large standard errors. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) had previously shown that a better estimator than FE 
is available if some of the explanatory variables are known to be uncorrelated with 
the unobserved group effect, thus described as exogenous explanatory variables. 
The Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator is an instrumental variables (IV) procedure 
that combines aspects of both fixed-effects and random-effects estimation. Given a 
sufficient number of exogenous regressors, the HT procedure allows time-invariant 
variables to be kept in the model. It also provides more efficient estimates than 
FE for the coefficients of the exogenous time-varying variables. The downside of 
the HT estimator resides in specifying the exogeneity status for each of the time-
varying and time-invariant variables in the model. In many practical applications 
such detailed specification is onerous. 
Pli.imper and Troeger introduced FEVD as an alternative that seemed to be supe-
rior to HT because it requires fewer explicit assumptions yet seemed to always have 
more desirable sampling properties. Like the FE estimator, and unlike HT, FEVD 
does not require specifying the exogeneity status of the explanatory variables. Like 
the HT esti'inator, and unlike FE, the FEVD procedure gives coefficient estimates 
for time-invariant ( and slowly-changing) variables as well as the time-varying vari-
ables. Plumper and Troeger motivated the FEVD procedure on heuristic grounds, 
and advocated it on the strength of favorable results in a Monte Carlo simulation 
study. In particular, the simulation indicated that FEVD has superior sampling 
properties for time-invariant explanatory variables. 
Although the FEVD procedure comes out of the empirical political science litera-
ture, it is rapidly finding application in many other areas including social research 
and economics. At last count there were well over 400 references in Google Scholar 
to this emerging estimation methodology. Several empirical studies report . stan-
dard errors for FEVD-based esti1nates that are strikingly smaller than estimates 
based on traditional methods. There is , however, little formal analysis of the 
FEVD procedure in this literature. 
This chapter is a remedy to the lack of formal analysis. We demonstrate that the 
FEVD coefficient estimator can be equivalently written as an IV estimator, which 
serves to demystify the nature of the three-stage FEVD procedure and its rela-
tionship with other estimators. As one immediate benefit , the IV representation 
allows us to draw on a standard toolkit of results. 
~ 
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First, using the IV variance formula, we show that the FEVD standard errors for 
coefficients of both the time-varying and time-invariant variables are uniformly too 
small. In the case of the latter variables, the discrepancy in the FEVD standard 
errors is unbounded, and grows with the length of the panel and with the variance 
of the group effects. 
Second, using the moment-condition representation, we prove that the coefficients 
of the time-varying variables in FEVD are exactly the same as in FE. This result 
is apparent in many of the practical studies which list FE estimates beside FEVD 
estimates, but it is hardly mentioned in the existing analytical material. An 
immediate implication is that FEVD estimates, like FE, are inefficient if any of 
the time-varying variables are exogenous. 
Third, FEVD usually produces lower variance estimates of time-varying coeffi-
cients than HT in small samples. However, it does so by including invalid instru-
ments that produce inconsistent estimates. So, even with massive quantities of 
data those FEVD estimates will deviate from the truth. 
Further developments can also be made to the estimator, to exploit the ideas in 
FEVD while avoiding the problems of that procedure. The adv..antage of FEVD 
will be found in smaller samples where the large sample concept of consistency 
does not dominate. The Monte Carlo simulation studies by Plumper and Traeger 
(2007a) and Mitze (2009) show a trade-off between bias and efficiency in which 
FEVD often appears to be better than either FE or HT under quadratic loss. 
We present Monte Carlo evidence that a standard shrinkage approach combines 
the desirable small sample properties of FEVD with the desirable large sample 
properties of the HT estimator, so that it has superior risk to both FEVD and HT 
over a wide region of the parameter space. 
In the next section we introduce the notation to be used and describe the three-
stage FEVD estimator. We summarize the connections between these stages in 
a theorem, which we prove by comparing the various moment conditions. This 
approach demonstrates naturally the description of the FEVD estimator as IV. 
Section 3.3 compares the correct IV variance formula with the formula implicit 
in the standard errors of the three-stage FEVD approach. The main results are 
summarized in two further theorems. We also provide an empirical example and 
Monte Carlo simulations to illustrate these results and some from the previous 
section. In Section 3.4 we examine the relationships between estimators in more 
detail, allowing the possibility of a trade-off between bias and variance to produce 
an estimator with lower mean-squared error. Some Monte Carlo evidence in the 
9 
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spirit of Plumper and Troeger that demonstrates the superiority of a standard 
shrinkage estimator is also provided in this section. Section 3.5 has some overall 
conclusions. 
3.2 The Model 
The data are ordered so that there are N groups each of T observations. The 
model for a single scalar observation is 
Yit = Xit/3 + Zty + ui + Eit for i = 1, ... , N and t = 1, ... , T. (3.1) 
Here, Xit is a k x 1 vector of time-varying explanatory variables, and Zi is a p x 1 
vector of time-invariant explanatory variables. 1 The parameters (3, ,, the group 
effect ui, and the error term Eit are all unobserved. Some elements of Xit or Zi are 
correlated with the group effect ui, in which case we call those variables endoge-
nous. Otherwise we call those variables exogenous. With endogenous explanatory 
variables standard linear regression techniques may produce estimates of the un-
known parameters which are inconsistent in the sense that they- do not converge 
to the true parameter values as the sample size grows large. One standard ap-
proach to this endogeneity problem is to use the instrumental variables technique 
developed by Hausman and Taylor. 
Notation 
The presentation is considerably simplified by introducing some projection matrix 
notation. Let 
D = IN 0 ir, (3.2) 
where IN is an N x N identity matrix and ir is a T x 1 vector of ones. That is , 
D is a matrix of dummy variables indicating group membership. For any matrix 
M, we use PM= M(M' M)-1 lv[' to indicate the projection matrix for M, and we 
use QM = I - PM to indicate the projection matrix for the nullspace of M. For 
example, 
PD= D(D' D)-1 D' = !_(IN 0 lTl~) 
T (3.3) 
1 The setup here describes a balanced panel with observations on every t for each i, but 
the ideas extend to unbalanced panels with more complicated notation. A constant can be 
represented in this model by including a vector of ones as part of the time-invariant elements, 
z . 
.. 
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is the matrix which projects a vector onto D. This particular projection produces 
a vector of group means. That is, PDY = {:zli} 0 ir, where f/i = } I:.,'{' 1 Yit· Also, 
QD = INr- PD (3.4) 
is the matrix which produces the within-group variation. That is, QDY = {Yit-:Zli} 
is the NT x 1 vector of within-group differences. 
The FEVD Estimator 
The FEVD proceeds in three stages, which we detail below. To sharpen the 
analysis, we assume that the elements of Z are exactly time-invariant (not just 
slowly-changing), so that PDZ = Z. An explicit analysis of the slowly-changing 
case yields qualitatively similar insights. 
Stage 1 
Perform a fixed effects regression of y on the time-varying X. -This is ordinary 
least squares (OLS) after within transformation: 
QDy = QDXf3 + QDZ,' + QDu + QDe (3.5) 
Note that the within transformation wipes out the time-invariant explanatory 
variables Z, and the group effect u. The moment condition corresponding to a 
fixed effects regression is 
(y - Xb)'QDX = 0. (3.6) 
The unexplained component after this first step, the residuals from FE estimation, 
is y - Xb. The group-average of the unexplained component is PD (y - Xb). 
Stage 2 
Regress the group-average of the unexplained component from the first step on 
the time-invariant Z. The moment condition is (PD(y- Xb) - Zg)'z = 0. Using 
the fact that PDZ = Z, this moment condition can be equivalently written as 
(y-Xb-Zg)'Z=0. (3.7) 
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The group-average residuals from this regression are 
h=PD(y-Xb-Zg). (3.8) 
Stage 3 
The group-average residuals h are used as proxies for the unobserved effect u in 
the original model. Regress y on X, Z, and h to get /3, ,, and fJ where fJ is the 
coefficient of h. The coefficients from this step are the final FEVD estimates. The 
moment conditions are 
(y - X/3 - z, - hfJ)'[X, Z, h] = 0. (3.9) 
Theorem 1. The solution for /3 is b from Stage 1; the solution for r is g from 
Stage 2; and the solution for fJ is one. 
Proof. We need to verify that the moment conditions (3.9) are satisfied at /3 = b, 
r = g, and fJ = 1. This requires that 
(y - Xb - Zg - h)'[X, Z, h] = 0. (3.10) 
Substituting in the definition of h from (3.8) and gathering terms, this simplifies 
to 
(y - Xb - Zg)'QD[X, Z, h] = 0. (3.11) 
Using the fact that QDZ = 0, this further simplifies to 
(y - Xb)'QD[X, Z, h] = 0. (3.12) 
The first set of equalities in (3.12) must be satisfied, since it is identical to the 
moment condition (3.6) that defines b. The second set of equalities must be sat-
isfied since QDZ = 0. Similarly, the third set of equalities must be satisfied 
since QDh = 0, which follows from the definition of h in (3.8) and the fact that 
QDPD = 0. □ 
Instrumental Variables Representation 
Using Theorem 1 we can show that the FEVD estimator can also be expressed as 
an IV estimator for a particular set of instruments. The major benefit of using the 
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IV representation is that one can draw on a standard toolkit of results. Theorem 
1 shows that the FEVD estimates of (3 are identical to the standard fixed effects 
estimator b from Stage 1. This estimator is defined by the moment condition 
(3.6). Theorem 1 also shows that the FEVD estimates of "Y are equivalent to the 
estimator of g from Stage 2. This estimator is defined by the moment condition 
(3.7). Combining both moment conditions, and using the fact that QDZ = 0, the 
full moment conditions for the FEVD estimator are 
(y - X(3 - Z"Y)'[QDX, Z] = 0. (3.13) 
In other words, the FEVD estimator is equivalent to an IV estimator using the 
instruments Q DX and Z. 
3.3 Variance Formulae 
3.3.1 IV Sampling Variance 
Using standard results for IV estimators, the asymptotically correct sampling vari-
ance of the FEVD procedure is 
Vrv(/3, "Y) = (H'W)- 1 H'rlH(W' H)-1 for H = [QDX, Z] and W = [X, Z]. (3.14) 
Here, His the matrix of instruments and W is the matrix of explanatory variables. 
n is the covariance of the residual, ui + Eit, which can be expressed as 
n = a;INT + a~IN ® lrl~ = a;QD +(a;+ Ta~)PD. (3 .15) 
Using straightforward algebraic manipulation of (3.14), the IV sampling variances 
of (3 and of "Y are expanded as below: 
(
X'QD) (X'QDX (H'W) = [X, Z] = 
Z' Z'X z~z) 
( 
(X'QDX)-l 
(H'W)-1 = -(Z'z)-1 Z'X(X'QvX)-1 (Z':)-1) 
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H'DH= 
X'QD 
(a;+ :aDZ'Z) 
( 
0"2 I 
(H'W)-1 H'QH = -a;(z'~)-1 Z'X (a; +:aDI) 
VrvCB, ,) = (H'w)- 1 H'DH(W' H)-l = 
O";(X'QDx)- 1 -(J";(X'QDx)-1 X' Z(Z' z)-1 
-(J";(z'z)-1 Z'X(X'QDx)-1 (O"; + TO"~)(Z'z)-1 
+O";(Z' z)-1 Z' X(X'QDx)- 1 X' Z(Z' z)-1 
I 
(3.16) 
3.3.2 FEVD Sampling Variance in Comparison with IV 
Sampling Variance 
Plumper and Troeger state that the sampling variance of the FEVD estimator 
can be obtained by applying the standard OLS formula to the Stage 3 regression. 
Therefore, 
X'X X'Z X'h 
VFEvo(,B, 'Y, 0) = s2 ([X, z, h]'[X, z, h]r1 = s2 1 Z' X Z' z Z'h 
h'X h'Z h'h 
-1 
(3.17) 
Here, s2 = IIY - X/3 - z, - hll 2 / dof , where dof is the degrees of freedom. By 
application of (3.8), the expression for s2 can be simplified to 
s
2 
= IIQD(Y - X/3) 11 2 / dof , (3.18) 
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which we note is the standard text book FE estimator for CJ; when dof = NT-N -k 
(see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, p. 271). 2 
Now consider the variance of /3. The FEVD variance formula for /3 is the top-left 
block of the overall FEVD variance formula in (3.17); using the partitioned-inverse 
formula this submatrix can be written as 
VFEvo(/3) = s2 (X'Qrz,h]x)-1 . (3.19) 
From the IV variance formula in (3.16), the correct variance for /3 is 
½v(/3) = CJ;(X'QDx)- 1 . (3.20) 
Note that this is exactly the textbook fixed effects variance formula. 
Now we note from (3.18) that s2 is a consistent estimator of CJ;. However, the 
matrices in the FEVD formula (3.19) and the correct IV formula (3.20) differ. 
The FEVD variance formula for /3 must therefore be incorrect, and we can show 
the direction of the error. 
Theorem 2. The FEVD variance formula for coefficients on time-varying vari-
ables is ltoo small. 
Proof Now PD[Z, h] = [Z, h], so that PDP[Z,h] = Prz,h]· Such a relationship be-
tween projection matrices implies that PD - Prz,h] is positive semi-definite (in ma-
trix shorthand, PD > Prz,h]) - So, QD < Q[Z,h]· That (X'Q[Z,h]x)-1 < (X'QDx)- 1 
follows immediately. This inequality will almost always be strict because the p + l 
variables [Z, h] cannot span the whole of the N-dimensional space of group oper-
ator D, and the X's have arbitrary within-group variation. □ 
The FEVD formula for the variance of /3 is biased in that it systematically un-
derstates the true sampling variance of the estimator. The essential inequality 
does not disappear as N gets larger, so the formula is also inconsistent. The usual 
reported standard errors will be too small. 
2 The usual OLS formula for the standard errors from the Stage 3 regression would calculate 
the scale term using dof = NT - k - p - 1, where pis the number of Z variables including the 
constant and the final minus one allows for the additional regressor h. This divisor would clearly 
produce an inconsistent estimator of a; for large N and small T. Plumper and Troeger (2007a, 
p. 129) mention briefly an adjustment to the degrees of freedom and, although they do not give 
an explicit formula , their software employs the divisor dof = NT - N - k - p + 1 (Plumper and 
TI:oeger, 2007b). This adjustment would yield a consistent estimate of a; , but it is nonstandard 
and slightly biased. To sharpen the subsequent analysis, we use the standard unbiased estimator 
of a;, in which dof = NT - N - k. 
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Now, consider the variance of 1 . The FEVD variance formula for , is the middle 
block of the overall FEVD variance formula in (3.17). 
We have 
½EvD(,) = s2 (Z'Q[X,h]z)-1 
= s2 (Z' z)-1 + s2 (Z' z)- 1 Z'[X, h] ([X, h]'Qz[X, h])-1 [X, h]' Z(Z' z)- 1 
where the second expression comes from the alternative representation of the par-
titioned inverse. Note that Z' h = 0, so in the partitioned central matrix of the 
second term, only the sub matrix corresponding to the X will be selected. We 
then have the simplification: 
VFEVD ( ,) = s2 (Z' z)- 1 + s2 (Z' z)-1 [(Z' X), OJ ([X, h]' Q z[X, hJ)-1 [(X' Z), OJ (Z' z)- 1 
Since Qzh = h, the right hand side is further simplified to: 
VFEVD( ,) = s2 (Z' z)-1+s2 (Z' z)- 1 [(Z' X), OJ ([( Q zX)h]'[( Q zX)h])-1 [(X' Z), O] (Z' z)- 1 
= s2 (Z' z)-1 + s2 (Z' z)-1 (Z'X)(X'QzQhQzx)- 1 (X1 Z)(Z' z)-1 
As QzQhQz = QzQh = I - Pz - Ph, and ash and Z are orthogonal, Pz +Ph= 
P[Zh], the FEVD variance formula in (3.17) written as: 
VFEVD(,) = s2 (Z'z)-l + s2 (Z1z)- 1Z'X(X'Q[z,h]x)- 1X'Z(Z'Z)- 1 . (3.21) 
In contrast, according to (3.14), the correct variance for, is 
VIV(,)= CJ;(z'z)-1 + TCJ~(z'z)- 1 + CJ;(z'z)-1 Z'X(X'QDx)-1x'z(z'z)-1 . 
· (3.22) 
Again, s2 is a consistent estimator of CJ; , so the first term in (3.21) and in (3.22) 
is essentially the same. However, the expressions are otherwise different , so the 
FEVD variance formula for 1 must also be incorrect. Again, we can show the 
direction of the error. 
Theorem 3. The FEVD variance formula for time-invariant variables is too 
small. 
Proof. As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, (X'QDx)-1 > (X'Q[z,h]x)-1 with al-
most certain strict inequality, so the last term in the FEVD variance formula (3.21) 
e 
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understates the corresponding term in the correct variance expression (3.22). The 
only exception would be the unlikely event that X and Z are exactly orthogonal, 
causing those tenns to vanish. But even then, the FEVD variance formula will be 
an understatement because it omits the term Ta-~(Z' z)-1, which must be positive 
definite whenever there are random group effects. □ 
In general the FEVD variance formula for "Y is systematically biased and incon-
sistent. The usual reported standard errors will be too small. The extent of the 
downward bias is unbounded. The correct variance expression includes a term 
that is directly proportional to the number of observations per group T and to 
the variance of the group effects a-~. In contrast the FEVD variance formula, and 
hence the standard errors, are unaffected by these parameters. By increasing ei-
ther or both of these parameters, with everything else held constant, the extent 
of the downward bias in the FEVD variance formula becomes arbitrarily large. 
3.3.3 Empirical Evidence for the Theorems 
Reported results from the applied empirical literature align with -these theoretical 
results. Table 3.1 presents our replication of Table 1 in Belke and Spies (2008), 
and shows results for pooled OLS (OLS), FE, FEVD, and HT. We add a column 
for the results from Stage 2 of FEVD and a row for the coefficient 8 that arises 
in Stage 3 to further illustrate our theoretical results. 3 The first six variables 
only are shown for brevity. They include logged nominal GDP of the importing 
country lngdim, logged nominal GDP of the exporting country lngdpex and logged 
bilateral real exchange rate lrer, as time-varying variables. The time-invariant 
variables shown are logged great circle distance in km ldist, border length in km 
border, and dummy for one or both countries being landlocked ll. Results are 
estimated from a panel sample of N = 420 trading pairs for T = 14 years giving 
5262 observations. 
The coefficients for the first three ( time-varying) variables are the same for FE 
and FEVD, as shown by Theorem 1. To illustrate the second aspect of Theore1n 
1, the coefficients for the next three (time-invariant) variables are exactly equal in 
Stage 2 and FEVD, and the solution for 8 is one. Theorem 2 is illustrated by the 
way the first three FEVD reported standard errors are systematically smaller than 
3 We are grateful to those authors for supplying their data. We found some occasional small 
differences in reported standard errors, probably due to use of "robust" standard errors in the 
published results. The full table of our replication results is provided in the Appendix 3.6.2. 
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lngdpim 
lngdpex 
lrer 
ldist 
border 
11 
6 
TABLE 3.1: Partial Replication of Belke and Spies (2008) 
(1) (2) 
POLS FE 
0.88*** 0.68*** 
(0.04) (0.11) 
0.89*** 0.71 *** 
(0.03) (0.07) 
-0.01 0.13** 
(0.01) (0.06) 
-1.27*** 
(0.11) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.16* 
(0.10) 
(3) 
Stage 2 
-1.41 *** 
(0.04) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
(4) 
FEVD 
0.68*** 
(0.01) 
0.71 *** 
(0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-1.41 *** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.23*** 
(0.00) 
LOO*** 
(0.00) 
(5) 
HT 
0.68*** 
(0.11) 
0.71 *** 
(0.07) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
-1.75*** 
(0.16) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
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One, two, and three asterisks reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
the FE ones, in an order of 0.01, 0.01 and 0.01 , against 0.11, 0.07 and 0.06, even 
though the coefficients themselves are identical and the standard error formula for 
FE is well established as being correct under the assumptions of the model. 
It is a little harder to illustrate Theorem 3, which says that the FEVD standard 
errors on the time-invariant variables are similarly understated. However the HT 
estimator is just-indentified in this case, which is the reason the HT coefficients 
and standard errors for time-varying variables are exactly the same as FE. It is 
no surprise, then, that the coefficient estimates of three time-invariant variables 
(which are all exogenous) are generally similar for POLS, FEVD , and HT. As 
expected, the HT standard errors are slightly larger but very close to those for 
POLS, in an order of 0.16, 0.00 and 0.14 against 0.11 , 0.00 and 0.10. However the 
FEVD standard errors are very small, at 0.00 in every case for the precision that 
is shown. This is most implausible, because one would not expect POLS to be 
generally less efficient, given the structure of this example. 
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Belke and Spies (2008) is the only paper to our knowledge that reports results for 
all methods including POLS, FE, FEVD, and HT. Several other applications report 
both FE and FEVD results ( e.g. Caporale et al., 2009; Mitze, 2009; Krogstrup and 
Walti, 2008). In the studies we examined, the FE t-statistics were consistently 
smaller than those reported for FEVD time-varying variables - and often much 
smaller - except for few cases affected by robust standard error formulae. Again, 
this is despite the fact that the coefficient estimators were actually identical by 
construction. 
3.3.4 Monte Carlo Evidence for the Theorems 
We further illustrate theoretical results by simulation examples. We compare 
the FEVD estimator with an IV estimator having moment conditions specified in 
(3.13) as well as a correct sampling variance formula specified in (3.16). 
The data generating process for our simulation is 
Yit = l + 0.5x1 + 2x2 - 2.5z1 + l.8z2 + ui + eit· (3.23) 
Here, [x1 , x2] is a time-varying mean-zero orthonormal design matrix, and [z1 , z2] 
is a time-invariant mean-zero orthonormal design matrix, all fixed across all ex-
periments. The idiosyncratic error term e is standard normal. The group effect u 
is drawn from a normal distribution in each replication. All variables are uncor-
related with u, and the variance of u conditional on all variables is 14 . Therefore, 
all variables are treated as known exogenous in our simulation. This assumption 
will be relaxed in the next section to allow for correlation between some of time-
invariant variables with group effect u to further investigate performance of FEVD 
to alternative estimators. 
Each experiment in our simulation has 200 replications. The number of groups 
(N) takes values of 5, 30 and 500 while the number of periods (T) takes values of 
5 and 20. This is to cover various ranges of panel width and length in empirical 
research. 
Estimates for the coefficient /31 of the time-varying variable x 1 , and the coefficient 
')11 of the time-invariant variable z1 , using the FEVD estimator and the IV estima-
tor are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. As proved by Theorem 1, estimates by the 
4The specified pattern of covariance is implemented through a Choleski decomposition ap-
proach. 
" 
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two estimators, FEVD and IV, coincide exactly across all sampling distributions. 
Furthermore, increasing either width and length of a panel helps enhancing perfor-
mance of both estimators by making their sampling distribution collapse around 
their expected values. 5 
FIGURE 3.1: Sampling Distributions of beta 1 
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Monte Carlo Simulation with 200 replications; Kernel= epanechnikov. 
Sampling distributions of variances for /31 and , 1 , using the FEVD estimator and 
the IV estimator, are shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. As shown in 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the means and distributions of estimates for variances of /31 
and , 1 , generated by using the IV variance formula, are always on the right of those 
generated by using the IV variance formula, regardless of the width and length of 
the panel data. Therefore, these figures collaborate our Theorems 2 and 3, which 
say that the FEVD variance f onnulas for both time-varying and time-invariant 
variables are too small. 6 
.. 
5Similar results for estimates for parameters /32 and "/2 are presented in the Appendix 3.6.3. 
6Similar results for estimates of variances for /32 and "(2 are presented in the Appendix 3.6.3 . 
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3.4 Comparison to Alternative Estimators 
3.4.1 Theory Framework 
2 
The FEVD estimator was introduced as an alternative to the HT instrumental 
variable estimator. By also expressing FEVD in its instrumental variable represen-
tation we are able to develop insights into their comparative properties. Hausman 
and Taylor showed that the standard fixed effects estimator is equivalent to an IV 
estimator with instrument set QDX. To that, they add any exogenous elements 
of X or of Z as further instruments. 7 
To see the relationship more clearly, decompose X and Z into exogenous and po-
tentially endogenous sets: X = [X1 , X 2) and Z = [Z1 , Z2), where the subscript 
1 indicates exogenous variables and the subscript 2 indicates endogenous vari-
ables. The HT procedure is then an IV estimator which uses the instrument set 
[QDX, X1 , Z1). In contrast, the FEVD procedure is an IV estimator which uses 
the instrument set [QDX, Z1, Z2). 
7Hausman and Taylor describe PDX as the additional instrument, but this interpretation 
follows Breusch et al. (1989) . 
• 
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The first essential difference between these estimators is that the FEVD instrument 
set excludes the exogenous time-varying variables X 1 . Of course, X 1 may have no 
members. In that case, the HT estimator for endogenous Z is not identified, so no 
useful comparisons can be made.8 However, if X 1 has known members, then a more 
efficient estimator than FEVD could be created by augmenting the instrument set 
with X 1 . The second essential difference is that the FEVD instrument set includes 
the potentially endogenous time-invariant variables Z2 . If these variables are in 
fact correlated with the group effect, then the FEVD estimator is inconsistent. 
The FEVD and HT estimators coincide exactly when there are no exogenous 
elements of X and no endogenous elements of Z . 9 The FEVD procedure is . thus 
primarily of interest when some Z may in fact be endogenous. The essential 
question raised by Ph.imper and Traeger is then whether it is better to use a 
biased and inconsistent but lower-variance estimator, or a consistent but higher-
variance estimator. The question of whether a weak-instruments cure is worse 
8Ideally, one would have theoretical grounds for identifying which elements of X are ex-
ogenous. As a practical matter, one could also use an over-identification test to confirm this 
assumption, since the fixed effects estimator of /3 is consistent. 
9More precisely, the two estimators are identical when all elements of X are treated as if 
endogenous and all elements of Z are treated as if exogenous, regardless of the actual endogeneity 
status. See section 3.3.4 for an illustration . 
. 
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FIGURE 3.4: Sampling Distribution of Variance for gamma 1 
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than the disease is a sound one, which has been considered in other contexts by a 
variety of authors; see for example Bound et al. (1995). 
Under a mean-squared error (MSE) loss function, neither the FEVD procedure 
nor the HT procedure will uniformly dominate the other. MSE can be expressed 
as variance plus bias squared. Thus, a consistent estimator such as HT will be 
preferable to the FEVD for sufficiently large sample size. 10 In contrast, for a 
small sample with a small endogeneity problem, it might be preferable to include 
the the time-invariant endogenous variables Z2 as instruments, as FEVD does. 
A more efficient estimator of this type than FEVD would be the IV estimator 
which augments the set of all valid instruments with Z2 , forming the instrument 
set [QDX, X 1 , Z]. 
One conventional approach to finding a balance would be to select between the 
competing estimators based on a specification test (Baltagi et al. , 2003). If the test 
rejects the null hypothesis of no difference between estimators, then HT would be 
selected. Otherwise, the efficient estimator estimator would be selected because 
the evidence of endogeneity is too weak. Selection of a final estimator based on the 
10Of course , consistency does require that valid instruments correlated with Z2 exist. 
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results of a preliminary test is known as a pretest procedure. Inference based on the 
standard errors of the final selected estimator alone may be misleading; however, 
bootstrap techniques which include the model selection step can circumvent this 
problem (Wong, 1997). 
Since the work of James and Stein (1961), statisticians have understood that 
shrinking (biasing) an estimator toward a low-variance target can lower the MSE. 
An extensive literature suggests shrinkage approaches based on using a weighted 
average of two estimators when one estimator is efficient and the other is con-
sistent; see for example Sawa (1973), Feldstein (1974), Mundlak (1978), Green 
and Strawderman (1991), Judge and Mittelhammer (2004), or Mittelhammer and 
Judge (2005). We consider a shrinkage estimator which combines the consistent 
but inefficient HT estimator and the efficient but possible inconsistent IV esti-
mator. For purposes of illustration, we choose a particularly simple shrinkage 
approach, but the literature contains many variations on the basic theme, which 
will have different strengths and weaknesses. If the bias, variance, and covariance 
of two estimators are known, it is algebraically straightforward to find the weight 
which minimizes the MSE of a combined estimator. In particular, suppose one 
estimator ¢ is unbiased. The other estimator x is biased, but has lower variance. 
The shrinkage estimator then has the form x + w(cp - x), where w is the weight 
placed on the consistent estimator. Straightforward calculus shows that optimal 
weight which minimizes MSE is 
µ2 + (]"2 _ O" ,1.. X X X'+' 
W= 2 2 2 2 ' 
µx + O"x + O" ¢ - O"x¢ 
(3.24) 
where bias is indicated by µ and where variance is indicated by O" . 
Of course, the exact bias and variances will usually not be known; however , prac-
tical estimates of these terms are readily available for IV estimators. Mittelham-
mer and Judge (2005) show that plugging in such empirical estimates produces 
a practical weighted-average estimator. They choose a single w to minimize the 
sum of MSE over all coefficients. Since we are primarily interested in the MSE 
of a single coefficient in this analysis, we apply the solution for w, as presented 
in (3.24) which is the single-covariate case of equation 3.5 of Mittelhammer and 
Judge. We use standard empirical estimates of the variance and covariance terms 
fro1n application of the basic IV formula (3.14). The difference between the two 
esti1nators provides our estimate of the bias of the efficient estimator, since HT 
is asymptotically unbiased. Mittelhammer and Judge provide detailed discussion 
on calculating bootstrap percentiles and standard errors, through application of 
.. 
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Efron's bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap (Efron, 1987). The only change 
needed for the present context is to account for the panel structure, which is 
most simply done by resampling at the group level rather than resampling single 
observations independently. 
3.4.2 Monte Carlo Evidence for Comparing the F EV D to 
Alternative Estimators 
In this section we compare the practical performance under a range of conditions of 
various estimators for an endogenous time-invariant Z. In addition to the FEVD 
and HT estimators, we consider a pretest estimator and a shrinkage estimator. 
The pretest estimator selects between HT and the IV estimator based on the 
instrument set set [QDX, X 1 , Z], which treats all Z as exogenous (as FEVD does) 
in addition to using the HT instruments. The pretest selection is based on the 
95% critical value of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test for exogeneity of 
Z (see e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p. 237). The shrinkage estimator 
assigns weights for the two estimators according to a first-stage empirical estimate 
of formula (3.24). 
Pli.imper and Traeger argue for the superiority of the FEVD procedure over the 
HT approach based on Monte Carlo evidence. While our simulation design stays 
close to the original design where appropriate, our design differ from theirs in two 
fundamental respects. 11 The first difference is that in the Plumper and Traeger 
Monte Carlo study, the HT estimator was not actually consistent. This is because 
their data generating process had no correlation between X and Z. The fact 
that the available instruments had, by construction, zero explanatory power for 
the endogenous variable contrasts sharply with their characterization of the Monte 
Carlo results (p. 130): "the advantages of the FEVD estimator over the Hausman-
Taylor cannot be explained by the poor quality of the instruments." Plumper 
and Traeger note (in footnote 11) that the advantage of FEVD persists in their 
experiments regardless of sample size. However, the asymptotic bias of an IV 
estimator is the same as the bias of OLS when the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the endogenous variable, and thus irrelevant (Han and Schmidt, 2001). In 
contrast, with a valid and relevant instrument, the bias of the IV estimator will 
approach zero asymptotically. We therefore consider scenarios in our simulation 
11The authors graciously provided the original simulation code upon request . 
.. 
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where the HT estimator is consistent, that is at where at least one instru1nent for 
the endogenous Z is valid and relevant. 
The second difference is that our simulations account for random variation in 
the group effect, while the Plumper and Troeger code holds the effect (u) fixed 
across all replications. Mundlak (1978) shows there is no loss of generality in 
assuming the effect is random, because the fixed-effects estimator and its related 
procedures can be described as inference conditional on the realizations of the 
effect in the sample. Further, the effect needs to be at least potentially random 
if the relationship between the effect and the regressors is to be described as 
correlation. As Mundlak shows, if the random effect is correlated with the group-
averages of regressors in unknown ways, then the optimal linear estimator in the 
random-effects model is in fact the fixed-effects estimator. 
The code used by Plumper and Troeger does not simply fix the replicated effects 
at some sample realization, rather it uses the Stata command 'corr2data' to fix the 
sample moments of the variables and the group effects exactly in every replication. 
The vector of effects is thereby 'fixed' by making it exactly orthogonal to the 
exogenous variables, effectively excluding any practical influence of the group effect 
in the simulated data. That process does not simulate a fixed-effects model, but 
rather one in which there is no group effect at all! By contrast, our random-
effects simulation represents the situation where the analyst is uncertain of the 
magnitudes of the group effects. 
We run a series of experiments which vary the degree of endogeneity and strength 
of instrument. The data generating process for our simulation is 
Yit = l + 0.5x1 + 2x2 - 1.5x3 - 2.5z1 + l.8z2 + 3z3 + ui + eit · (3.25) 
Here, [x1 , x2 , x 3 ] is a time-varying mean-zero orthonormal design matrix, fixed 
across all experiments. [z1 , z2) is a time-invariant mean-zero orthonormal design 
matrix, fixed across all experiments. z3 is fixed for all replications in each exper-
iment. z3 has sample mean zero and variance 1, and is orthogonal to all other 
variables except x1 . The sample covariance of the group mean of x1 with z3 is set 
exactly to an experiment-specific level, which allows us to vary the strength of the 
instrument across experiments.12 The idiosyncratic error term e is standard nor-
mal. The random effect u is drawn from a normal distribution in each replication. 
The expectation of u conditional on z3 is pz3 , where p works out to be the value of 
12Conditional on a non-zero sample correlation of the endogenous variable and the instrument , 
the moments of the IV estimator exist, so the Monte Carlo MSE is well-defined. 
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cov(z3 , u) set in the experimental design. All other variables are uncorrelated with 
u, and the variance of u conditional on all variables is 1. The level of endogeneity 
is varied across experiments by changing the value of cov(z3 , u). Each experiment 
has 1000 replications, which vary the random components u and e. There are 30 
groups (N) and 20 periods (T), as reported in Pli.imper and Traeger (2007a). In 
implementing the estimators [x1 , x2 , z1 , z2] are treated as known exogenous, while 
[x3 , z3] are treated as potentially endogenous. 
FIGURE 3.5: Performance of the Four Estimators for Varying Instrument 
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Figure 3.5 illustrates the simulation results for varying instrument strengths and 
endogeneity levels. The vertical axis in each panel is the square root of MSE of 
various estimators for the endogenous time-invariant variable z3 . The horizontal 
axis of each panel is the covariance between the random effect u and z3 . Each panel 
illustrates different instrument strength, as indicated by stronger instruments hav-
ing higher correlation between the group-means of x1 and the endogenous variable 
z3 . The four panels display the experiments for corr(i\ , z3 ) = 0.15, 0.30 , 0.45 , and 
0.60 respectively. 13 Note that, within each panel, the HT results are unchanging as 
a consequence of the experimental design. Also , across panels, the FEVD results 
are unchanging by design. 
13Because variances of x1 and z3 are both 1, the covariance of these variables equals their 
correlation. 
Chapter 3. The Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition: A critical analysis 69 
The most notable feature of Figure 3.5 is that neither HT nor FEVD uniformly 
dominates the other. If reasonably strong instruments are available to implement 
the HT procedure, and endogeneity is an issue, HT can greatly outperform FEVD 
as shown in Panel 4 because the higher variance of HT is compensated by lower 
bias. 14 For all cases when endogeneity is absent ( or is mild), FEVD will be the 
most efficient estimator, as shown at the far left of all panels, because FEVD 
exploits the true ( or approximately true) restriction that z3 is uncorrelated with 
u. If the investigator has strong prior reason to believe that endogeneity is not 
an issue, it makes sense to use that information. Indeed, with informative priors 
over endogeneity, using a Bayesian procedure which minimizes risk against that 
prior would be the ideal approach. However, usually, the investigator will be using 
FE, or HT, or FEVD precisely because of concern that endogeneity might be a 
significant problem. 
Rather than relying solely on prior information about the degree of endogeneity, 
the investigator can rely on evidence from within the dataset. Both the shrinkage 
and the pretest estimators are in this spirit. The shrinkage estimator in particular 
exhibits remarkably good risk characteristics across all ranges of all four panels, 
and it clearly dominates the pretest approach under MSE loss. Indeed the shrink-
age estimator often has an MSE lower than both the HT and the FEVD, and never 
is much worse than the better of the two. The Monte Carlo evidence suggests that 
a shrinkage estimator would almost certainly be the best choice in the absence of 
prior information that the endogeneity problem is quite small. 15 More generally, if 
incomplete or uncertain prior information is available, alternatives which explicitly 
model that information, such as traditional Bayesian techniques or recent variants 
such as Bayesian model averaging (Hoeting et al., 1999), will likely be the best 
approach. 
14 The discussion here focuses on the small sample properties. When N is very large, HT will 
always outperform FEVD if there is endogeneity and valid and relevant instruments exist. For 
a modest example of relative estimator performance as N grows, see the Appendix 3.6.1, where 
the case of N = 300 and T = 2 is illustrated . 
15Wllile our focus is on estimator performance, it is worth noting that the Monte Carlo results 
do confirm that the asymptotic variance formula in (3.14) provides Uiibiased estimates of the HT 
and FEVD sampling variance, when a-; and a-~ are calculated with appropriate degrees of freedom 
corrections for small sample. Further, the bootstrap quantiles for the shrinkage estimator are 
reasonably accurate, confirming the results of Mittelhammer and Judge (2005). 
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3.5 Conclusions 
The FEVD estimator of Plumper and Troeger (2007a) offers the analyst of panel 
data a way to include time-invariant ( and slowly-changing) variables in the pres-
ence of group effects that are possibly correlated with the explanatory variables. 
Thus it appears superior to the existing leading approaches of fixed-effects ( which 
omits the time-invariant variables) and Hausman-Taylor ( which requires specify-
ing the exogeneity status of each explanatory variable). Plumper and Troeger's 
motivation for the procedure was mostly heuristic and their evidence came from 
Monte Carlo experiments showing that FEVD often displays better mean-squared 
error properties than both FE and HT. The procedure can be implemented in 
three easy stages, or even more conveniently in the Stata package provided by 
Plumper and Troeger (2007b). This procedure has proved popular with panel 
data analysts. 
Our analytical results and revised Monte Carlo experiments challenge the value of 
FEVD. Is it still a useful tool? 
We find that the coefficients of all the time-varying variables after the three stages 
of FEVD are exactly the sa1ne as FE in the first stage. This fact is sometimes 
seen in the empirical applications but rarely commented upon with any clarity. 
Obviously, there is no gain in using FEVD over the simpler FE if these coefficients 
are the objects of interest. Further, if something is known about the exogeneity of 
explanatory variables then these estimates are inefficient because they ignore the 
extra information. What is worse, unlike the simple first-stage FE, the standard 
errors from FEVD are too small - sometimes very much too small, judging from 
our empirical example and other published applications. In this case FEVD is a 
definite step backwards. 
The main attraction of FEVD is its ability to estimate coefficients of time-invariant 
explanatory variables. But, again the third stage is questionable. The same coef-
ficient estimates are given in the second stage, which is a simple regression of the 
group-averaged residuals from FE on the time-invariant variables. The purported 
value of the third stage is to correct the standard errors , but this reasoning is now 
known to be false. Indeed there will be cases where the second-stage standard 
errors - even though they are known to be wrong - will be more accurate than 
those from the third stage. The example we have provided in Section 3 shows this 
possibility. 
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So if FEVD is the label to describe the three-stage procedure, it cannot be rec-
ommended for making inferences about any of the coefficients. The coefficient 
estimator, however, also represents a particular choice of instruments in standard 
IV . Dropping the three-stage methodology and reverting to an explicit IV ap-
proach would allow correct standard errors to be obtained in the cases where the 
estimator is consistent. However, since all of the time-invariant variables are used 
as instruments, the FEVD estimator will be inconsistent if any of these are endoge-
nous. The value of this estimator relative to others then depends on the trade-off 
between inconsistency and inefficiency. 
When the objective is reduced mean-squared error, the literature is replete with 
other methods such as shrinkage estimators known to have good properties. We 
have provided one such estimator that clearly dominates the FEVD estimator 
over much of the parameter space and also limits the risk in regions where the 
FEVD risk is unbounded. We demonstrate the feasibility of such an estimator 
with standard errors found empirically by bootstrapping. In undertaking these 
investigations we have also uncovered an explanation for the misleading evidence 
favouring FEVD that was suggested in the previous Monte Carlo studies . 
.. 
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3.6 Appendices 
3.6.1 Monte Carlo Evidence for Comparing FEVD to Al-
ternative Estimators for Large N and Small T. 
FIGURE 3.6: Relative Estimator Performance when N = 300 and T = 2. 
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In applications such as labor market studies the number of groups can be quite 
large, often in the tens of thousands , since there may be a distinct group for each 
individual in the study. Figure 3.6 presents a modest example of the relative 
behavior of the four estimators as the number of groups grows larger. Each panel 
in Figure 3.6 illustrates the same parameter settings as the corresponding panel in 
Figure 3.5. The simulation code for the figures is identical, except for the N and T 
settings. While the overall number of observations is the same in the two figures , 
the larger number of groups provides more information about the time-invariant 
variables. Panel 4 illustrates that the relative performance of FEVD can be quite 
poor for reasonable parameter settings and a modest number of observations. 
,. 
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3.6.2 Full Results for the Empirical Evidence for the The-
orems 
Variable Descriptions 
lnimports logged imports in 1000 US$ (Source: OECD ICTS) 
lngdprep logged nominal gdp importing country (Source: UN NAMAD) 
lngdppar logged nominal gdp exporting country (Source: UN NAMAD) 
lrer logged bilateral real exchange rate 
ldist logged great circle distance in km as calculated by haversine formula 
border border length in km 
11 dummy=l for one country and =2 for both countries of the trading 
pair being land locked 
cl dummy=l if trading partners share an official language 
eu dummy=l if EU me1nber state 
ea dummy=l if Europe agreement 
ewu dummy=l if EWU member state (incl. 1998) 
lavrer3 logged multilateral exchange rate 
lavdist logged multilateral distance 
avborder Multilateral border 
avll Multilateral landlocked 
avcl Multilateral language 
aveu Multilateral EU 
avea Multilateral EA 
avewu Multilateral EWU 
hcl number of years of a trading pair in the sample 
hc3 dummy=l if the trading pair is present in the sample in t-1 
6 
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TABLE 3.2: Full Replication of Belke and Spies (2008). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POLS FE Stage 2 FEVD HT 
lngdpim 0.88*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) 
lngdpex 0.89*** 0.71 *** 0.71 *** 0.71 *** 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) 
lrer -0.01 0.13** 0.13*** 0.13** 
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) 
ldist -1.27*** -1.41 *** -1.41 *** -1.75*** 
(0.11) (0.04) (0.00) (0.16) 
border -0.00 0.00** 0.00*** -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
11 -0.16* -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.16 
(0.10) (0.04) (0.00) (0.14) 
cl 0.23* 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.02 
(0.12) (0.05) (0.00) (0.16) 
eu 0.08 0.03 0.03*** 0.03 
(0.09) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) 
ea 0.16* 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) 
ewu 0.13** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
lavrer3 1.22*** 0.45** 0.45*** _ 0.45*** 
(0.41) (0.22) (0.03) (0.22) 
lavdist 0.55*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 1.45*** 
(0.15) (0.04) (0.00) 0.24) 
avborder 0.00*** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
avll -0.10*** 
-0.14*** -0.14*** -0.18*** 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) 
avcl -0.02 -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.44 
(0.26) (0.10) (0.00) (0.39) 
aveu -0.74*** -0.22* -0.22*** -0.22* 
(0.21) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) 
avea 0.34 -0.07 -0.07*** -0.07 
(0.23) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) 
avewu 0.22* 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 
(0.12) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08) 
hcl 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09* 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) 
hc3 
-0.18*** 
-0.03 -0.03*** -0.03 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
8 1.00*** 
(0.00) 
One, two, and three asterisks reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05 , and 0.01 confidence levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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3.6.3 Full Results for the Monte Carlo Evidence for the 
Theorems 
FIGURE 3. 7: Sampling Distributions of beta 2 
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FIGURE 3.9: Sampling Distribution of Variance for beta 2 
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FIGURE 3.10: Sampling Distribution of Variance for gamma 2 
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Chapter 4 
Productivity, Net Returns and 
Efficiency: Land and Market 
Reform in Vietnamese Rice 
Production 
4.1 Introduction 
Vietnam has achieved remarkable progress in reducing rural poverty in the last 
thirty years , due largely to a series of extensive market and land reforms in agri-
culture, along with impressive increases in economic growth at the national level. 
The land and market reforms in agriculture were pervasive, moving the system 
of rice production from commune-based public ownership and control to one with 
effective private property rights over land and farm assets , competitive domestic 
markets and individual decision making over a wide range of agricultural activi-
ties. The substantial incentive effects created by these policy measures, inducing 
farmers to work harder and use land more efficiently, have been estimated to be 
as much as fifty percent of the increase in total factor productivity (TFP) during 
the peak of the reform period (Che et al., 2006). Overall, given these reforms , 
Vietnam has gone from being a large importer of rice from 1976- 80, to now the 
second largest exporter of rice in the world , with considerable increases in farm 
profitability and rural incomes, and decreases in rural poverty rates by over forty 
percent from 1993 to 2004 alone (Hansen and Nguyen, 2007). 
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However, 1nuch still remains to be done to increase living standards in rural areas 
and enhance general rural development. Like many reform processes, the early 
rapid gains in economic activity have dissipated over time, with the suggestion 
now of a TFP 'slow down ' in rice production in many areas in Vietnam. In 
addition, many of the poor still farm small areas of land, constrained in use, often 
with fragmented or non-contiguous plots, and with little or no human and physical 
capital accumulation or access to agricultural extension services and farm credit. 
Much of this is due to remnants from past institutional arrangements, but also 
to continued constraints in land use, credit availability and the provision of rural 
services, all calling for further or renewed land policy and market reform. 
This paper has two basic tasks. First , it assembles a data set from 1985 to 2006 to 
measure the changes in TFP, terms of trade, net incomes and net returns in Viet-
namese rice production, both in the principal rice growing areas and throughout 
the country. The results track the effects of the major land and market reform 
process and determine key differences in TFP and net returns over time and by 
region. All of this speaks directly to existing land use practices and is suggestive of 
needed policy response. The second task is to isolate the remaining institutional 
constraints and policy challenges that may be limiting increases in productivity 
and efficiency. For this purpose, two stochastic production frontier and inefficiency 
models, drawn from two different farm survey data sets, are estimated to deter-
mine the potential effects of ongoing issues over land use and sale, the provision of 
credit, land fragmentation, less than secure property rights and the lack of rural 
education and support services. 
Section 2 of the paper provides context, highlighting the nature and extent of 
the past market and land reform process and the remaining institutional barriers 
and policy challenges in land use practice and rural development . Section 3 briefly 
summarizes the various data sets used in the paper, along with variable definitions 
and econometric specification. An extensive data appendix details the sources of 
the data, as well as data constructions and various adjustments for TFP calcula-
tions. Section 4 provides the measures of TFP, terms of trade, net incomes and 
net returns in rice production, while section 5 provides estimates for the stochastic 
frontier and inefficiency models. Section 6 concludes . 
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4.2 Context 
Rice continues to dominate agricultural production in Vietnam, with rice produc-
tion accounting for nearly 90 percent of the output of food grains and almost 
two-thirds of rural farm income (SDAFF, 2006). Although rice is produced in 
every one of the 60 (recently redefined as 64) provinces in Vietnam, the Red River 
Delta (RRD) and the Mekong River Delta (MRD) are the main rice growing re-
gions. The smallest producers of rice (less than 100,000 tons per year) are in Binh 
Phuoc province, which is relatively small in area, and contains the principal coffee 
growing (Gialai Kontum) and mining (Cao Bang, Bae Kan) areas. Provinces with 
the largest rice output (more than a million tons per year) are located in the MRD 
(Tien Giang, Soc Trang, Long An, Kien Giang and An Giang), which as a whole 
accounts for roughly half of Vietnam's output of rice and most of its international 
exports. In terms of natural conditions, the MRD and the RRD are the most 
favorable for growing rice, with many areas naturally irrigated, producing up to 
three rice crops per year. Based on farm survey data for 2004 ( as used below), 
the average farm size in the RRD (0.4 hectares per farm) is much smaller than in 
the MRD (1.4 hectares per farm). However, the number of threshing machines in 
the RRD is almost double that of the MRD. In the MRD, with a large volume of 
high-quality rice exports, rice processing takes place in mills rather than on the 
farm to maintain international standards. 
Rice output has increased dramatically during the major land and market re-
form periods, from 10 million to nearly 34 million tons nationwide from 1980 to 
2004 (Kompas, 2004). After a period of 'output share contracts' (from 1981-87), 
where up to 80 percent of rice output had to be delivered to the state, with the 
remainder sold in competitive markets , a period of 'trade liberalization' (1988-
94) brought major institutional and market change, allowing for effective private 
property rights over both land (initially 10-15 and later 20 year leases) and capital 
equipment. With reform, most production decisions were decentralised, all farm 
income ( after tax) was retained by the farmer and rice could be sold freely in com-
petitive domestic markets. The result was an increase in rice prices (from state 
controlled low prices prior to reform), added profitability, considerable increases 
in TFP and dynamic gains from trade reform due to induced capital accumulation 
out of retained farm earnings (Che et al., 2001, 2006) . 
Since 1994, these dramatic market and land reforms have been solidified and in 
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many cases extended in the 'post-reform' period. 1 Nevertheless , a number of 
concerns remain, and have been raised again recently in a 'Participatory Poverty 
Assessment' (PPA), with over 240 focus groups and 1,450 participants, undertaken 
by the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, 
2009). Chief among these are issues surrounding land titles and their use, land 
fragmentation and the lack of rural credit availability and supporting rural services. 
Land title and use requirements are a good example of the challenges that remain. 
Although the Land Law of 1993 (amended and clarified in 1998, 2001 and 2003) 
allows "land use rights to be transferred, exchanged, leased, mortgaged and inher-
ited" (Congress of Vietnam, 1993), in practice, considerable constraints remain in 
place regarding both land conversion (i.e., land transferred or converted to other 
uses) and land accumulation (i.e., trades and accumulation of land plots). For any 
land conversion, for example, the commune authorities have to first develop a plan, 
often based on or as minor amendments to past historical 'blueprints' for land use 
in that area, to submit to various levels of government for approval. The PPA 
reports that this process is often long and transactions costs are high, making it 
difficult for poor farmers in particular to participate (Vietnam Academy of Social 
Sciences, 2009). In addition, although land consolidation in Vietnam is occurring, 
with a number of important benefits, there are still restrictions on overall land 
size (see Ravallion and Van de Walle, 2008). In 2007, the Vietnamese government 
increased limits on the transfer of land use rights for annual agricultural land from 
3 to 6 hectares for the South East, the MRD and Ho Chi Minh City and from 2 to 
4 hectares for other cities and provinces. This is a welcome albeit modest change 
for many farmers, but in most cases rice farming outside the MRD still takes place 
on very small farms, at subsistence levels ( General Statistic Office, 2004; Vietnam 
Acade1ny of Social Sciences, 2009). 
Part of the obstacle to land consolidation is the lack of fully secure property rights . 
The terms of land use titles were extended for agricultural land from 15 to 20 years 
with the Land Law of 1993, but in many cases even 20 years is too short to provide 
secure rights in the shift to larger farms, or allow farm land to be turned into use 
for small manufacturing or industry. Overall the process of land certification or 
entitlement itself has also been below expectations. Household survey data from 
( General Statistic Office, 2006b) suggests that only 76 percent of agricultural land 
parcels, 68 percent of urban land parcels and 34 percent of forest land parcels 
have been granted land-use right certificates (World Bank, 2009b). Even where 
1 For a detailed discussion of land reform policy in Vietnam, see Chu et al. (1992); Fforde 
(1996); Marsh and MacAulay (2002) 
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land certificates do exist, there is a shortage of basic infrastructure for an effec-
tive operation of land administration, including cadastral mapping, transaction 
registrations and record management in the provision of land administration ser-
vices. Problems are compounded by lack of information or public awareness and 
the apparent limited capacity of land administration staff, especially at the com-
mune and district levels (World Bank, 2009b). It is perhaps for this reason that 
real estate markets have been slow to develop, with recent data indicating that 
the role of land rental markets in agriculture in rural areas remains thin (General 
Statistic Office, 2004), and that continued government restrictions often prevent 
low cost and efficiency enhancing transfers (Deininger and Jin, 2008). Land rights 
that are not secure also have an impact on credit availability and capital accu-
mulation. The PPA reports that farms without land-use certificates, which would 
normally be used as collateral, are not able to obtain even short term loans, much 
less transfer land use entitlements. This is especially true for many farms with 
land tenures that are due to expire soon, given the 20 year leases initiated in 1993 
(Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, 2009) . 
Land fragmentation occurs when households have land use rights to a number of 
often small, non-contiguous plots. With reform and the resuJting dissolution of 
the commune system in Vietnam, land was allocated to prior commune members 
in a roughly egalitarian manner: a more or less equal distribution of plots to each 
household, throughout the commune, so that no one household would have a con-
centration of plots in the most fertile parts of the commune, or near roads, water 
sources or other essential services. Immediately after the major reform process 
(1988-94), there were as many as 75 to 100 million parcels or plots of land in 
Vietnam and on average about seven to eight plots per household (World Bank, 
2003a; Van Hung et al., 2007), of which about 10 percent had an area of only 
100 square meters or less (Phien, 2001). Evidence suggests that total plot num-
bers have been falling recently with land consolidation (nationwide, falling to 4.3 
plots per household ( General Statistic Office, 2004), but the problem is still com-
mon. Fragmentation levels, for example, continue to remain high in the RRD , the 
most populated region, with 90 percent of the households having rice farm sizes 
of roughly 0.2 to 0.5 of a hectare (Chu, 2008) and an average of 4.6 plots per 
farm ( General Statistic Office, 2004). The number of plots per farm in the MRD , 
by contrast, is only 1.6. In some cases (e.g., risk spreading) , fragmentation may 
be an advantage (see Marsh et al., 2006). However, for the most part , small and 
scattered land holdings hamper mechanization, the use of buffaloes and tractors 
and technological adoption, and require additional time and labour for farming 
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activities that must be carried out in geographically distant plots. The embank-
ments that separate plots alone have been estimated to reduce total agricultural 
land for cultivation in Vietnam by 2.4 to 4 percent (Thanh, 2008). 
4.3 Data Sources, Variables and Specifications 
Three different data sets are used in this paper. The first is a provincial level 
data set on rice production in Vietnam, from 1985 to 2006, for 60 provinces, 
used to construct TFP, price and quantity indices and net income and return 
measures, greatly improving on the basic TFP estimates (to 1994) provided in 
( Che et al., 2006). This is an extensive data set on prices and quantities for 
all rice outputs and inputs, directly obtained as ( or aggregated to) provincial 
averages. The key variables include paddy rice output, labour, land, material 
inputs ( especially fertilizer, but also seeds and pesticide), capital ( a measure of 
tractors and buffaloes), as well as input prices for labour, land, fertilizer, pesticides 
and capital used in rice production. (See the Appendix for detailed data sources, 
constructions and adjustments.) 
The second data set, used to construct a stochastic production frontier and ineffi-
ciency model, is a farm survey data set for 388 rice farms, complied in 2004 (by the 
authors) in the major rice growing regions ( the MRD and RRD), designed specifi-
cally to isolate the potential effects on inefficiency from differing farm characteris-
tics and potential land fragmentation. Key additional variables include measures 
of soil quality and irrigation, average plot size, as a proxy for land fragmentation , 
and the level of education of the household head of the farm. 
The third data set is the 2004 Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) , 
which is used to confirm and extend the results of the smaller farm survey data 
set , providing added estimates of the effects of secure property rights , more precise 
measures of the effects of land fragmentation (using a Simpson index) and access 
to agricultural extension services and credit. The VHLSS is a household survey 
data set of roughly 9,000 households in 2,216 communes, with cluster-sampling 
techniques to cover the entire country, conducted by the General Statistical Office 
(GSO) in Vietnam in selected years (e.g., 2002, 2004 and 2006). The 2004 VHLSS 
data set , in particular, compared to other VHLSS data sets in Vietnam, has an 
extended module for land, with separate components for land use and agricultural 
production. Sample size is reduced to 3,671 households to isolate farms that are 
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primarily rice producers. It is important to note that a Simpson index is not ap-
plicable to the 2004 farm survey data, since the exact size of each plot for the 388 
farm households was not recorded. The measure of fragmentation is thus simply 
total rice land divided by the number of plots. 
For all stochastic production frontiers log-likelihood specification tests were used 
to determine functional form and the presence of inefficiency effects. In all cases, 
standard 01S estimates are seen to be inappropriate and functional form tests 
reject a translog specification in favor of a more standard Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function. Tests also indicate that estimates of the stochastic frontiers using 
a random coefficients approach, allowing for 'non-neutral ' shifts in the production 
frontier, following Kalirajan and Obwona (1994), resulted in little difference in es-
timated coefficients, with the inefficiency term adequately represented by a trun-
cated half-normal distribution. Frontier and inefficiency estimates are obtained 
using Frontier 4.1 (see Coelli et al., 1998). 
4.4 Total Factor Productivity, Terms of 'Irade 
and Net Returns 
The change in TFP is a measure of outputs to inputs over any two time periods. 
Results for Vietnamese rice production are generated using Tornqvist quantity 
( and price) indices given by 
N 
" (Wis +Wit) ( ) In Q st = 7:i' 2 In qit - In qis (4.1) 
or 
Qst = II q,t) is~wit N ( w 
i=l qis 
(4.2) 
for N quantities, q inputs or outputs ( depending on context), periods s and t and 
weights 
N 
Wis = Pis qis / L Pis qis 
i=l 
(4.3) 
for time periods, for example. TFP, for outputs y and inputs xis thus given by 
1 1 In T F Pis = 2 (wis + Wit) (In Yit - In Yis) - 2 ( Vis + Vit) (In Xit - In Xis) ( 4.4) 
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FIGURE 4.1: Paddy Rice Output (Indexed) in Vietnam (1985-2006) , Average 
Annual Growth Rate by Fitted Linear Trend = 3.5% 
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for input weighted shares vi, for periods s and t. For convenience, results are 
summarized across eight regions, as officially defined in Vietnam: RRD (1), the 
Northeast (2), the Northwest (3); the North Central Coast (4), the South Central 
Coast (5), the Central Highlands (6), the Southeast (7) and the MRD (8). As 
mentioned, the RRD and the MRD are the major rice growing regions in the 
country. Region 7 is largely industrial, and regions 2, 3 and 6 are the poorest by 
conventional measures. 
There is little doubt that the increase in rice production in Vietnam has been 
substantial, especially after the output share contracts period (1981-87) , or under 
the major land and market reforms (1988- 94 and forward) (Che et al. , 2001). For 
the country as a whole, the indexed value of paddy rice output shows an average 
annual increase of 3.5 percent , as a fitted linear trend (see Figure 4.1). The largest 
increases in rice output occur during the period of trade liberalization (1988-94) , 
and continue (virtually unabated) in the 'post-reform' period to 2006. . 
However, trends in TFP vary markedly between regions in the country. Figure 
4.2 shows that not only is TFP higher in the MRD, but also that the growth 
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in TFP is substantially larger in the MRD compared to the RRD and all other 
regions. As a fitted annual trend, the growth in TFP in the MRD is 4.42 percent , 
while in the RRD it is 2.25 and in all other regions 1.36 percent per year. This 
poor TFP performance is of special concern in the poorest regions of the country 
(regions 2, 3 and 6), where the average annual increase in TFP is less than 1.3 
percent. In all cases, except for the MRD, there is also evidence of a 'slow down' in 
productivity after the year 2000. This is an added problem, again, in poor regions 
( which generally do not have a natural advantage in rice production, or sufficient 
water resources for wetland rice), but it is also a concern in the RRD, a major rice 
growing area, where farms remain relatively small and fragmented. 
FIGURE 4.2: TFP (Total Factor Productivity) Indexes for the Mekong River 
Delta (MRD), the Red River Delta (RRD) and All Other Regions (Other) for 
Paddy Rice Production in Vietnam, 1985-2006. Average Annual Growth Rate in 
TFP by Fitted Linear Trend for the MRD is 4.42%, for the RRD is 2.15%, and 
for All Other Regions is 1.36% 
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With the reform process, the indexed price of rice increases throughout Viet-
nam, from the state-controlled low price in the 'communal period' to a partially 
controlled price during the output share contracts period, and beyond. During 
the trade liberalization period (1988- 94) , in particular, all controls over domes-
tic prices were removed, and prices rose rapidly to world values , especially from 
.. 
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1993- 96. After 1996 the domestic price of rice generally tracks world prices for 
rice on international markets, and fluctuates accordingly. 
Input prices, on the other hand, increase more slowly ( and unifonnly) throughout 
the trade liberalization period, as the likely product of both increases in the output 
of rice and resulting patterns of economic development. Much of this increase is 
dominated by increases in the price of fertilizer ( with some volatility) , but farm 
wage rates also increase at an average annual rate of 1.44 percent. 
The combination of output and input price changes, as the TOT, is summarized 
in Figure 4.3, showing a relatively stable trend until 1993, with improvement from 
1993- 96, due mostly to increases in domestic rice prices, after which it declines 
sharply (save 1998) until 2001. Although the TOT improves after 2001, it still 
remains below its starting point throughout the remainder of the series, to 2006. 
This highlights the importance of TFP increases to partly offset this trend, since 
increases in productivity will generate proportionally more revenues for given input 
use. 
FIGURE 4.3: Terms of Trade indexes for Rice Production in Vietnam, as the Ratio 
of Indexed Paddy Prices to the Indexed Value of All Input Prices; 1985-2006 (Base 
year 1985) 
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Figure 4.4 is the key graph, in effect combining all price, quantity and productivity 
indices together. It shows both the indexed value of paddy rice output (i.e., the 
indexed price multiplied by the indexed quantities of rice) and the indexed value 
of input expenditures (i.e., the indexed input prices multiplied by the indexed 
quantities of inputs). The wedge between the two lines provides a measure of 'net 
income' in rice production over time. For Vietnam as a whole, land and market 
reforms indicate substantial increases in net income from 1988- 99, and especially 
so in the years 1993-99. In 2000- 01, both the domestic and international price for 
rice fall dramatically, and the wedge closes. 
FIGURE 4.4: Net Income Measure or the Indexed Value of Paddy Rice Output 
Values (Indexed Output Prices Multiplied by Indexed Output Quantities) and the 
Indexed Value of all Input Values (Indexed Input Prices Multiplied by Indexed 
Input Quantities) in Rice Production in Vietnam, 1985-2006 
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The wedge for the years 1988-99 provides an essential story of economic devel-
opment, and also coincides with a well documented decrease in the rural poverty 
rate in Vietnam. Increases in the price of rice, output and productivity, on the 
one hand, and increases in the farm wage rate on the other, result in substantial 
increases in farm and rural income. It is roughly during this period, specifically, as 
commonly measured, from 1993 to 2004, that the defined share of poor people in 
Vietnam "dropped by two thirds and approximately 24 million people were lifted 
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out of poverty" (Hansen and Nguyen, 2007). Not all of this poverty reduction was 
due to rice production, of course, but given the large share of the population in 
rural areas and the predominance of rice production in rural agriculture, there is 
little doubt that the reform and post-reform periods had a major impact on overall 
living standards. 2 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that these gains are not shared equally throughout 
the country. Figure 4.5 shows the indexed ratio of the value of revenues to the 
value of input costs for paddy rice production, for selected regions, as a measure 
of 'net returns'. Relative to the starting point, all regions do reasonably well from 
1992-98, but after 1998 both the RRD and all other regions fall (in some cases) far 
below the starting point. For the years 1999-2004, net returns are even less than 
one for areas outside of the MRD and RRD. Overall, the MRD does consistently 
better than all other regions with relatively large net returns, from 1989 forward. 
FIGURE 4.5: Net Returns in Vietna1n, as the Indexed Ratio of Revenues to Input 
Costs in Paddy Rice Production for Mekong River Delta (MRD), Red River Delta 
(RRD), and All Other Regions (Other), 1985-2006 
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2 See Glewwe et al. (2002) for the distributional effects of poverty reduction in Vietnam, based 
on early household surveys in 1993 and 1998, and Ravallion and Van de Walle (2008) for the 
recent welfare impacts of land reform. 
.. 
Chapter 4. Land and Market Reform in Vietnamese Rice Production 90 
4.5 Frontiers and Efficiency 
The importance of the level and changes in TFP and resulting changes in net 
income highlight the importance of potential efficiency gains that accompany fur-
ther land and market reform. The following sections use stochastic production 
frontiers and inefficiency models to isolate the key constraints on efficiency gains 
( as a component of TFP), and what policy measures might be most suitable to 
increase efficiency. 
4.5.1 Stochastic Frontiers and Inefficiency 
Stochastic production frontiers were first developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). The specification allows for a non-negative 
random component in the error term to generate a measure of technical inefficiency, 
or the ratio of actual to expected maximum output, given inputs and the existing 
technology. The idea can be readily applied to both cross section and panel data, 
following Battese and Coelli (1995). Indexing firms by i = 1, 2, ... , n the stochastic 
output frontier is given by 
¾ = J(Xi, {J)evi-ui (4.5) 
for ¾ output, Xi a 1 x k vector of inputs and {3 a k x 1 vector of parameters to 
be estimated. As usual, the error term vi is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed as N(O, a-;) and captures random variation in output due 
to factors beyond the control of firms. The error term ui captures finn-specific 
technical inefficiency in production, specified by 
Ui = Zi c)+ Wi (4.6) 
for zi a 1 x m vector of explanatory variables, c5 a m x 1 vector of unknown 
coefficients and wi a random variable such that ui is obtained by a non-negative 
truncation of N(zi c5, a-~)- Input variables may be included in both equations 4.5 
and 4.6 as long as technical inefficiency effects are stochastic (see Battese and 
Coelli, 1995; Forsund et al., 1980; Sch1nidt and Knox Lovell, 1979) . 
The condition that ui > 0 in equation 4.5 guarantees that all observations lie 
on or beneath the stochastic production frontier. A trend can also be included 
in equations 4.5 and 4.6 to capture time-variant effects. Following Battese and 
Corra (1977) and Battese and Coelli (1993), variance terms are parameterized 
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by replacing er~ and er~ with er2 = er~ + er~ and , = er~/ ( er~ + er~). The technical 
efficiency of the i-th firm for the basic case can be defined as 
E(½ I ui, Xi) = e-ui = exp(-zi6 - wi) TE 
- r. -..: r \ i r, / ,: T I (4.7) 
and clearly must have a value between zero and one. The measure of techni-
cal efficiency is thus based on the conditional expectation given by equation 4.7, 
given the values of vi - ui evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters in the model, where the expected maximum value of½ is conditional 
on ui = 0 (see Battese and Coelli, 1988). Efficiency can be calculated for each 
individual firm per year by 
[ ( ) I ] 1 - <P( aa +,(Vi + ui)) /era [ ( ) 2/ ] E exp Ui Vi + Ui = <P ( ( ) / \ exp r Vi + Ui + er a 2 1 - , Vi + Ui er a (4.8) 
for era= ✓,(1 - ,)er2 and <P(·) the density function of a standard normal random 
variable (Battese and Coelli, 1988). The value of gamma equals zero when there 
are no deviations in output due to inefficiency, and equals one when there are no 
deviations in output due to random effects, or variance in v. 
4.5.2 Farm Survey Data (2004) 
4.5.2.1 Econometric Specification 
The first frontier estimate uses survey data obtained from a selection of 388 farms 
producing rice from 32 communes across 8 provinces in the RRD and MRD, with 
a roughly equal split of farms and communes in each area. The survey, a targeted 
sample of fanners primarily producing rice, was carried out by the authors from 
August to December 2004, with detailed collection of rice output and input data, 
as well as farm specific characteristics. The main areas from which farms were 
selected in the MRD are Soc Trang, Tra Vinh, Vinh Long and Can Tho; and, in 
the RRD , from Ha Tay, Nam Dinh, Thai Binh and Nam Ha. Summary statistics 
are provided in Table 4.1. The specification for the stochastic production frontier 
is given by 
ln ½ = f3o + f31 ln Ki+ f32 ln LABi + {33 ln LANi + {34 ln Fi ( 4.9) 
+(35 ln Pi+ {35M RDi + vi - ui 
.. 
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for Y the output of paddy rice in kilograms, K capital in machinery hours , as the 
sum of hours a farm uses tractors in land preparation and transportation, as well 
as hours employed for pumps and threshing machines, LAB working days , as the 
sum of family and hired labour, LAN total cultivated rice land in hectares times 
the number of crops over the year, F kilograms of fertilizer used, P pesticides 
in kilograms and M RD a binary variable for MRD rice farms. The inefficiency 
model in this case is 
ui = 50 + 51SIZEi + 62PLOTSIZEi + 63SOILi 
+54J RRi + 65EDi + wi 
( 4.10) 
for SIZE the area of rice land (both leased and directly controlled by the house-
hold) in hectares, PLOTSIZE the average size of plots for rice land on a given 
farm, or the area of rice land in hectares, divided by the number of plots, as a 
proxy for land fragmentation, and SO IL a measure of soil quality, ranked in de-
creasing order (from 1 to 6), based mainly on the chemical con1position of the soil. 
This is an ordinal ranking, tied to land tax levies by land quality in Vietnam, and 
does not literally measure relative differences across land quality types ( e.g. , type 
2 land is not twice as good as type 4 land). I RR is a measure-of water availabil-
ity (natural and irrigated) , ranked in decreasing order (from 1 to 4) , obtained by 
asking farmers to rank their irrigation conditions, based on the level and difficulty 
of supplying water and drainage. The ranking from 1 to 4 is simply given by very 
good, good, fair or poor. ED is the level of education of the farm decision maker, 
categorized by levels: primary, secondary, high school and higher education. 
Additional likelihood ratio ( LR) tests to confirm specification are summarized in 
Table 4.2. Correct critical values from a mixed x-squared distribution ( at the 1 
percent level of significance) are drawn from Kodde and Palm (1986). The relevant 
test statistic is 
LR= -2{ln[L(H0)/ L(H1)]} = -2{ln[L(H0 )] - ·ln[L(H1)]} ( 4.11) 
where L(H0 ) and L(H1 ) are the values of the likelihood function under the null and 
alternative hypotheses, respectively. The null hypothesis that technical inefficiency 
effects are absent (, = 50 = 51 = 52 = 53 = 54 = 55 = 0) and that farm-specific 
effects do not influence technical inefficiencies ( 51 = 52 = 53 = 54 = 55 = 0) in 
equation 4.10 are both rejected, as is 50 = ()i = 52 = 53 = 54 = 55 = 0. Finally, 
the null hypothesis that , = CJ';/ ( CJ; + CJ';) = 0, or that inefficiency effects are not 
~ 
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TABLE 4.1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables in Paddy Rice Production for 
the Farm Survey Data Set, 2004 
Variables Units Mean Std dev Min Max 
Output (Y) kg 10,321 12,484 690 105,593 
Capital (K) hours 36 37 4 272 
Labour (LAB) man days 156 91 32 584 
Land (LAN) ha 2.27 2.35 0.13 14.60 
Fertilizer (F) kg 814.08 610.05 73.00 5000.00 
Pesticides (P) kg 1.69 11.88 1.39 123.65 
Mekong River Delta (MRD) yes=l 0.50 0.51 0 1 
Land (SIZE) ha 0.92 0.99 0.06 7.30 
Plot size (PLOTSIZE) ha 0.45 0.58 0.02 4.50 
Soil (SOIL) rank 2.72 1.07 1 5 
Irrigation (IRR) rank 2.62 0.59 1 4 
Education (ED) level 2 0.64 1 4 
stochastic, is rejected. All results indicate that stochastic effects and technical 
inefficiency matter and thus that traditional OLS estimates are not appropriate 
in this study. Specifications with interaction terms and non-linear effects of farm 
size on efficiency were also attempted, but these proved to be non-significant. 
TABLE 4.2: Generalized Log Likelihood Ratio Tests and Parameter Restrictions 
for the Stochastic Production Frontier and Technical Inefficiency Models, Farm 
Survey Data, 2004 
Null Hypothesis Likelihood 
2 Xo.99 Decision Ratio Statistics 
1. 1' = 60 = 61 = 62 = 63 = 64 = 65 = 0 212.99 17.76 Reject Ho 
2. 1' = 0 7.56 5.41 Reject Ho 
3. 60 = 61 = 62 = 63 = 64 = 65 = 0 212.23 16.07 Reject Ho 
4. 61 = 62 = 63 = 64 = 65 = 0 211.75 14.33 Reject Ho 
The critical values for thehypotheses are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986). 
4.5.2.2 Results for Farm Survey Data 
Results for the farm survey data set are reported in Table 4.3. The coefficients for 
capital, labour, land, fertilizer and pesticide in the stochastic production frontier 
model are 0.15, 0.13, 0.41, 0.21 and 0.06, respectively. The value of the coefficient 
for the binary variable M RD illustrates the advantages of growing rice in the south, 
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compared to the north. This value is 0.17 and is consistent with the measured 
difference in TFP between the RRD and the MRD, illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
TABLE 4.3: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Production Frontier and Tech-
nical Inefficiency Models for the Farm Survey Data, 2004 
(Equations [4.9] and [4.10]) 
Stochastic production frontier model 
Constant 
Capital (K) (ln) 
Labour (LAB) (ln) 
Land (LAN) (ln) 
Fertilizer (F) (ln) 
Pesticide (P) (ln) 
MRD 
Technical Inefficiency Model 
Constant 
Land (SIZE) 
Plot size (PLOTSIZE) 
Soil (SOIL) 
Irrigation (IRR) 
Education (ED) 
Gamma 
Sigma-squared 
Log-likelihood 
Mean Efficiency (%) 
Number of observations 
Coefficient 
6.56(0.228) 
0.15(0.030) 
0.13(0.035) 
0.41(0.036) 
0.21(0.030) 
0.06(0.016) 
0.17(0.037) 
0.59(0.084) 
-0.14(0.023) 
-0.07 (0.023) 
0.05(0.008) 
0.05(0.012) 
-0.05(0.011) 
0.67 
0.01 
273.25 
86 
388 
T- ratio 
All coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
28.83 
4.89 
3.62 
11.23 
6.91 
3.88 
4.43 
7.05 
-6.39 
-2.82 
6.41 
4.33 
-4.55 
2.26 
13.86 
Of particular interest, however, are the inefficiency results. The coefficients on soil 
and irrigation are positive as expected, since the ranking_ on soil and irrigation is in 
decreasing order of quality, implying that higher quality soil and better irrigation 
increase efficiency. It is also clear that more educated farmers are also more 
efficient. The coefficients on SIZE and PLOTS I Z E indicate the loss in efficiency 
from current land use practice. The estimates indicate that larger farms and farms 
with larger average plot size are more efficient. The latter in particular indicates 
a potential issue with land fragmentation , and the constraints to consolidation. 
Admittedly, average plot size on a given farm is a crude indicator of fragmentation , 
since it lacks a measure of distance between plots or whether plots are contiguous 
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or not. However, it is also clear from the discussion in section 2 above that the 
smaller the average plot size on a farm the more likely it is that these plots are not 
contiguous. This is especially so in the north, where, as indicated, small and highly 
fragmented farms predominate. Frontier estimates by Van Hung et al. (2007), on 
a smaller survey data set for 188 farms in the north only, near Hanoi in the RRD, 
in the year 2000, show a comparable negative relationship between the number of 
plots and farm efficiency. 
4.5.3 VHLSS Data (2004) 
4.5.3.1 Econometric Specification 
The second frontier estimate uses VHLSS data for 3,671 households largely en-
gaged in rice production (from a total of more than 9,000 households surveyed) 
in 2004. The cluster survey sample applies to the entire country, not only to 
the main rice growing areas. Rice output of the households in this sub-sample of 
3,671 farms accounts for more than 75 percent of total household annual crops in 
terms of quantity and more than 78 percent in terms of value: Summary statis-
tics are listed in Table 4.4. Log-likelihood ratio tests (see Table 4.5) generate a 
specification for the stochastic production frontier of the form 
ln ~ = f3o + /31 K Ri + /32 ln LABi + {33 ln H LABi + (34 In LANi 
+~~~+~~~+~MR~+½-¼ 
with an inefficiency model given by 
ui = 60 + 61EDi + 52F RAGi + 63CERTi 
+54SOILi + 55 EXTi + 56 InCRE + wi 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
for Y the output of paddy rice in kilograms, produced over the twelve months prior 
to the survey date, KR the value of rented capital in rice production ( tractors , 
machines, tools and implements in thousand Vietnamese Dong (VND) and LAN 
the amount of area in hectares that the household uses for annual crop production, 
regardless of its ownership. Labour comes from two sources: LAB is household 
labour (in hours) and H LAB is hired labour in rice production (in thousand VND). 
Expenditures on fertilizer (F) and pesticide and herbicide (P) in rice production 
. 
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are all measured in thousand VND. M RD is a binary variable for households in 
the MRD. 
TABLE 4.4: Summary Statistics for Key Variables in Paddy Rice Production for 
the VHLSS Survey Data Set, 2004 
Variables Units Mean Std Min Max dev 
Paddy rice output (Y) kg 3,878 5,931 75 120,750 
Capital rented (KR) 000 VND 646 1,145 0 18,400 
Labour (LAB) hours 2,485 1,918 0 16,048 
Labour hired (HLAB) 000 VND 336 1,083 0 36,000 
Land (LAN) ha 0.56 0.73 0.02 10.00 
Fertilizer (F) 000 VND 1,195 1,871 0 34,000 
Pesticide (P) 000 VND 388 996 0 19,800 
Mekong River Delta (MRD) yes=l 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Education (ED) years 6.62 3.69 0 17 
Land Fragmentation (FRAG) index [0,1] 0.55 0.30 0 0.99 
Land with LUC ( CERT) ratio 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Soil (SOIL) rank 3.20 1.37 1 6 
Access to extension services(EXT) yes= 1 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Credit (CRE) 10 mill VND 0.17 0.51 0 9 
TABLE 4.5: Generalized Log Likelihood Ratio Tests and Parameter Restrictions 
for the Stochastic Production Frontier and Technical Inefficiency Models, VHLSS 
Data, 2004 
Null Hypothesis 
1. ' = 80 = 81 = 82 = 63 = 64 = 65 = 65 = 0 
2., = 0 
3. 80 = 81 = 82 = 63 = 64 = 65 = 65 = 0 
4. 81 = 82 = 63 = 64 = 65 = 65 = 0 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
210.42 
124.36 
154.04 
72.68 
2 Xo.99 Decision Statistics 
19.38 Reject Ho 
5.41 Reject Ho 
16.07 Reject Ho 
14.33 Reject Ho 
The critical values for thehypotheses are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986). 
In the inefficiency model, ED is years of schooling of the household head and 
F RAG is a measure of land fragmentation given by a Simpson index, defined as 
( 1 _ LA:t) (4.14) 
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where ai is the area of the i-th plot and A = :Z::i ai is total household farm size. A 
value of zero for the Simpson index indicates that a household has only one parcel 
or plot of land. The closer the index is to one, the more fragmented is household 
farm land, or the more numerous are the number of plots. CERT designates that 
a farm household holds a land certificate title ( measured as a ratio of land under 
title to total land size), allowing for the sale or lease of all or some plots of land, 
and SOIL is a measure of soil quality, as in the farm survey data set, ranked 
in decreasing order ( from 1 to 6). Not surprisingly, the measure of soil quality 
varies more and the mean is higher ( meaning less quality) in the VHLSS data, 
with its broader coverage across all types of land, and throughout the country, 
compared to the farm survey data, which concentrates only on rice farms in the 
MRD and RRD (see tables 4.1 and 4.4). EXT is a binary variable indicating 
whether the farmer visited an extension services office, attended meetings to seek 
advice or guidance on cultivation practices or raising livestock, or was visited on 
the farm by an extension staff officer. In the summary data, 48 percent of those 
surveyed accessed these services. The value C RE is total farm household credit 
from banks and other financial institutions for agricultural production during the 
year in ten-millions of VND. 
4.5.3.2 Results for VHLSS Data 
Results for the VHLSS data set are reported in Table 4.6. Estimated input coeffi-
cients are comparable with the results for the farm survey data set for capital, land, 
fertilizer and pesticide. The binary variable M RD again indicates the advantages 
of growing rice in the MRD. Results indicate that better educated farmers and 
higher quality soil increase efficiency across farms. The estimated coefficient on 
SOIL in the VHLSS estimates (0.48 compared to 0.05 in the farm survey data) 
reflects the importance of the contrast in soil quality outside of the major rice 
growing regions, and its effect on inefficiency. 
The VHLSS estimates also show, more pointedly, the effect of land fragmentation 
on efficiency, using a Simpson index. The more fragmented is a household farm, 
or the larger the number of plots , the lower is efficiency, with a coefficient value 
of 0.25. 
Of added interest here are coefficient estimates on land use certificate, access to 
extension services and credit. As mentioned, a proper land use certificate is essen-
tial not only for the ease of acquiring, selling or leasing land, but it also provides 
" 
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TABLE 4.6: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Production Frontier and Tech-
nical Inefficiency Models for VHLSS Data Set, 2004 
(Equations [4.12] and [4.13]) 
Stochastic production frontier model 
Constant 
Capital rented (KR) (ln) 
Labour (LAB) (ln) 
Hired labour (HLAB) (ln) 
Land (LAN) (ln) 
Fertilizer (F) (ln) 
Pesticide (P) (ln) 
MRD 
Technical Inefficiency Model 
Constant 
Education (ED) 
Fragmentation (FRAG) 
Ratio of land with LUC (CERT) 
Soil (SOIL) 
Access to extension services (EXT) 
Credit (CRE) (ln) 
Gamma 
Sigma-squared 
Log-likelihood 
Mean Efficiency (%) 
Number of observations 
Coefficient 
6.40(0.072) 
0.09(0.006) 
0.03(0.006) 
0.02(0.003) 
0.52(0.009) 
0.16(0.006) 
0.08(0.005) 
0.21(0.022) 
-2.28(0.562) 
-0.07(0.015) 
0.25(0.100) 
-0.24(0.075) 
0.48(0.084) 
-0.08(0.041) 
-0.07(0.026) 
0.88 
0.52 
-1315.25 
77.49 
3,671 
T- ratio 
89.50 
17.30 
4.79 
7.84 
56.76 
27.47 
16.92 
9.80 
-4.06 
-4.62 
2.48 
-3.19 
- 5.74 
-1.98 
-2.49 
42.55 
6.02 
All coefficients are significant at the .01 level except access to extension services (EXT) , which 
is significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
the only ready source of collateral for farm loans. Those farms with a proper cer-
tificate are more efficient, as are those that have access to agricultural extension 
services and credit. The result on credit, showing that farms receiving more credit 
are more efficient, along with the fact that only 20 percent of households have 
access to funds, is consistent with recent findings suggesting substantial credit 
constraints for all rural households in Vietnam (Bao Duong and Izumida, 2002). 
.. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Extensive land and market reform in Vietnam has resulted in dramatic increases 
in rice output over the past thirty years. Results show that TFP increases consid-
erably in the major rice growing areas ( the MRD and RRD areas) during the early 
years of land and market reform, but with evidence of a productivity 'slow-down' 
since 2000 in all regions except the MRD. TFP in the MRD remains much higher 
than in the RRD, and TFP in other regions ( excluding the RRD and especially in 
poor areas) remains virtually unchanged throughout the entire period. Terms of 
trade, net incomes and returns are also favorable throughout the reform period, 
providing much of the explanation for increased incomes and poverty reduction 
during this time, noting that overall performance has worsened considerably since 
2000- 01. The differences over time and by region speak directly to existing land 
use regulations and practices and suggest calls for further land and market reform. 
In this regard, additional frontier and efficiency model estimates illustrate the re-
maining institutional and policy constraints, including existing restrictions on land 
consolidation and conversion and poorly developed markets for land and capital. 
Estimates show that larger and less fragmented farms, and those that are better 
irrigated, with higher quality spoil, a clear property right or land use certificate 
and access to agricultural extension services and credit are more efficient. 
With this in mind, it seems clear that the mandate to grow rice in every province, 
at least in terms of a narrowly defined efficiency criteria, is inappropriate. Pro-
ductivity and efficiency are both substantially larger in the MRD and RRD areas, 
where rice production has a clear comparative advantage. This shows up repeat-
edly in both TFP and related measures , as well as in frontier and inefficiency 
models in terms of the magnitude of the binary variable for the MRD ( and its 
effect on output). It is also indicated by coefficient estimates that measure the 
effects of irrigation and soil quality on efficiency. Land in the MRD and RRD is of 
much better quality in this regard, and naturally suited to rice production. Land 
policy (formal or in practice) which makes it difficult for land to be converted to 
other uses is thus difficult to justify . 
The same can be said for land consolidation. If farms that are larger and less 
fragmented are more efficient, practical restrictions on land size need to be relaxed 
and a more active real estate market for land needs to be provided, encouraging 
low-cost and efficiency enhancing land transfers. A necessary and straightforward 
prerequisite for this is well-defined land use certificates, covering every parcel of 
land, something that Vietnam has yet not been able to accomplish. This may also 
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partly resolve problems with credit availability, as would a significant extension 
of the 20 year lease provisions on parcels of agricultural land. Without a land 
use certificate, or with limited remaining tenure, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to secure a loan, much less convert and consolidate land. The original land and 
market reforms, as dramatic as they were, have not gone far enough to secure 
property rights or provide sufficient or suitable markets for land and credit. 
There are at least three issues that warrant further research. First, it would 
be useful to have a more refined measure of land fragmentation than either the 
Simpson index or average land size and number of plots used here, one that includes 
distance and a spatial representation of non-contiguous plots. There is partial data 
available for this in Vietnam, but more needs to be collected. Second, the estimates 
would benefit from additional measures of rural services. The only variable used 
here, access to agricultural extension services, as a simple binary variable, matters 
to efficiency, but so too must variables like rural infrastructure (e.g., roads, water 
rights and quarantine and surveillance measures) and specific cultivation practices, 
including the use of rice hybrids. Unfortunately, there is a lack of broad rice farm 
survey data to provide such estimates. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
there needs to be a clear investigation into the precise nature and cause of the 
thin or poorly developed agricultural land and credit markets in Vietnam, and 
what specific policies might be best to help relax these constraints. 
.. 
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4.7 Appendix 
4. 7.1 Data Sources and Adjustments 
Data for TFP and related measures (1985-2006) and for the 1991-1991 balanced 
panel data set is drawn mainly from the Statistics Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 1991-2006, data sources obtained from the General Statis-
tics Office of Vietnam, including VHLSS data, related project investigations, stud-
ies and reports by Vietnamese organizations, such as the State Planning Commit-
tee (SPC), the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Processing Industry (MAFI), 
the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), the Department of Prices and Markets 
(DPM) (formally known as the State Department of Price (SDP)), and interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization (FAO). The details of the structure of rice production (especially for the 
early data series) are extracted from the Surveys of Rice Production in the RRD 
and the MRD by Cantho University, funded by the International Rice Research 
Institute (see Nguyen, 1995; Vo, 1995). 
It should be noted that from 1985-2002 there were 60 defined provinces in Vietnam 
based on the GSO statistics and administrative units. However, beginning in 
2003, provinces were redefined into 64 provinces based on the GSO statistics and 
administrative units. In this study the 'new' provinces are aggregated into the 
previous provinces in the data set before 2003, for consistency. In particular, Can 
Tho, Dak Lak and Lai Chau refer to Can Tho and Hau Giang, Dak Lak and Dak 
Nong, and Lai Chau and Dien Bien provinces. Regions are as currently defined 
by the GSO. Primary data for 1985-1999 is obtained from Che et al. (2006) and 
Kompas (2004). The data set for 2000-02 is from Kompas (2004). In general, prices 
are measured in constant 2006 USD , and converted to Dong where appropriate. 
Data assembly and construction is as follows. 
1. Output quantity and prices. Paddy output is drawn from SDAFF (2001, 2006) 
and General Statistic Office (2008b) under the category of 'production of paddy 
by province' . The time series of rice prices by province is computed from a number 
of sources, with recent data provided by the GSO. For the period 1985-2003 price 
data is based on Kompas (2004) and Che et al. (2006), most of which is obtained 
from the Department of Prices and Markets (DPM). A rice equivalent for output 
is chosen rather than rice output alone since in the same rice fields farmers usually 
overlap production with other short-term cereal crops, such as sweet potatoes and 
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maize. There are multiple crops per year in 1nany areas. Specific time series 
data for rice output is from SDAFF (1991) and MAFI (1991) for the period 1976-
90, from SDAFF (2001) for 1990-93, General Statistic Office (1995) for 1994 and 
SDAFF (2001) for 1995 to 1999. All measures were verified by alternative data 
sets contained in SDAFF (2001) for the years 1975-1999. Updates were obtained 
from SDAFF (2006). 
2. Land quantity and prices. The time series for 'planted area of paddy' is obtained 
from SDAFF (1991, 1992, 2001, 2006), SPC (1995) and General Statistic Office 
(2008b). The Vietnamese government divides the soil quality of land into seven 
levels and levies land tax depending on quality. A study by World Bank (1994) 
distinguished the quality of soil into five levels in terms of cultivated area. Soil 
conditions and irrigation is generally much better in the RRD and MRD, compared 
to other regions (MWR, 1994). Land-use price variables are defined as the cost of 
land use, or the average tax levies per one sown hectare in terms of value. The 
tax levies are required to be paid to government for the right of using land, which 
depend on land quality (by rank from type 1 to 5) . Land taxes for rice land are 
based on the gross value of rice production (SDAFF, 2006). It is assumed that the 
land price indices are coincident with the gross value of rice area ( as the multiple 
of rice output overall crops per year and the price of rice). 
3. Labour quantity and prices. Data for the quantity of labour is obtained by 
multiplying average man-days worked per hectare by the number of hectares in a 
given rice cultivation area. The rice cultivated area is obtained from SDAFF (1991, 
2001, 2006) and General Statistic Office (2008b) . Total labour for rice production 
is calculated from total rice planted (in area) and average labour used for rice 
production per hectare. Average man-day working requirements includes work 
for land preparation, transplanting, weeding and harvesting, originally based on 
the survey of rice production by the Cantho University (1990-1995), as detailed 
in Nguyen (1995) and Vo (1995). The data on the price of labour for paddy 
production is esti1nated from average labour costs by the SRP by the Cantho 
University, DPM (1995, 2002, 2005) and General Statistic Office (2006b), for the 
RRD and MRD. For 2003-06, the labour price variable is estimated using 2002 as 
a base year and the movement in the wage index for rice production, estimated as 
the average annual change in labour costs for rice cropping per hectare (SDAFF, 
2006). 
4. Material inputs and prices. Materials for paddy production are largely com-
posed of rice seeds and preparation, fertilizer and insecticide ( of these fertilizer is 
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the largest component, representing at least 30 to 40 percent of total costs DPM 
(1995, 2002, 2005) and General Statistic Office (2006b). For the period prior to 
2002 material input quantities are partly measured in terms of a 'urea-used equiv-
alent', or total planted paddy area multiplied by the rate of fertilizer used per 
hectare per rice crop. The rates of fertilizer use for paddy production per hectare 
per rice crop are obtained from the SRP for the RRD and MRD and SDAFF 
(2001, 2006). This rate is adjusted in some non-principal rice growing provinces, 
based on reports provided by the GSO. For the period of 2000-02, material inputs 
are estimated as a multiple of the growth indices of total fertilizer consumption 
used by Vietnam (FAO, 2007), using 1999 as a base year, and the actual current 
fertilizer use by provinces in 1999 (provided from Kompas , 2004). 
In Kompas (2004), material inputs include the nutrition content of all fertilizers 
( organic and chemical), insecticides and seeds. The conversion factor used to ag-
gregate organic and chemical fertilizers is similar to that used by Tang (1980) and 
Sicular (1988). The amount of organic fertilizer for the rice industry is obtained 
from the total amount of organic fertilizer used for agriculture. Organic fertilizer 
for agriculture is assumed to be supplied from two main sources: night soil and 
large animal manure (buffaloes, cattle and pigs). Population-adjusted night-soil is 
estimated based on the size of the rural population ( General Statistic Office, 2008b) 
multiplied by a rural utilization rate (0.9). The standard number of large animals 
equals the sum of buffaloes, cattle and pigs ( General Statistic Office, 2008b), for 
which the weighted ratios are 1, 1 and 0.33, respectively. Organic fertilizer for rice 
production is obtained by multiplying the amount of organic fertilizer for agricul-
ture with the weighted ratio between food grain area sown to the total sown area 
for cultivation. The chemical fertilizer data used for rice production is derived di-
rectly by multiplying the average amounts of chemical fertilizer used in the north 
(165.4 kg/ha) and the south (193 kg/ha) ( drawn from Cantho University (1995)) 
and the rice area in every province (SDAFF, 2006) . The data set for insecticides 
is constructed by multiplying the average use of insecticide per hectare in the year 
1992, or 5.8 kg and 7.6 kg in the north and south, respectively, and the total rice 
area (SDAFF, 2006). In a similar manner, the data for seeds are calculated from 
the average use of seeds per hectare, or 140 kg/ha and 240 kg/ha in the north 
and south, respectively, multiplied by the total rice area ( General Statistic Of-
fice, 2008b). The time series for chemical fertilizer is calculated from the average 
amounts of chemical fertilizer used per hectare multiplied by cultivated area in 
each year (SDAFF, 2001, 2006). The time series data for insecticides and seeds 
are calculated from the average use of insecticide and seeds per hectare (SDAFF, 
.. 
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2001 , 2006) multiplied by rice area for each year (SDAFF, 2006). To verify, an 
updated measure of fertilizer (in terms of quantities) for 2003-2006 is estimated 
from the trend of average fertilizer use in the South East Asia (FAO, 2007) , using 
the 2002 as a base year . 
5. Capital quantity and prices. The capital variable for 1985-1999 is based on 
Kompas (2004), following a similar approach to that used by McMillan et al. 
(1989) , and assumes that the physical capital can be represented by the capacity 
of tractors in combination with a buffalo equivalent measure. The conversion from 
the number of draught animals to the capacity of tractors is based on well-known 
observations in Pakistan (see Blomqvist, 1986), indicating that a bullock-day (a 
pair of bullock working 8 hours) is approximately the same as a tractor-hour, with 
a typical tractor being between 15 and 25 horsepower. In the Vietnamese case, 
we assume that one cattle or buffalo-day is equivalent to roughly 0.6 bullock-days 
( or 14 hours of work by one pair of cattle or buffalo is roughly 8 hours of work 
by-one bullock), with a typical tractor being 15 horsepower. The data sources for 
the capacity of tractors, number of buffaloes and cattle are provided from MAFI 
(1991 , 1994); SDAFF (2001) , and for recent series by SDAFF (2006) and General 
Statistic Office (2008b). The capital measure used for rice from 1985-1999 is drawn 
from (Kompas, 2004). The capital measure used from 2000-02 is estimated from 
the planted area and the average capital cost for rice from (DPM, 2005). The 
updated capital quantity variable for 2003-2006 is estimated and verified from the 
trend of tractors used in the South East Asia (FAO , 2007), using the 2002 as a 
base year. Capital prices for 1985-1999 are obtained from Che et al. (2001) and 
Kompas (2004), with additional details for the early part of this series provided 
in Che et al. (2006). An updated series is drawn from district level data obtained 
from General Statistic Office (2008b). 
.. 
Chapter 5 
Food Security and the Poor: 
Regional Effects of Rice Export 
Policy on Households in Vietnam 
5.1 Introduction 
Recent dramatic increases in the price of staple foods have raised concerns over 
food security and the vulnerability of the poor. World food prices reached their 
peak in the second quarter of 2008, with wheat and maize three times and rice five 
times more expensive than at the beginning of 2003 (Von Braun, 2008). Several 
exporting countries with food security concerns responded to these price increases 
by imposing export controls and (in some cases) total bans, which further fuelled 
world food price increases (Childs and Kiawu, 2009; Timmer, 2008; Heatley and 
Fan, 2008). Along with a desire to ensure domestic supplies, the export controls 
were often rationalised by an expressed need to protect the poor from increases 
in domestic food prices, since staple foods account for a large proportion of their 
consumption bundle. Further tensions occurred in exporting countries, many of 
which are developing economies, since changes in the price of staple foods differ-
entially impact rural and urban households, with relatively poor food producers in 
rural areas benefiting from higher world and domestic food prices at the expense 
of urban households. 
We focus on Vietnam's rice production and trade as a case study. Vietnam is the 
world's second largest rice exporter, with exports of six million tons, equivalent to 
16 percent of the world trade volume in rice (Shigetomi et al. , 2011). Its export 
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revenue is approximately three billion USD, contributing roughly three percent to 
Vietnam's GDP (World Bank, 2009c). Vietnam is also a poor developing country 
with about 15 percent of the population or twelve million people living below 
the poverty line. Although a relatively small component of GDP, trade and trade 
policy in the rice sector is very important for the Vietnamese because as much as 66 
percent of rural households and 77 percent of the poorest quintile in Vietnam are 
rice producers. Rice is also the dominant staple food in Vietnam, representing 33 
recent of the total household expenditure among the poorest quintile households. 1 
Given the importance of rice, the Government of Vietnam has maintained strict 
control over rice exports. To do so, the Government sets an annual rice export 
target, which can be adjusted throughout the year, subject to changes in domestic 
supply and demand. The Government, at its discretion, can also suspend rice 
exports whenever it is deemed necessary. This control is further underpinned by 
the almost monopoly-like power possessed by state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the 
rice export n1arket, as well as their heavy involvement in rice export policy and 
management. Furthermore, SOEs dominate inter-regional trade in the domestic 
market, especially under the national food security framework, which transfers 
rice from surplus to deficit regions. Given this control, geographically partitioned 
by two national SOEs, Vietnam's domestic rice supplies characteristically lack 
integration between markets across the north and the south of the country (Minot 
and Galetti, 1998; Baulch et al., 2008; Luu, 2003). 
In 2008, in the face of rising world prices for rice, Vietnam imposed an export ban 
from March 25th to the end of June over concerns for food security and a desire 
to stabilise the domestic price of rice. This ban, together with one by India earlier 
on, the world's third largest rice exporter, coupled with panic purchases by rice 
importers, especially from the Philippines, contributed to pushing the world rice 
price to its peak in May of 2008 (Timmer, 2008). 
-
This paper analyses Vietnam's rice export policy in the context of rising world rice 
prices. In particular, we investigate both national and sub-national impacts as well 
as the distributional and welfare implications of different policy scenarios. To do 
so, we bring together insights from a regionally-disaggregated or 'bottom-up' com-
putable general equilibrium ( CGE) model and a micro-simulation on household 
data. At the economy-wide level, our bottom-up CGE model is a combination of 
eight interacting CGE models , representing eight regions in Vietnam. To this end, 
it allows both national and sub-national assessments of a change in the world price 
1 Calculated using Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 2006 (VHLSS 2006) data. 
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of rice on GDP, domestic prices and employment under different policy scenarios. 
Sub-national changes in domestic producer and consumer prices of both food and 
non-food items, as well as changes in factor prices and including wages for both 
skilled and unskilled labour generated from the bottom-up CGE model, are then 
inputed into household data for a further disaggregated analysis of different policy 
options at the household level. 
We consider three policy scenarios in this paper. The first is where Vietnam 
maintains the status-quo with a rice export control designed to mimic the imposed 
export ban in 2008, and the prevailing and market-segmenting powers of the SOEs 
in domestic rice and export markets. In the second scenario, Vietnam still controls 
rice export quantities, but liberalises the rice export market domestically - a 
WTO commitment Vietnam has promised to deliver on since 2011. In the last 
scenario, we assume that Vietnam has a relatively free rice export policy, with no 
export controls or bans, and a nearly competitive domestic rice market. 
Using a Vietnam interregional input-output table for 2005 (VIRIO 2005) for the 
CGE model and household survey data (VHLSS 2006) for the micro-simulation, we 
draw three main conclusions. First, for Vietnam as a whole, although the range of 
export policy options has little impact on GDP, there are substantial distributional 
impacts across regions and households from different export polices. Second, both 
rural and urban households, including poor households, benefit from free trade, 
even though domestic rice prices are higher. Finally, under free trade, compared 
to other export policies, relatively large gains accrue to rural households , where 
poverty is most pervasive in Vietnam, with peak gains among the middle-income 
cohort and a relatively symmetric distribution of gains around this group. 
Despite numerous recent modelling exercises done on Vietnam's international trade 
integration, this research, to the best of our knowledge, is the first that uses a 
regionally-disaggregated or bottom-up CGE model. With its disaggregation, the 
model is able to capture regional dimensions of the Vietnamese economy under 
different market conditions. The latter is important since fully integrated market 
conditions are not a realistic assumption for the domestic rice market in Vietnam, 
making an aggregate or national CGE model for the country inappropriate. 2 
Our results also differ substantially from the literature in the sense that they cap-
ture the distributional impacts from different export polices , across the regions and 
2See World Bank (2005) and Abbott et al. (2009, 2007) for critical reviews of modelling 
exercises quantifying the impact of Vietnam's global integration and Baulch et al. (2008) for 
fragmentation in the Vietnamese domestic rice market. 
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for different households. The existing literature, for example, using mostly par-
tial equilibrium methods, shows that rice export liberalisation in Vietnam would 
increase food prices and average real income, making urban households worse off 
while rural households would be better off (Minot and Goletti , 1998). Other studies 
on the impact of higher food prices in Vietnam generally collaborate these find-
ings (Ivanic and Martin, 2008; Vu and Glewwe, 2011; Phung and Waibel, 2010).3 
Although these studies provide important insights, they are done in isolation from 
economy-wide impacts, thus ignoring the connections between a change in the 
price of rice and changes in the price of inputs and non-food commodities.4 The 
connection between the price of rice and the wage rate, in particular, is important 
for understanding the effects on urban welfare, or for those who do not necessarily 
grow rice, from different export policies. 
5.2 The rice market in Vietnam 
Vietnam has made remarkable progress in rice production over the last thirty 
years, moving from a large importer of rice during the period 1976-80, to now the 
world's second largest rice exporter in the world. About 8.5 million hectares of rice 
planted area, equivalent to more than 4 million ha of land, produces approximately 
43 million tons of rice per year in Vietnam ( General Statistic Office, 2009). More 
than 50 percent of the rice output is produced in the Mekong River Delta (MRD), 
and more than 90 percent of exported rice comes from this region ( Government of 
Vietnam, 2008). For our purposes, there are three special aspects of rice production 
in Vietnam worth highlighting: (1) the Vietnamese government's control of export 
quantities and the role of SOEs; (2) the lack of integration between rice markets 
in the north and south; and (3) the details of how the Vietnamese government 
responded to the food crisis of 2008. 
3The impact of higher food prices in other lower-income countries has been studied widely, 
with a variety of conclusions. For example, see Deaton (1989) for Thailand; Budd (1993) for 
Cote d 'Ivoire, Barrett and Dorosh (1996) for Madagascar; and Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) , 
Warr (2005) and Ravallion and Van de Walle (1991) for Indonesia . 
4Ivanic and Martin (2008) is the only study on the impact of higher food prices in Vietnam 
which takes into account changes in wages , but only for unskilled labour. 
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5.2.1 Quantity controls and market power in Vietnam's 
rice export market 
Vietnam has declared three objectives in its management of rice exports: the 
profitability of farmers, with attempts to guarantee a minimum return over costs, 
food security or 'adequate domestic supplies under any circumstances', and stable 
domestic prices ( Government of Vietnam, 2008). A recent decree by the Prime 
Minister replaced the food security objective by one of 'implementing interna-
tional trade commitments and ensuring efficient export supplies' ( Government of 
Vietnam, 2010). 
One of Vietnam's key measures used to achieve its objectives is to control the 
quantity of rice exports. Since 1992, three years after Vietnam began exporting 
rice, the Government has controlled rice exports by setting annual rice export 
targets. This target is set in consultation with Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD), the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) and the Viet-
nam Food Association (VFA). 5 It is based on estimates of domestic supply and 
demand. As a result, within a given year, the targeted annual export volume can, 
in principal, vary subject to changes in domestic conditions, although in practice 
the target and the policy surrounding it is often binding and restrictive. Evidence 
suggests that the policy results in both rice production and exports being below 
their optimal levels (Nielsen, 2003). 
Export quantity controls were initially carried out through an export licensing 
system. At one point , SOEs had a complete legal monopoly over rice exports, 
with each of a limited group of 15 to 40 SOEs granted a quota that specified the 
amount of rice it could export (Minot and Coletti, 2000). In 1998, reforms allowed 
for some private and foreign-shared companies to engage in rice exports, followed 
by a simplification of the approval system for export businesses , which was in turn 
replaced by the current registration system. On May 1, 2001, the export quota 
system was formally abolished with the view to promoting competition among rice 
exporters in expanding their share in the world market. 
Despite abolishing the export quota system, the government's overall control of 
the total quantity of rice exports has remained virtually unchanged. At its discre-
tion, the Vietnamese government can suspend or limit rice exports whenever it is 
5VAF is a trade organisation which consists of the SOEs and private companies that engage 
in rice exports. Before 2011, foreign-owned companies had to establish joint ventures with SO Es 
in order to export rice. These joint ventures have been considered as 'associates' but not full 
members of VFA. 
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deemed necessary, and even without export bans being imposed, no further rice 
export contracts can be implemented whenever the total quantity of contracted 
rice exports reaches the government's annual target. 
In addition, there has also been little diminution of the market power of rice ex-
porting SOEs in the face of reforms. Rice exporting SOEs are dominated by two 
national companies: the Vietnam Northern Food Corporation (usually referred 
to as 'Vinafood 1 '), based in Hanoi, and the Vietnam Southern Food Corpo-
ration ('Vinafood 2'), based in Ho Chi Minh City, along with a few provincial 
SOEs. Vinafood 1 and Vinafood 2 were established in 1995 to strengthen the 
state capability of food market control and provide an instrument for domestic 
price stabilisation (Dang and Tran, 2008). 
The overall dominance of SOEs in Vietnamese rice export market is largely ex-
plained by direct government support. First, food SOEs, such as Vinafood 1 and 
Vinafood 2, have access to credit from government financial institutions and pro-
motional funds for exports at highly subsidised interest rates, often set at zero 
(Dang Kim Son and Tran Cong Thang, 2008, Luu, 2002). Second, SOEs with 
export contracts can borrow up to 100% of the value of the contract, while private 
companies can borrow only a maximum of 70% of the collateral that is provided in 
the form of their buildings and equipment (Dang and Tran). Third, SO Es are of-
ten exempted from tax and receive government assistance to facilitate purchases of 
rice (Dang and Tran). Finally, the two national SOEs, Vinafood 1 and Vinfood 2, 
are often assigned exclusive roles to execute government-to-government rice deals , 
generating considerable clout in overseas markets (Tsukada, 2011; Dang and Tran, 
2008) .6 
Another key measure of the government to achieve its rice market objectives, 
especially in terms of ensuring a reasonable profit · for farmers , is to set a "floor 
price" for rice exports. This floor price serves as the basis for negotiation between 
rice exporters and foreign importers. As a result , the domestic rice market price, 
especially in the MRD, is more or less conditioned by this floor price (Luu, 2002). 
Until recently, the floor price was set by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) based on 
recommendations from MIT, MARD, Vinafood 1 and Vinafood 2, and the VFA. 
6The efficacy of monopoly-like power over food supplies exercised by SOEs generates differing 
views. Ghosh and Whalley (2004) suggest that the price control of those parastatals increases 
welfare. On the other hand, Dang and Tran (2008) argue that food SOEs are inefficient and they 
fail to deliver their objectives as well as incur large fiscal losses . For example, total net losses 
of the central SOEs in agriculture were estimated to be US$22 million in 1998 (Dang and Tran, 
2008). Recently, there are increasing signs of deterioration in the general financial health of the SOEs (World Bank, 2011) . 
.. 
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Since 2011, the floor price has been set by the VFA directly, based on guidelines 
promulgated by the MOF. It is not uncommon to observe executive staff members 
from Vinafood 1 and Vinafood 2 taking lead positions in the VFA. This, combined 
with no representation from farmers, has raised conflict of interest questions for 
the VFA in formulating producer prices (e.g. , Phap Luat, 2010). 
5.2.2 Lack of integration between domestic rice markets 
in the north and the south 
Despite extensive market liberalisation in agricultural production in Vietnam af-
ter Doi Moi, domestic market integration in Vietnam has lagged considerably. 
This is partly explained by substantial constraints to transportation generated by 
geographical conditions associated with an elongated country, coupled with poor 
infrastructure due to long-lasting wars in the middle of the last century. Bureau-
cratic rigidities before 1997, where the procedures to buy and transport rice from 
the south to the north resembled those for trade with another country, also created 
considerable market segmentation7 (Minot and Coletti, 2000). 
Recent evidence suggests that the poor integration between markets in the north 
and the south continues (Baulch et al., 2008; Minot and Coletti, 2000), whereas 
markets within a region seem highly integrated (Baulch et al., 2008; Luu, 2003). 
This is largely explained by the position and power of the SOEs. Long distance 
trade tends to be dominated by the SOEs simply because they are well-resourced, 
supported by the government and, under the framework of the national food se-
curity policy, they are directly tasked with transferring rice from surplus to deficit 
regions , albeit under often market-distorted pricing. Only a few large private 
traders, miller-polishers and polishers can compete with SOEs in inter-regional 
trade. Given the small number of players and the reported inefficiency of SOEs, 
improvement in the north-south market integration is unlikely. By contrast, oper-
ating in markets within a region is seen as a distinct advantage for private traders 
given their local knowledge. In these markets , competition and the large number 
of participants often results in efficient outcomes and little remaining opportunity 
for arbitrage (Luu, 2003). 
7In March, 1997, Decree No. 140/TTg was issued to lift internal trade restrictions on rice, 
to help eliminate some licenses and controls on transports . 
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5.2.3 The 2007-2008 food crisis in Vietnam 
Recent spikes in the price of rice have generated two official responses from the 
Government of Vietnam. The first was a recommendation by the VFA in July of 
2007 for a ban on the signing of new export contracts beyond the annual export 
target, effectively imposing a binding and upper-limit on exports. The government 
gave official approval for this action in September, 2007. This ban was removed 
in January 2008. 
The second and more dramatic action occurred in 2008, as indicted above, when 
the government imposed an export ban from the 25th March until the end of June, 
during the peak of the global food crisis, when international prices for rice rose 
rapidly from 400 USD in January to roughly 1000 USD per ton in May (Figure 5 .1). 
The ban was rationalised on the grounds of maintaining domestic food security and 
the control of domestic prices - with the latter objective, in large part, designed 
to protect the poor and urban consu1ners. 
.. 
FIGURE 5.1: Monthly International Free-On-Board (FOB) and MRD Prices of 
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It is clear from the evidence that these objectives were not achieved. In terms 
of food security, and due partly to panic hoarding by consumers and speculative 
delays in sales by rice wholesalers , domestic supplies of rice in stores effectively 
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disappeared throughout most of the country8 . For example, in late April , many 
retail shops were closed throughout provinces in the MRD. For those stores that 
remained open, both here and in the northern cities in particular, rice prices 
increased by the hour and many stores sold out of rice completely, or sold only in 
limited quantities ( e.g., limits of 10 kg per customer in Ho Chi Minh City were 
common) (Tuoi ue, 2008). Domestic prices were also not stabilised. Across the 
country, prices of staple foods increased by 6.1 and 22.19 percent monthly, as 
compared to 2.2 and 2.28 percent for non-staple foods in April and May (General 
Statistic Office, 2008b). 
The effective shortage of rice was at odds with the announcements of policy makers 
as well as available information on domestic supplies. For example, in April, the 
chairman of the VFA, who was also the General Director of Vinafood 2, was quoted 
as saying that a "rice shortage was impossible due to the recent large harvest in 
the MRD and a much lower export target allowed for in international contract 
negotiations as compared with the previous year" (Tuoi Tre, 2008). Indeed, total 
production for the winter- spring season in the MRD (before the export ban) in-
creased by 4 percent, or by 300 thousand tons, compared with harvest over the 
same period in the year before. On the other hand, the total r:-ice export volume 
by the end of March increased by only 5 percent compared to the same period in 
2007 (General Statistic Office, 2008a). Furthermore, given the increases in world 
rice prices, there was an apparent and strong supply response from rice farmers 
in the MRD. By mid-April, rice cultivation in the MRD for the summer-autumn 
season had increased by 20 percent, which was more than enough to offset a slight 
fall in cultivated land in the north due to unusually cold weather. 
The food 'shortage' was brought under control only after the Prime Minister, 
provincial heads and relevant city representatives requested SOEs to release rice 
from their warehouses and threatened to punish speculative behaviour. The ulti-
mate effect on producers in the MRD, in particular, was clear. The export ban 
prevented significant sales of rice in international markets at high world prices. 
Rice fanners, many of whom are poor, also experienced sharp falls in returns over 
costs, from an estimated 85 percent for their winter-spring season to only 20 per-
cent for their summer- autumn harvest (Government of Vietnam, 2008). Indeed, 
toward the end of 2008, the government had to support SOEs to guarantee returns 
to farmers with additional rice purchases and subsidies due to the sharp fall in 
international demand and substantial excess domestic supplies. 
.. 
8Much of volatility in rice prices throughout the world was attributed to hoarding behaviour (Timmer, 2010, 2012) 
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5.3 Method, Model and Simulation 
The following sections describe the different policy scenarios used in the modelling, 
the bottom-up CGE model itself and the measurement of distributional impacts 
and changes in household welfare in the micro-simulation model. 
5.3.1 Policy scenarios 
Our goal is to examine the impact of a 30 percent increase in the world price of 
rice on Vietnam's economy and households in order to mimic ( often dramatic) 
changes in world rice prices. The overall price change is similar to the change in 
world rice prices from 2005 to 2007, but less than the price-spike that occurred in 
mid-2008 (Croser et al., 2010; Ivanic and Martin, 2008). The percentage change 
in rice prices can easily be scaled in the model to generate contrast and magnified 
effects. We use a bottom-up CGE model to analyse the performance of the national 
and regional economies in terms of GDP, employment and domestic output prices, 
wages and other input prices. The changes in domestic output prices, wages and 
input prices by region, including the effects on rural and uroan households as 
well as on producers and consumers, generated by the bottom-up CGE model , are 
then simulated using household data to measure the regional impacts on household 
welfare. 
We consider three policy scenarios. The first, termed 'Quota Monopolist ', resem-
bles Vietnam's current situation where both rice export controls and the market 
power of SOEs are in place. The model under this scenario is designed with a (vari-
able) ad1ninistrative rice export limit and a producer tax of 15 percent to mimic 
the super-profits of food and rice export SOEs with an export ban. In the second 
scenario, designated si1nply as 'Quota', Vietnam still controls rice export quanti-
ties, but liberalises the rice export market - a WTO accession commitment, as 
mentioned, Vietnam has promised to deliver since 2011 .. The model under Quota 
is similar in design to Quota Monopolist but it does not have a producer tax 
and the rice market is otherwise competitive so that rice can shift ( although not 
completely freely) throughout the country in response to price signals and excess 
supplies and demands. Finally, under the last policy scenario, 'Free Trade', Viet-
nam allows free exports, without control, and more nearly competitive domestic 
markets for rice. In all scenarios, prevailing fragmentation of markets between the 
North and the South is taken into account for by the regional dimension of our 
regional CGE model. 
~ 
Chapter 5. Regional Effects of Rice Export Policy on Households in Vietnam 115 
5.3.2 The bottom-up CGE model 
5.3.2.1 Overview 
The bottom-up CGE model used in this paper is based on the ORANI model 
for the Australian Economy (Horridge, 2003). To generate bottom-up and multi-
regional characteristics, the top-down regional extension in the ORANI model has 
been replaced with a fully bottom-up regional model. In basic terms, our bottom-
up CGE model can be viewed as a combination of eight interacting ORANI models, 
representing eight regions in Vietnam. 
We use VIRIO 2005 to construct the regional characteristics of the CGE model. 
VIRIO 2005 is a database that covers eight regions ( denoted R), representing the 
Red River Delta (RRD), the North East (NE), the North West (NW), the North 
Central Coast (NCC), the South Central Coast (SCC), the Central Highlands 
(CH), the South East (SE), and the MRD. The RRD and especially the MRD are 
the major rice growing regions, although rice is grown in almost every province 
of Vietnam. The SE is largely industrial, the CH is dominated by coffee produc-
tion and other industrial crops, and the NCC and SCC are clearly coastal areas. 
The poorest regions are the NW and CH where many of the ethnic minorities live 
(Nguyen et al., 2012). The terrain in these regions is hilly and often mountainous 
and far less suitable for wet rice production. Details on specific provinces included 
in each region are provided in Appendix 5.6.1. VIRIO 2005 has 28 industries (I) 
which produce 28 commodities ( C), namely: paddy, other crops, livestock and 
poultry, forestry, fish farming, fisheries, oil and gas, mining, processed seafood, 
processed rice, other agricultural processing, textiles, paper, wood, rubber , non-
metallic mineral products, transport equipment, metal products, other manufac-
turing, electricity and water, construction, transport (margins), communication, 
trade (margins), financial services, public administration, hotels and restaurants, 
and other services. 
While our bottom-up CGE model has features similar to a typical ORANI model, 
it differs in at least three important ways to incorporate regional features . First , 
regional indices are added to every variable and coefficient , increasing the dimen-
sion of the model considerably. Second, whereas the basic flow of goods and/ or 
services in a typical ORANI database maps from two sources/destinations (i .e. , 
the domestic economy and the rest of the world) , in our bottom-up CGE model, 
the mapping is from R + l sources/ destinations to include all R regions and the rest 
of the world. Similar regional identifiers are applied to the usual ORANI structure 
.. 
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of designated 'Margins', 'Taxes', 'Labour', 'Capital', 'Land', 'Other Costs ' and a 
'Production Tax'. Finally, instead of having a CxI ORANI dimension, the 'make 
matrix' in our model is a CxRxI matrix to capture regional features. For simplic-
ity, we assume that every industry is 'local' in the sense that it can produce goods 
and services only within its region. 
5.3.2.2 Model description 
The model itself consists of four agents: the household (urban and rural), the 
government, the investor and the foreign sector ( exports and imports). It has five 
blocks: production, demand, market clearing, price linkages and miscellaneous 
blocks. 
The production block in each region is made up of a set of Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation ( CET) and Leontief production functions. Apart from the differ-
ences mentioned in the previous sub-section, the production structure is the same 
as that of a typical ORANI model. That is, composite intermediate commodities, 
primary factors and other costs are combined in fixed proportions (i.e., Leontief 
functions) into Rx I output (activity) levels. 
The demand block comprises demands for productive factors (skilled and unskilled 
labour, capital, and land) and demands for commodities (intermediate, household, 
investment, export, government, inventory, and margin demands). The demand 
for productive factors is given by a set of Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) demand functions, as are the intermediate demands for each commodity. 
This CES functional form implies that commodities demanded can be substituted 
for one another depending on their prices and the elasticities of substitution be-
tween them. Given constant returns to scale, which characterises the model's 
production technology, the competitive 'Zero Pure Profits ' condition is imposed 
to equate output price to its marginal cost of production. In brief, each of the 
C commodities at the base of the regional production structure is generated by 
using the commodities bought from the other R regions and abroad with a CES 
and Leontief technology. These outputs are then transformed into C goods and 
sold in R regions and abroad based on the CET function , which is employed to 
model trade flows among regions and the rest of the world. 
Household demand is a combination of a Stone-Geary and a CES function . Instead 
of using the typical ORANI model 's Klein-Rubin utility function , we follow Dixon 
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and Rimmer (2005) in employing a Stone-Geary function , reflecting the assump-
tion that households always consume a basic subsistence bundle regardless of their 
budget and the prices of the bundle. Any expenditure over and above this follows 
a standard CES functional form. At the base of the household demand structure, 
each of the 28 composite goods are created by goods bought from each R region or 
abroad with CES technology, and then combined into final consumption goods for 
households in each region by the Stone-Geary utility function transformation. Pa-
rameter values for the household demand are drawn from the Vietnamese Monash 
(VIPAG) model, which also uses the Stone-Geary utility function. 
Investment demand is constructed by a combination of Leontief and CES functions. 
Each of the 28 composite goods is created by goods bought from each R region and 
abroad with CES technology, in a manner similar to household demands. They are 
then combined into capital for I industries in regions R using Leontief production 
functions. 
Export demand for each region and the world is assumed to have the following 
specification: 
Export(C, R) = QF(C, R) [ P(C, R) ] EXP_ELAST(C,R) 
e * PF(C, R) (5.1) 
where for each good C in region R, Export is real export volume; Q F and PF are 
quantity and price shift parameters; P is the export price; EXP _ELAST( C, R) is 
the export demand elasticity; and e is the exchange rate. For the export demand 
schedule to be downward slopping, EXP _ELAST( C, R) must be negative in the 
model. While equation (1) looks similar to a demand equation in a typical ORANI 
1nodel, here there are CxR export demand equations with regional indices R being 
incorporated to model trading flows between each of the eight regions and the rest 
of the world. The flow of domestic goods among eight regions, as usual, follows 
typical demand, supply and market clearing conditions. 
Other demand components maintain their corresponding ORANI setup, except 
for basic regional designations. Government expenditure is tied to private con-
su1nption. Inventory demands for each region depend on its production volume or 
its imports. Margins incorporate transportation and trade services, where margin 
demands depend on commodity flows and are linked to intermediate, investment , 
private, and government demands. There are no margins for inventory demand. 
Apart from adding the usual regional index to all the original ORANI equations, 
Chapter 5. Regional Effects of Rice Export Policy on Households in Vietnam 118 
we also assume that the region that uses a margin is also the one that delivers the 
margin, reflecting the fact that trade services are largely local. 
The market clearing block has standard equations to ensure market clearing con-
ditions in each market, but with regional balance. For example, in the commodity 
market, the usual condition that commodities produced in each region are equal 
to their demand is strengthened to ensure that the production of any good in each 
region must be equal to its use in that region and in all other regions. Likewise, 
the total imports of any good must be equal to its use in all regions combined. 
In the labour market, aggregate regional labor supply is assumed to be fixed. How-
ever, labour is allowed to be mobile across industries so that output in industries 
can vary subject to price changes. Returns to labour, or wages, are indexed to 
the CPI to reflect short-run conditions in the labour market. As labour is mobile 
within a region, the real wage for each industry adjusts according to the difference 
between the supply and demand for labour. In the capital market , on the other 
hand, capital is assumed fixed across industries to concentrate on short run effects 
of a change in rice prices. 
The price-linkage block maintains the link between the producer-and the consumer 
prices. The gap between the two prices is taxes, by definition, which include excise, 
value-added taxes, duties, and margins , which include wholesale and retail charges 
and transportation. Finally, the miscellaneous equations block includes reporting 
and equations for recursive dynamics simulations, which are not needed in our 
study. Interested readers are encouraged to consult (Horridge, 2003) for further 
details on all of these equations. 
5.3.3 Measurement of household welfare impacts 
To measure the change in household welfare, we use a method based on Deaton 
(1989) as implemented in Minot and Goletti (1998). Since a household can be 
a consumer, or a producer, or both, its net welfare change is a combination of 
both consu1ner and producer surpluses. For an individual household, the change 
in consumer surplus (~CS) associated with the change in the consumer price of 
a good is simply approximated as: 
~cs~ -qf(pg - pf)= -qf(~Pd) (5.2) 
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where qf is the quantity demanded before the price change, pf and p~ are the 
consumer prices before and after the change, and ~pd refers to the change in the 
consumer price. This first order approximation reflects only the immediate impact 
of the price change as it does not take into account a consumer's response. The 
consumer's response is included in the second-order approximation, given by: 
~CS rv -0.5(qf + qg)(p~ - pf)= -qf(~pd) - 0.5(~pd)(~qd) 
A d [ A d] 2 d dup d d up 
-qlpl-d - 0.5Edq1P1 -d (5.3) 
P1 P1 
where qg is the quantity demanded after the price change, ~qd refers to the change 
in consumption, and Ed is the price elasticity of demand. 
Likewise, the second order approximation for a change in producer surplus (~PS) 
associated with the change in the producer price of a good is: 
~PS rv 0.5(qf + q~)(p; - pf) = qfpf ~ps + 0.5Esqfpf [~ps] 2 (5.4) pf pf 
where qf and q~ are quantities supplied before and after the price change, pf and 
p; are producer prices before and after the change, and ~ps is -the change in the 
producer price. 
Since consumers and producers will generally respond to changes in prices, we 
mainly use the second order approximation of ~CS and ~p S. For calibration, 
we employ the recent estimate of demand elasticity for rice in Vietnam by Nguyen 
et al. (2009) and the average of supply elasticities for rice in the North and South 
of Vietnam by Khiem and Pingali (1995). 9 For other commodities, we apply 
estimates from various studies on Vietnam and other countries ( see Appendices 
5.6.2 and 5.6.3 for details). Finally, we define the sum of ~CS and ~PS to give 
a measure of net benefit (NB): 
N 
NB= L(~PSi + ~CSi) (5.5) 
i=l 
where N is the number of goods a household consumes and/ or produces. To 
analyse distributive effects, we focus on the ratio of household net benefit to its 
9There might be a concern that demand and supply elasticities for rice may vary with house-
hold living standards and across regions. To address these two concerns, we checked the sensi-
tivity of our results by using alternative estimates for demand and supply elasticities by regions 
and quintiles in Vietnam from Minot and Goletti (2000) and Le (2008). Overall results changed 
only slightly and are available from the authors on request. 
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expenditure, or: 
N 
NBR = L(l>PSi + l>CS;) (5.6) 
i=l 
where Y is total household expenditure before the price change, and NB R is the 
net benefit ratio . 
As indicated above, we use the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey in 2006 
(VHLSS 2006), carried out by the General Statistics Office ( GSO) in Vietnam, for 
the micro-simulation. VHLSS 2006 is the latest household survey available before 
the food crisis and the various rice export bans imposed by the Government of 
Vietnam in 2007 and 2008. In addition, the time of the survey, which was in May 
and September of 2006, is the closest to the time frame of VIRIO 2005. Both 
income and expenditure information was collected from 9,189 of households , or 
roughly 0.05 percent of all households in Vietnam. VHLSS 2006 is a multi-stage 
stratified random sample, split by urban and rural households. 
We follow Deaton (1989) in using non-parametric kernel regressions in our analysis 
of household demand and supply patterns for rice, as well as household welfare 
impacts as a result of an increase in the world price of rice. This_approach places a 
flexible curve on an ( x, y) scatterplot with no parametric restrictions on the form 
of the curve ( Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), thereby providing easily comprehensible 
descriptions of data across the population. 
Throughout this study, we use household expenditure per person as our measure 
of household living standards. It could be argued that income, rather than expen-
diture, is a better measure of welfare. However, income can be difficult to measure 
in a developing country like Vietnam, its large amount of unreported income. By 
contrast, household expenditures can be measured in an internationally accepted 
way and can be deflated by region-specific cost of living indices. Another advan-
tage of using expenditure as a measure of welfare is that consumption tends to be 
smoothed in response to income fluctuations over relatively a long period of time 
(Deaton, 1997). Based on per capita household expenditure, we define households 
in the lowest quintile, the highest quintile and the middle quintiles as poor, rich 
and middle expenditure households. 
.. 
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5.4 Results 
In this section, we first present basic results for the household rice demand and sup-
ply in Vietnam, followed by model results for both the national and sub-national 
economies drawn from the bottom-up CGE model. We then analyse the distribu-
tional and welfare impacts on households via the micro-simulation. 
5.4.1 Household rice demand and supply 
To analyse household demand and supply patterns for rice , relative to living stan-
dards, and how these vary by region, we first calculate rice shares in total expendi-
ture and estimate the probability of being a rice producer and a net rice seller. A 
rice producer implies that a household produces rice, but may or may not produce 
enough rice for its own consumption. Later, in section 4.3 , we classify households 
as simply net buyers or sellers of rice, based on the difference between household 
consumption and production of rice. 
Figure 5.2 shows the non-parametric regressions of rice shares_on the logarithm 
of household per capita expenditure, or lnexpc. Here, the rice share is the share 
of rice in household total expenditure. The logarithmic transformation is chosen 
to reduce skewness of household per capita expenditure (Deaton, 1989). The 
analysis reveals that rice is an important staple, and the poorer the household the 
more important is rice in household consumption. For example, poor households 
spend between 20 to 50 percent of their expenditure on rice, while rich households 
spend from less than 1 to 10 percent. Rice also accounts for a larger share of 
rural household expenditure than is the case for urban households, since rural 
households are generally poorer than their urban counterparts. On these results 
alone, increases in rice prices will differentially harm poorer households , whether 
rural or urban, but especially so for rural households. As there is no apparent 
difference among regions in terms of rice consumption. in the data, we do not 
include an illustration of this result. 
Figure 5.3 presents the estimated probability densities of rural and urban house-
holds producing rice and those that are net sellers of rice as functions of lnexpc. 
Rice production is clearly an activity of rural households , and especially so for 
poor households. The solid lines , depicting rural and urban households producing 
rice, show that nearly 80 percent of poor rural households are rice producers in 
comparison to 30 to 60 percent of poor urban households. It is also clear that the 
.. 
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difference between the expected probability of being a net rice seller, the dashed 
lines, and that of being a rice producer, gets smaller as living standards increase for 
both rural and urban households. This result suggests a possible lack of suitable 
land, labour and other necessary materials for poor households to produce rice to 
meet their own consumption demands. The two solid vertical lines, represent the 
20th and 80th percentiles of the distribution . 
Figure 5.4 further elaborates the results in Figure 5.3 by regions. Here, we focus 
only on rural areas where 1nost of rice production occurs, .although it is not uncom-
mon in Vietnam for poor urban households to have rice plots in nearby fields. For 
brevity, we highlight only the most pronounced regional differences ( with compar-
isons for other regions collected in Appendix 5.6.4). The right panel in Figure 5.4, 
for example, compares the two key rice producing regions, the RRD and the MRD. 
Households in the RRD are much more likely to produce and sell rice than those 
in the MRD, and these probabilities fall as their living standards increase. The 
estimated probabilities of selling and producing rice are relatively stable across the 
lnexpc distribution for MRD households. Furthermore, the gap between those two 
• 
Chapter 5. Regional Effects of Rice Export Policy on Households in Vietnam 123 
.8 
>. 
:t= 
en 
.6 C 
Q) 
"O 
>. 
+-' 
:.0 
ro 
..0 
.4 0 
l,,_ 
Cl. 
"O Q) 
+-' 
ro 
E 
~ 
.2 en 
w I I 
/ 
0 
6 
FIGURE 5.3: Rice Production and Sales Position 
I 
1 ·············· •··· 
/ 
/ 
/ I,_ 
I ...... _ 
-..... 
I ',r 
I ' 
8 
--
' ', 
........... 
-
\ .. , .... ,,. , .. 
' 
' 
' 
' 
lnexpc 
"\ 
' 
' \ 
Proportion Producing 
Proportion Net Selling 
\ , y 
10 
\ 
\, 
\ 
12 
Two solid vertical lines are at the 20th and 80th percentiles of the lnexpc distribution. Kernel 
= epanechnikov; degree= O; banwidth=0.25 and 0.22 for rural proportion producing and 
selling, respectively; 0.36 for both urban proportion producing and selling. 
estimated probabilities is smaller in the MRD. This likely reflects the remnants 
of land policy in Vietnam over the last three decades: small and non-contiguous 
plots of land were allocated to households in the rural North, including the RRD , 
after the dismantling of agricultural collectives, to ensure equity, hindering land 
consolidation and accumulation and leading to rice production largely on a small 
scales or even at subsistence levels. Rice farms in MRD, on the other hand, are 
larger and more consolidated, allowing for mechanisation (Kompas et al. , 2012). 
MRD rice farmers are thus more likely to produce at a larger scale . 
The left panel in Figure 5.4 compares Vietnam's richest and most industrialised 
region, the South East (SE) , with the poorest and the most remote region in the 
North East (NE) , near the border with China. There is a sharp contrast between 
these two regions. Almost all poor households in the NE produce rice, compared to 
30 to 50 percent of poor households in the SE. Households in the SE have access to 
manufacturing jobs in factories and small industries, throughout the region, while 
their counterparts in the NE have almost no off-farm job opportunities. Although 
.. 
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many NE households produce rice, unfortunately, a large number cannot produce 
enough rice to meet their own household demands, largely due to the fact that the 
soil in this region is the least suitable for wet rice production. 
FIGURE 5.4: Regional Heterogeneity in Rice Production and Sales Position in 
rural SE, NW, MRD and RRD 
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5.4.2 Results from the bottom-up CGE model 
The model results presented in Table 5.1 show the impact of a 30 percent increase 
in the world price of rice on national and regional GDP in Vietnam under the 
different trade scenarios. At the national level, the impact is small. In particular, 
GDP falls slightly under Free Trade, by 0.06 percent , it increases by 0.6 percent 
under Quota and falls by 0.37 percent under Quota Monopolist. This small ag-
gregate impact is consistent with results from static CGE models in Vietnam. 10 
Furthermore, the slight negative impact under Quota Monopolist is consistent 
10See Abbott et al. (2009) for a comprehensive review of and predictions from CGE models in 
Vietnam. 
-
Chapter 5. Regional Effects of Rice Export Policy on Households in Vietnam 125 
with the actual slow down in the GDP growth rate in Vietnam from 8 percent for 
the 2004-2007 period to 6 percent in 2008, with high food prices often seen as the 
most contributing factor (Central Institute for Economic Management , 2010). 
At the regional level, Table 5.1 reveals a relatively homogeneous picture of the 
regional GDP impact under Quota and Quota Monopolist. Indeed, GDP in all 
regions increases, on average, by 0.5 percent under Quota. By contrast, GDP in 
all regions falls by about 0.5 percent under Quota Monopolist. In addition, under 
Quota, the MRD gains the most, followed by the two poorest regions, the CH 
and the NW. Under Quota Monopolist, the poorest region, the NW, suffers the 
most while the richest and most industrialised region, the SE, and the largest rice 
exporting region, the MRD, are the regions least worst off. 
Table 5.1 also reveals a contrasting picture of the impacts on regional GDP under 
Free Trade. For example, the MRD, where most rice exports to the world originate, 
benefits most from the rice price increase. Its GDP increases by 2.17 percent. 
Meanwhile, the two poorest regions, including the NW and the CH, and the richest 
region, the SE, are among the regions made worst off. These regions experience 
a fall of about one percent, on average, in their GDP, with higher rice prices 
-(both international and domestic) resulting in increased wage rates and negative 
employment effects. The impact in the remaining regions varies. GDP in both 
the NE and the SCC falls by 0.25 percent while it increases in the NCC and the 
RRD by 0.12 and 0.05, respectively. 
All together, the results in Table 5.1 suggest that all regions, except the MRD , 
have the highest increase in their GDP under Quota, and that the MRD, not 
unsurprisingly, gains the most under Free Trade. Most importantly, Table 5.1 
indicates that Quota Monopolist is the worst of all policies for the country and all 
its regions in terms of GDP. 
As shown in Table 5.2, the model results indicate that domestic rice prices increase 
rapidly under Free Trade, moderately under Quota Monopolist , and fall under 
Quota, all as expected. It is also apparent that the impact on regional domestic 
rice prices is very similar for the MRD and the SE, on one hand, and all of the 
re1naining regions on the other. For example, in the MRD and the SE, under 
Free Trade, domestic rice prices increase by more than 30 percent , the simulated 
increase in world rice prices, while they fall the most sharply (by about 17 percent) 
under Quota. For other regions, under Free Trade, domestic rice prices increase 
by about 26 percent and fall by about 5 percent under Quota. These contrasting 
regional results are largely driven by the weak market integration between rice 
e 
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TABLE 5.1: Change in GDP (percent) 
Whole country/ regions Free Trade Quota Quota Monopolist 
Vietnam -0.06 0.6 -0.37 
Regions 
Red River Delta 0.05 0.41 -0.62 
North East -0.25 0.26 -0.72 
North West -0.91 0.78 -0.89 
North Central Coast 0.12 0.29 -0.59 
South Central Coast -0.25 0.15 -0.56 
Central Highland -1.3 0.82 -0.54 
South East -0.88 0.6 -0.22 
Mekong River Delta 2.17 1.07 -0.18 
markets in the north and south rice of Vietnam (Baulch et al., 2008), while the 
MRD and the SE are highly inter-connected, with resulting co-movements in rice 
prices. Furthermore, the MRD is the largest rice exporter while the SE is the key 
rice-processing region. Under trade liberalisation, these two regions are the most 
exposed to changes in the world rice market, and thus experience the bulk of the 
changes in the world demand for rice. By contrast, they also tend to generate 
the largest excess supplies of rice when rice export restrictions are in place, with 
consequent and significant falls in rice prices. 
TABLE 5. 2: Change in Regional Domestic Rice Prices (percent) 
Whole country/ regions Free Trade Quota Quota Monopolist 
Red River Delta 27.64 -7.32 12.32 
North East 23.94 -4.70 13.62 
North West 26.10 -4.02 13.68 
North Central Coast 26.16 -4.45 13.57 
South Central Coast 24.52 -4.14 13.84 
Central Highland 26.78 
-5.15 12.70 
South East 32.02 
-18.27 6.49 
Mekong River Delta 34.24 
-16.8 6.41 
Changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) are presented in Table 5.3. Their 
trend is closely linked with domestic rice prices, since rice is a key component 
in calculated consumption baskets. Nominal regional wages also change accord-
ingly, as reported in Table 5.4, since throughout the country ( and especially for 
unskilled labour) they are largely indexed to the CPI - a result also consistent 
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with the assumption of fixed regional labour supplies in our model. Table 5.5 
indicates changes in regional employment. Importantly, unskilled workers in key 
rice producing regions, most of whom are poor, are likely to have more employ-
ment and (using Table 5.4) much higher wages under Free Trade. These workers 
are more likely be involved in rice production and rice-related industries that ex-
pand with Free Trade and other agricultural sectors. On the other hand, higher 
wages and shifts in labour to key rice growing areas within a region generate falls 
in employment in other industries and areas. In the other two trade scenarios, 
more employment, both skilled and unskilled, is created under Quota, compared 
to Quota Monopolist in all regions. 
TABLE 5. 3: Change in regional Consumer Price Index (percent) 
Free Trade Quota Quota Monopolist 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Red River Delta 3.14 5.48 -0.87 -1.66 0.92 1.79 
North East 3.27 5.39 -0.96 -1.64 1.05 1.95 
North West 4.58 7.83 -1.5 -2.71 1.34 2.43 
North Central Coast 3.29 5.19 -0.84 -1.43 0.96 1.69 
South Central Coast 2.22 3.9 -0.36 -0.66 0.85 1.76 
Central Highland 3.61 6.42 -1.4 -2.65 0.77 1.46 
South East 2.16 4.44 -0.93 -2.2 0.37 0.83 
Mekong River Delta 4.17 6.78 -1.29 -2.58 0.56 1.05 
TABLE 5.4: Change in Regional Wages (percent) 
Whole country /regions Free Trade Quota Quota Monopolist 
Red River Delta 4.93 -1.06 0.99 
North East 4.74 -1.26 1.17 
North West 6.5 -1.9 1.59 
North Central Coast 5.12 -1.09 1.1 
South Central Coast 3.17 -0.43 0.95 
Central Highland 4.5 -1.6 0.82 
South East 2.31 -0.91 0.36 
Mekong River Delta 8.37 -1.33 0.75 
The overall results can be explained by a combination of features in Vietnam's 
economic structure and the movements in output and input prices. First, the 
small impact on national GDP in Vietnam from the world rice price increase 
is consistent with the small share of the value of rice production in Vietnam's 
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TABLE 5.5: Change in Regional Employment (percent) 
Free Trade Quota Quota Monopolist 
Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled 
Red River Delta -0.75 1.44 0.63 0.58 -0.83 -0.93 
North East -0.92 0.31 0.41 0.34 -0.88 -1.05 
North West -1.91 -0.84 1.06 1.13 -1.06 -1.19 
North Central Coast -0.45 1.06 0.4 0.4 -0.73 -0.86 
South Central Coast -0.69 0.33 0.22 0.19 -0.76 -0.8 
Central Highland -1.8 -1.53 1.04 1.2 -0.67 -0.74 
South East -1.5 -1.31 0.99 1.02 -0.36 -0.37 
Mekong River Delta 2.16 5.17 1.56 1.73 -0.34 -0.28 
economy. Although distributional and welfare effects can be large, rice production 
itself accounts for only (roughly) 10-15 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2009c). 
Second, a slight fall in GDP under Free Trade is also consistent with the fact that 
gains in the expanding rice sector are offset by losses in the rest of the economy. In 
particular, when domestic rice prices increase in all regions under Free Trade (Ta-
ble 5.3), producers of rice expand production with enhanced profitability. Since 
they are largely labour-intensive producers , they also generate upward pressure 
on labour demand and wages, especially for unskilled workers. Furthermore, in-
creases in rice prices also increase the CPI (Table 5.3) and nominal wages (Table 
5.4). Labour, an important input, thus becomes more expensive, in1posing a loss 
to sectors where output prices have not risen, or have not risen as much as wages, 
unless there are substantial opportunities to substitute capital for labour. The 
net result is a (slight) fall in GDP due to the increased production of low-valued 
rice compared to other parts of the economy. When export trade is limited, al-
ternatively, as is the case under Quota, domestic rice prices fall , leading to lower 
nominal wages in all regions (Tables 5.2 , 5.3 and 5.4). Resources are therefore 
shifted away from the rice sector to other sectors, which account for a larger share 
of national output, and a larger (albeit small) positive impact on national GDP. 
Quota Monopolist again represents the worst case scenario, since domestic rice 
prices increase with no compensating gains to the rice exporting regions due to 
export controls. 
Finally, the heterogeneity in the regional impacts , especially under Free Trade, 
can be explained by three factors. These factors include regional comparative ad-
vantage in rice production, the regional contribution of rice production to GDP, 
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and the direction of price and wage movements. As shown in Figure 5.5, rice pro-
duction is centred largely in the MRD , contributing the highest share to regional 
GDP. Therefore, the regional impact of a higher rice price is the most pronounced 
in this region. In contrast, rice production accounts for less than five percent 
(in almost all cases) of regional GDP in other regions, with much smaller output 
throughout. In addition, higher prices from Free Trade also generate employment 
effects in other regions. For example, the SE, the most industrialised region, is 
also among the most worst off under Free Trade largely because its industrial and 
non-rice sectors have higher labour costs as a result. 11 The loss for non-rice sectors 
thus far outweighs the gain in the expanding rice sector in this region. Finally, 
not all regions in Vietnam produce enough rice for their own demands. In fact , 
the NW and the CH have to import rice, mainly from the MRD. The NW, the 
most remote region, also has to pay higher margin costs. Consequently, these two 
regions are made relatively worse off when domestic rice prices increase. 
FIGURE 5.5: Regional GDP Shares of Paddy and Processed Rice and Regional 
Paddy Production 
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11See Central Institute for Economic Management (2010, pp. 92-94) on labour movements 
from industrial regions , especially the SE, to rural areas in 2008 . 
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5.4.3 Distributional and welfare impacts 
As mentioned, although the impacts of changes in the world price of rice are small 
nationally, in terms of GDP, there are significant distributional impacts on regional 
household welfare. With this in mind, it is important to first note that there are 
a large number of net sellers of rice in Vietnam, and that this measure varies by 
region and expenditure levels. Here, households are classified as net rice sellers or 
buyers based on household differences between rice production and consumption. 
A household is defined as a net rice seller if the value of its rice production is higher 
than the value of its rice consumption; and alternatively, as a net rice buyer. Rice 
sufficient households are those where the value of produced rice exactly equals the 
value of consumption. As only 13 households in the sample of more than 9000 
households are rice sufficient, their results are not presented here for simplicity. 
Household net seller or net buyer positions in rice as well as their (mean) per-
centages in the household data are shown in column 2 of Table 5.6. In terms of 
all households, 40 percent are net sellers, and in rural areas over 50 percent of 
households are net sellers. There are also regional and expenditure level varia-
tions as well. In the RRD, 55 percent of households are net se!lers, for example, 
compared to only 9.4 percent of the sample for the SE. In terms of expenditure 
levels, the 2nd and 3rd quintiles contain more than 50 percent net sellers and in 
the richest quintile, as expected, 87 percent of the sample are net buyers. Even 
for the poorest quintile, most of whom are in rural areas , over 48 percent of the 
households are net sellers, whereas in urban areas, over 90 percent of households 
are net buyers of rice. 
Column 3 of Table 5.6 presents the micro-simulation results, as a second order 
approximation of the average change in the NBR for households in the whole 
country, and as disaggregated by urban and rural households, regions , quintiles , 
and skilled versus unskilled labour. The first order approximation, which assumes 
no household response from both the demand and supply side, is presented in 
colu1nn 4, suggesting little presence of sensitivity effects ." 
~ 
Categories % of 
all hh 
All 100.0 
Urban 25.1 
Rural 74.9 
Red River Delta 21.2 
North East 14.3 
North West 4.7 
North Central Coast 11.0 
South Central Coast 9.3 
Central Highlands 6.3 
South East 12.9 
Mekong River Delta 20.3 
Poorest Quintile 19.0 
2nd Quintile 19.7 
3rd Quintile 20.6 
4th Quintile 20.6 
Richest Quintile 20.1 
Skilled 56.3 
Unskilled 43.8 
TABLE 5.6: Household net position in rice and net benefit ratio (%) 
% of hh in catergories Second order approximation NBR First order approximation NBR 
Net Net Free Quota Quota Free Quota Quota 
Seller Buyer Trade Monopolist Trade Monopolist 
40.1 59.7 4.7 1.2 -1.3 4.4 1.1 -1.4 
8.8 90.8 0.8 0.3 -0.4 0.6 0.3 -0.4 
50.6 49.3 6.3 1.5 -1.7 5.8 1.5 -1.7 
55.2 44.8 4.0 0.7 -1.3 3.7 0.7 -1.3 
46.8 53.2 3.3 0.7 -2.2 3.0 0.7 -2.2 
35.8 64.2 1.7 2.5 -2.6 1.1 2.5 -2.7 
51.0 49.0 5.2 1.0 -2.0 4.8 1.0 -2.1 
44.3 55.3 2.6 0.2 -1.5 2.4 0.2 -1.5 
22.1 77.8 -0.3 2.3 -1.5 -0.8 2.3 -1.5 
9.4 89.8 -0.2 1.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.9 -0.4 
35.0 65.0 12.5 2.1 -0.9 12.0 2.1 -0.9 
48.3 51.7 4.8 2.4 -2.8 4.2 2.3 -2.9 
55.1 44.8 7.0 1.5 -1.8 6.5 1.5 -1.9 
51.1 48.9 6.5 1.3 -1.4 6.1 1.2 -1.4 I 
35.7 64.3 4.7 0.8 -0.8 4.4 0.8 -0.8 
12.3 87.0 1.3 0.2 -0.3 1.2 0.2 -0.3 
34.0 65.7 4.0 1.0 -1.1 3.6 0.9 -1.1 
46.6 53.4 5.8 1.5 -1.6 5.3 1.4 -1.7 
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The micro-simulation shows, on average, that the NBR of households in the whole 
country increases by 4.7 percent under Free Trade and 1.2 percent under Quota. 
It is negative or falls by -1.3 percent under Quota Monopolist. The differences are 
explained by the fact that rising rice prices both benefit net sellers of rice and, 
given the results of the CGE modelling, increase nominal wages and incomes. 12 
Quota Monopolist, or the status quo, once again, stands out as an inferior policy 
from the household's perspective, with households in all disaggregated categories 
invariably worse off. Under Quota, all households gain, with considerable variance 
in results compared to Free Trade, depending on region in particular. 
5.4.3.1 Distributional and welfare impacts: rural versus urban 
Differences between rural and urban households are profound under different trade 
scenarios. Figure 5.6 shows changes in the NBR across the lnexpc distribution for 
rural and urban households by scenario. Solid vertical lines are the 20th and 80th 
percentile of the distribution. 13 Although Free Trade dominates the other two 
scenarios across most of the distribution, for both rural and urban households, it 
shows especially enhanced gains in rural areas for the bulk of tpe population. In 
particular, in rural areas, the gain under Free Trade is substantially higher than 
that under Quota Monopolist across the entire lnexpc distribution, and also much 
higher than under Quota for all rural households, except for those in the lowest 2nd 
percentile. On average, the gain under Free Trade in rural Vietnam is 6.3 percent 
compared with 1.5 percent and -1. 7 percent, under Quota and Quota Monopolist. 
The gain under Free Trade is highest for the middle-expenditure households. For 
the very poor rural households, on the other hand, only the 0.12th and lower 
percentile are worse off under Free Trade. These poorest households often lack 
12Our results for Vietnam as a whole support aggregative and partial equilibrium findings 
in (Minot and Goletti , 1998) , where it is shown that trade liberalisation increases average real 
income, as well as findings in Vu and Glewwe (2011) and Phung and Waibel (2010), where it is 
argued that higher food prices increase average Vietnamese household welfare. 
13With kernel density estimation there is a genuine trade-off between avoiding bias and re-
ducing the variance of the estimate. In our sample, there is a large variance in the NBR at 
the top end of the lnexpc distribution. This is plausible since very rich households tend to have 
much more variety in consumption and ( to a lesser extent) production, especially among rural 
households. In any case, we are interested in households where rice production and/ or con-
sumption is important. For the richest two percent of households , rice consumption accounts 
for less than two percent of their household expenditure. These households are also less than 
two percent likely to be involved in rice production. Hence, to focus our attention and to avoid 
over-smoothing our estimates for households by increasing the bandwidth in the lower end of 
lnexpc, we exclude the richest two percent households from the sample in our kernel regression 
estimation of NBR on lnexpc . 
.. 
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working-labour, have sick people or many young children, and have no or little 
fertile land. 
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FIGURE 5.6: Change in Household Welfare: Rural versus Urban 
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= epanechnikov, degree = O; bandwidth=(0.27; 0.29; 0.2) and (0.4; 0.4; 0.37) for rural and 
urban under Free 'Irade, Quota and Quota Monopolist , respectively. Two percent richest 
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Urban households also gain the most under Free Trade, albeit on average only by 
0.8 percent. In Figure 5.6, all urban households are shown to do better under Free 
Trade than under Quota Monopolist and only 4 percent of poorest households are 
expected to do better under Quota than under Free Trade. With as much as 90 
percent of households as net rice buyers, the gain for urban households under Free 
Trade may come as a surprise. Indeed, our results differ from the literature in this 
regard, with previous findings on Vietnam and for other countries indicating that 
urban households as net rice buyers are generally worse off with increases in rice 
prices ( e.g. Minot and Goletti, 1998; Ivanic and Martin, 2008; Vu and Glewwe, 
2011; Phung and Waibel, 2010; Warr, 2008). While these results seem sensible, 
they often ignore the impact of changes in rice prices on wages and employment, 
due to the use of partial equilibrium modelling (Minot and Goletti , 1998; Ivanic 
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and Martin, 2008; Vu and Glewwe, 2011; Phung and Waibel, 2010) , or the lack of 
detailed household data in a general equilibrium framework (Warr, 2008, 2005). 
Combining both the bottom-up CGE results and the micro-simulations , our re-
sults suggest that urban dwellers can still gain, though slightly, with increases 
in the price of rice. This comes as a result of gains from higher wages ( fully or 
partially) offsetting the losses from more expensive rice and food. As seen from 
the CGE modelling results (Table 5.4), wages increase under Free Trade, bene-
fiting labour in both rural and urban areas. Changes in employment also tend 
to favour unskilled labour in many regions (Table 5.5). It must also be noted 
that the negative effects of increases in rice prices on consumption bundles has 
fallen in importance both rapidly and recently in Vietnam, thanks to substantial 
increases in the household living standards and changes in consumption shares. 
Indeed, shares of rice consumption in the household expenditure have reduced by 
half, from 17 and 33 percent in 1993 to 8 and 16 percent in 2006 for urban and 
rural households, respectively (Minot and Coletti, 1998; Vu and Glewwe, 2011). 
Granted, the very poorest, in both rural and urban areas, are harmed by increases 
in rice prices, but these are only a small fraction of the population. The large 
gains in rural areas for the bulk of the population more than offset these losses in 
any case. 
5.4.3.2 Distributional and welfare impacts: regional differences 
In this section, we focus on distributional impact of Free Trade only, since Free 
'Trade is (for the most part) the preferred policy scenario. Figure 5.7 compares 
the distributional impacts in the key rice producing regions, the RRD and the 
MRD, the richest industrial region, the SE, and the poorest region, the NW. Not 
surprisingly, the gain from export liberalisation is largest for the key rice exporting 
regions. On average, MRD households are expected to gain 12.5 percent. The 
gain for rural households in the MRD is especially impressive, ranging from 7 to 
16 percent , while their urban counterparts gain about 5 percent across the lnexpc 
distribution. While the gain for rural households is relatively obvious given MRD's 
position in rice production and export trade, the gain for urban dwellers in MRD 
is attributed to these households being involved in rice trading and transport 
activities , as well as the general increase in wages in this region. 
The gain in the second largest rice producing region, the RRD , alternatively, ex-
hibits a pro-poor pattern with the gain diminishing with living standard, especially 
Chapter 5. Regional Effects of Rice Export Policy on Households in Vietnam 135 
FIGURE 5.7: Change in Household Welfare: RRD, MRD, SE and NW under Free 
Trade 
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Two solid vertical lines are at the 20th and 80th percentiles of the lnexpc distribution. Kernel 
= epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth=(0.43; 0.27; 0.46; 0.3) and (0.27; 0.47; 0.56; 0.49) for 
rural and urban in RRD, MRD, SE and NW, respectively. Two percent richest households are 
excluded. 
for rural RRD households. This pattern is driven by the fact that the probability 
of being a rice farmer and a net rice seller falls as the living standard increases 
in rural RRD. Furthermore, given the low productivity of rice production in the 
RRD , compared to the MRD - due largely to fragmentation of rice farms or to 
the presence of small and non-contiguous plots (Kompas et al. , 2012) - better-
off rural households in this region tend to diversify their incomes away from rice 
production and agriculture in general. 
For urban RRD households, the gain from rising rice prices is particularly high for 
poor households and flattens-out among the middle and rich quintiles. There are 
two likely explanations for this phenomenon. First , although urbanisation is rapid 
throughout Vietnam, in this region a large number of administratively classified 
'urban' households are actually residing in semi-rural areas , with many households 
working small rice fields near the edges of urban centres. These households are 
more likely to be involved in rice production and thus benefit from higher prices. It 
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is also not unusual for urban households to have plots of rice land nearby. Second, 
the wage effect again matters. Poor urban households normally provide unskilled 
labour, which has a much higher wage (Table 5.4) and employment (Table 5.5) 
under Free Trade in the RRD. 
It is apparent from Figure 5. 7 that households from the SE are worse off, on 
average, while households from the poorest region, the NW, are slightly better off, 
regardless of whether they are rural or urban. These differences between the two 
regions can be explained by the differences in the likelihood of households being 
rice producers and sellers in each region. Not many SE households produce rice. 
On the contrary, the estimated probability density of NW households producing 
rice is very high, especially among the poorest. In addition, although many rice 
farmers cannot meet their own rice consumption demand, given the unsuitable 
terrain in this region, they also produce other staple foods such as maize and 
cassava. To this end, the loss from paying higher prices for rice may be offset by 
the gain from selling other food products - which, given our bottom-up CGE 
model results become more expensive when the price of rice increases. It is also 
the case that the NW is characterised by a good deal of subsistence agriculture 
(Pandey et al., 2006), and is thereby less likely to affected by world-price volatility. 
Figure 5.8 compares the second poorest region, the CH, with the NE, the NCC 
and the SCC. Households in the CH are clearly worse off, in comparison. This 
result is plausible given that the CH can only meet as much as 30 percent of its 
rice demand from local production, with its soil much more suitable for industrial 
crops such as coffee. On the other hand, the gain from trade liberalisation is 
prevalent throughout rural areas of all other regions , and highest in the NCC 
given its net seller position in rice production. The NE, the NCC and the SCC 
exhibit a similar pattern, with a gain from Free Trade that accrues mostly to rural 
households, reaching its peak around the 20th percentile in the lnexpc distribution. 
The gain for urban households in the NCC and the SCC also displays a pro-poor 
pattern, while it appears more uniformly spread in the NE. The similarity between 
the NCC and the SCC may be explained by similar economic and development 
characteristics between the two regions. Both are emerging regions with sea ports, 
supporting a number of international trading and service activities in urban areas. 
Urban NE, on the other hand, is relatively less developed, and thus the disparity 
in expenditures in urban areas is far less pronounced. 
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FIGURE 5.8: Change in Household Welfare: NE, NCC, SCC and CH under Free 
Trade 
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Two solid vertical lines are at the 20th and 80th percentiles of the lnexpc distribution. Kernel 
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5.5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyses Vietnam's rice export policy in the context of rising world 
rice prices. Bringing together insights from a bottom-up CGE model and a micro-
simulation on household data, we provide a clear analysis of Vietnam rice export 
policy at the aggregate and household level. Perhaps most importantly, we show 
that one of the key arguments for rice export controls or export bans in the face 
of rising prices - the desire to protect the poor from welfare losses due to higher 
rice prices - does not hold in Vietnam. 
On the surface, the poor appear to be highly vulnerable to rice price increases. 
The share of rice in consumption bundles is higher the poorer the household, and 
especially so in rural areas where most of the poor reside. Ur ban households are 
also not likely to be rice producers and thus cannot directly benefit from higher 
prices for rice. 
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Nevertheless, our results show that a free trade export policy largely benefits the 
poor in Vietnam, for both rural and urban households. This is especially the 
case for rural households, where poverty is most pervasive in Vietnam, and for 
the bulk of the rural distribution by expenditure. There are two clear reasons for 
this. First, many of the poor are net sellers of rice in Vietnam and particularly 
in rural areas. Second, even for those households who are not net sellers of rice, 
our bottom-up CGE modelling results show increases in wages in all regions, with 
the price of rice, along with increases in unskilled employment in both the major 
rice growing regions, the MRD and the RRD. These wage and employment effects 
indicate that a free trade policy is also preferred for urban households. This is a 
perhaps new and surprising result, which depends critically on the effects of rising 
rice prices on wages, employment and the prices of non-food commodities, all of 
which cannot be captured without the general equilibrium framework. Granted, 
our bottom-up CGE model has short-run features, but the transitional gains and 
the resulting poverty reduction in rural areas that accrue from selling rice to the 
rest of the world at very high prices would undoubtedly more than compensate 
any losses (in particular) to very poor urban households over a longer horizon. 
That said, we have also shown considerable and variable region9--l effects to differ-
ing export polices, including that from free trade. The only trade scenario that 
generates uniformly worst-case outcomes is the policy that mimics the status quo 
in Vietnam, one with export controls and regionally fragmented and monopoly-
like influence over rice prices and the rice market. A third policy scenario, a quota 
policy designed to keep domestic rice prices low, is preferable to free trade but only 
for the lowest 2nd percentile of the rural expenditure distribution. For those very 
poor, who usually do not grow rice or provide substantial labour services, direct 
support from the government using a free trade policy, such as that provided by 
the 'Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Progra1n' in Vietnam, is essential. 
.. 
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5.6 Appendices 
5.6.1 Regions and provinces in Vietnam 
Region 
Red River Delta 
Provinces 
Ha N oi, Hai Phong, Vinh Phuc, Ha Tay, Bae Ninh, Hai Duong, 
Hung Yen, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh 
North East Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Lao Cai, Bae Can, Lang Son, Tuyen Quang, 
Yen Bai, Thai Nguyen, Phu Tho, Bae Giang, Quang Ninh 
North West Lai Chau, Dien Bien, Son La, Hoa Binh 
North Central Coast Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang 'Iri, 
Thua Thien Hue 
South Central Coast 
Central Highlands 
South East 
Da Nang, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, 
Khanh Hoa 
Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dae Lak, Dae Nong, Lam Dong 
Ho Chi Minh City, Ninh Thuan, Binh Phuoc, Tay Ninh, 
Binh Duong, Dong N ai , Binh Thuan, Ba Ri_a - Vung Tau 
Mekong River Delta Long An, Dong Thap, An Giang, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, 
Ben 'Ire, Kien Giang, Can Tho, Hau Giang, Tra Vinh, 
Soc Trang, Bae Lieu, Ca Mau 
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5.6.2 Own price elasticities of demand 
Code Industry Demand Sources 
Elasticity 
1 Paddya 
2 Other cropsb 
-0.98 Nguyen et al. ( 2009) 
3 Livestock & Poultryc -1.19 Nguyen et al. (2009) 
4 Forestrya 
5 Fish Farminga 
6 Fishery 
-1.40 Dey (2000) 
7 Oil & gas 
-0.08 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) 
8 Mininga 
9 Processed seafood -1.05 Nguyen et al. ( 2009) 
10 Processed Rice -0.41 Nguyen et al. (2009) 
11 Other Agricultural -0.42 UNCTAD (2007) 
Processingd 
12 Textiles -0.69 Han and Wahl (1998) 
13 Paper 
-0.47 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) 
14 Wood 
-0.35 Adams and Haynes (1980) 
15 Rubber 
-0.25 UNCTAD (2007) 
16 Non-Metallic Mineral -0.47 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) 
Products 
17 Transport Equipment -1.17 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) 
18 Metal Productsa 
19 Other Manufacturing -0.47 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) 
20 Electricity & Water -0.53 Cheesman et al. ( 2008) 
21 Construction 
-0.21 Han and Wahl (1998) 
22 'n·ansport (Margin) -1.15 Falvey and Gemmell ( 1996) 
23 Communication -1.66 Falvey and Gemmell (1996) 
24 Trade (Margin)a 
25 Financial services -0.74 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) 
26 Public Administration -1.20 Falvey and Gemmell (1996) 
27 Hotels & Restaurants -1.06 Falvey and Gemmell (1996) 
28 Other Services 
-0.74 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) 
a No consumption 
b Average of demand elasticity of vegetables, maize , roots, proc.starch, tofu and fruits 
c Average of demand elasticity of pork, beef, chicken, other poultry, other meat and egg 
d Average of demand elasticity of milk, butter, cheese, refined sugar , processed coffee, 
coca, tobacco , vegetable oil and tea 
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5.6.3 Own price elasticities of supply 
Code Industry Supply Elasticity Sources 
1 Paddya 0.057 Khiem and Pingali (1995) 
2 Other cropsb 0.019 Khiem and Pingali (1995) 
3 Livestock & Poultryc 0.205 UNCTAD (2007) 
4 Forestry 0.89 Adams and Haynes ( 1980) 
5 Fish Farming 0.76 Campbell (1998) 
6 Fishery 0.76 Campbell (1998) 
7 Oil & gasd 
8 Mininge 0.10 Evers et al. (2008) 
9 Processed seafood d 
10 Processed Ricea 0.057 Khiem and Pingali (1995) 
11 Other Agricultural 0.25 UNCTAD (2007) 
Processing! 
12 Textiles 2.50 Lim (2006) 
13 Paper 5.59 Shea (1993) 
14 Wood 1.06 Shea (1993) 
15 Rubber 0.25 UNCTAD (2007) 
16 Non-Metallic Mineral 5.49 Shea (1993) 
Products 
17 Transport Equipmentd 
18 Metal Products 5.49 Shea (1993) 
19 Other Manufacturing 5.49 Shea (1993r-
20 Electricity & Water 
21 Construction 1.20 DiPasquale (1999) 
22 Transport (Margin)e 0.10 Evers et al. (2008) 
23 Communication d 
24 Trade (Margin)e 0.10 Evers et al. (2008) 
25 Financial services 0.516 Hancock (1985) 
26 Public Administrationd 
27 Hotels & Restaurants 1.976 Fujii et al. (1985) 
28 Other Services e 0.10 Evers et al. ( 2008) 
a Average of supply elasticities for rice in Vietnams South and North 
b Average of supply elasticities for maize , cassava and sweet potato, for Vietnams South and 
North 
c Average of supply elasticities for livestock, bovine meat , pig meat and poultry 
d No income 
e Supply elasticity of labour 
f Average of supply elasticities for milk, butter, cheese, refined sugar, processed coffee, 
coca, tobacco, vegetable oil and tea 
~ 
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5.6.4 Regional Heterogeneity in Rice Production and Sales 
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Two solid vertical lines are at the 20th and 80th percentiles of the lnpcexp distribution. Kernel 
= epanechnikov; degree = O; banwidth=(0.45 , 0.4) ; (0.24, 0.25); (0.24, 0.24) and (0. 77, 0.35) 
for proportion producing and selling in CH, NCC , NE, and SCC, respectively. 
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